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This thesis develops the theory of failure prediction for UK
oprotruction canpardes. The research aims were directed bwards an
evaluation of WM:MI methods namely:
1. Multivariate discriminant analysis: This technique is widely
employed in the commercial sector with such of the work
concentrated on failed and healthy companies. Altman [8], Deakin
[25], Taffler [11]. The different characteristics of two or more
groups are analysed to create a model that best differentiates
between them. The end result transforms these characteristics into
a single variable, normally called a Z-score.
This method was particularly well demnstrated In this thesis by
the successful prediction of failure of Rush and TOmkins plc three
years before the recent announcement.
Secondly the multiple regression second version was
enthusiastically egplced by the Londcn Baaxgh of Camden for
vetting contractarscntender lists.
Generally the first model performed well on the data for quoted
and unquoted ozmpanies, while the second as better for unquoted
ccmpanies, particularly thcee private companiesdealingudth LBC.
2. Traditional financial ratios: The use of financial ratios to
predict failure is not new, indeed Merwin [2] analysed 6 years
trends of ratios for a number of failed and nal-failed companies
and found that three ratios were particularly sensitive predie1ui	 b
of failure. Further work was later reported by Beaver [3] and
Pinches [6].
In this study, 31 financial ratios were calculated and
statistically examined as potential indicators. Three were found
to be important at the following limits:
-	 current assets/current liabilities 1.0
-	 net assets/current liabilities 1.0
-	 pre-tax profit/payable interest 2.0
Ratios alone, hadeve.r, were not sufficiently reliable to predict
failure and the research concluded that it was essential to use at
least two different methods before firm indicaticns of failure of
a suspect company can be substantiated.
3. The A-score method: The concept behind the A-soore is based on
the belief that if a company is in financial difficulty the reason
generally relates to inadequate management ability and errors
perpetrated earlier, the A-score is designed to address this
aspect of failure prediction e.g. Argenti [7].
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A questionnaire was devised and included 17 questions related to
failure for both an "at risk" group classified as vulnerable, i.e.
those scoring negatively by the Z-score model and a positively scoring
"solvent" group.
The existence of managerial factors related to failure was
investigated in the questionnaire using a multiple choice method. Both
groups proved adequate for ccmparison purposes, and were therefore
included in the A-score model.
The A-score for a company is obtained by adding the weight of all
factors and errors together, and a cut-off value determined. The model
was statistically verified by the t-test method at 1% significant
level and further examined by the Willcoxon (Rank Sum) tests null
hypothesis rejected at 5% level of significance.
An attempt was also made to relate A-score and Z-score values,
unfortunately statistical analysis indicated only 67.7%
intercorrelation between A-score and Z-score i.e. not very strong.
However, the Z-score value of zero corresponded to an A-score cut-off
value of about 50, these being critical values in both modes.
Finally, trend analysis was shown to be a suitable extra check in
objective evaluation of company performance, and an improved method of
systematically appraising contractors was produced. However, the
developed models should only be used as part of an overall asse4mment
of company stability. Any predictions should be interpreted with
caution as the models require further testing on a broader range of
companies. It is also important to appreciate that the use of such
models to exclude ocmpanies from tender lists could accelerate or even
cause failure.
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCITICti
1.1 Introducticn
1.2 Objectives
1.3 Methodology
1.4 Achievements
1.5 Organisa-tion of -the 'thesis
CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL narRoDucrioN
1.1 INTRoDucrioN
The number of construction company liquidations has been, perhaps
surprisingly higher in recent years than in the low output years of
1977 and 1982. This could indicate that many which started up in the
boom years have since failed due to inadequate finance and managerial
skills.
Figure 1 plots the number of insolvencies in construction companies in
England and Wales. It can be seen that during the period 1979-1985 an
increase of insolvencies followed by a rapid decrease in 1985 probably
starting with the boom in construction in 1986.
The fall in insolwncies in 1987 corresponds with the increase in
output in 1987. A fall in overall demand always seems to be
accompanied by a rise of insolvencies and vice versa.
It is clear that the number of firms becoming insolvent between the
period of 1983-1986 was nearly twice as much as before.
Although the number of insolvencies went up however, there was a large
entry of firms into the construction industry and many may not have
possessed all the attributes required to ensure success.
There are also, fairly high numbers of insolvencies with compulsory
and voluntary liquidations among construction companies accounting for
around 13% of all liquidations.
1
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FIGURE 1 . 1 : THE TREND OF INSOLVENCIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY
2
Activity 1982 1987 % Increase
1 General builders 57565 68947 19.8
2 Building and Civil
Engineering Contractors 3242 3917 20.8
3 Civil Engineers 2357 2946 25.0
4 Plumbers 13286 15207 14.5
5 Carpenters & Joiners 9341 11741 25.7
6 Painters 14267 14898 4.9
7 Roofers 4469 6145 37.5
8 Plasterers 3590 4137 15.2
9 Glaziers 3036 4871 60.4
10 Demolition Contractors 523 634 21.5
11 Scaffolding Specialists 623 1081 73.5
12 Reinforced CbrIcrete
Specialists 435 597 37.2
13 Heating & Ventilation
Engineers 7469 8751 17.2
14 Electrical Contractors 13176 16402 24.5
15 Asphalt & Tar Spreaders
Plant Hires 3260 3819 17.11
16 Flooring Contractors 1272 1495 17.5
17 Construction Engineers 1154 1756 52.2
18 Insulating Specialists 1076 1379 28.0
19 Floor & Wall Tilling 963 1259 30.7
20 Miscellaneous 1866 3189 70.9
Total 144395 175095 21.3
TABLE 1.1: NUMBER OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS BY ACTIVITY
(Source: House and Construction Statistics (keynote))
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Table 1.1 shows the number of private contractors by activity for the
years 1982 and 1987, in which 45% are single employee operations.
The rate of appearance and disappearance of small building firms in
particular is high, with about 3000 new VAT registrations and roughly
the same number of de-registraticns each year. Therefore in this
research it was decided to concentrate on general builders, building
and civil engineering contractors or civil engineers who employ more
than fifty employees medium-size to large companies and are also
recorded in CoapanyFtmse. The companies are classified by numbers of
employees, for example, small and medium cornputUm;, employinglessthan
and 250 employees respectively, and over 250 for large canpanies [1].
Construction has always been a high risk business and clearly there is
a need for an early warning system of bankruptcy. Furthermore
potential company failures should be recognised at the earliest
possible opportunity in order to minimise the costs to the pUlaic,
especially as the majority of Government contracts are awarded to
firms that appear on selected tendering lists. Also since under the
Local Government Act 1988 reasons for rejecting potential contractors
in ompetitive tendering need to be substantiated as necessary to set
standard financial appraisal requirements.
In this context a London wide survey (see Appendix D) revealed that
while the majority of authorities (24 out of 25) examine firm's
financial accounts only eleven authorities prefer to see accounts for
the last three years, a further eleven prefer to see the last two
years and the remaining two base their appraisal on the most recent
years results alone.
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Twenty authorities cut of twenty five use ratio analysis to assess the
financial appraisal which relies heavily upon an assessment of
liquidity. Of the twenty authorities using ratios six use Z - Score
analysis (mainly Altmans Z-Score developed in 1968 in the USA) to
assess the solvency of potential contractors.
Furthermore, twenty two of the twenty five authorities impose some
form of limit on the value of contracts which may be awarded.
In conclusion, the objectives behind the use of financial limits seem
to be:
- Firms should not be encouraged to overtrade and consequent
receivership.
- Firms should not be encouraged to become over-reliant on
Cbuncil business.
- The council Should not allow firms to become over-dependent upon a
few contracts.
- There should be as wide a choice of firms as possible to ensure
tenders are competitive and Councils get value for ncney.
- The use of financial limits based upon standard criteria ensure
that applicants are treated fairly.
Obviously it would not be practicable under current circumstances to
adopt a limit on the value of work, because of the impossibility of
enforcement and mcnitoring adherence to the limits.
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Therefore, some other methods are needed which will give a
quantitative indication of the solvency of crinpimlies.
This research work successfully developed several Z-Score models that
were able to classify companies into solvent and insolvent groups, by
giving each company a score related to its degree of solvency.
Until now, no other construction based systern has beml pTcamored in the
UK and the motivation for the development of a separate construction
based system is that, in the UK, the characteristics of such firms
differ from those of manufacturing concerns. The main difference being
that civil engineering and construction companies practices are
dominated by the contracting firm, with a contractor directly
responsible to the client. The hypothesis of the thesis to prove that
bankruptcy prediction for construction companies is both empirically
feasible and theoretically explainable was largely achieved.
1 . 2 OBJECTIVES
1. To assist Local Authorities in the selection of an approved list
of contractors for competitive tendering.
2. To provide bankers, lenders and investors with an early warning
system of financial difficulty for construcbduicrucenies.
3. To minimise the danger of corporate failure of companies making
take-over bids of other companies possessing potential failure
characteristics.
4. To develop a model able to predict the failure of ompanies in
the constrilation industry on a financial basis.
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5. To develop a model that is able to predict the failure of
companies in the construction industry on a non-financial basis.
6. To investigate reasons for failure by using different methods of
prediction before coming to a conclusion.
7. To develop a practical system that is able to classify companies
into solvent and insolvent groups.
1.2.1 SeloonciaryObjEmrtives
1. To review the econcmdc situation of the construction inalstry
during the period of project.
2. To reviewtte reasons for failure by case study method.
3. To review the previous studies of predicting failure in the
construction industry and other sectors.
4. TO develop a computer package for the calculation of financial
ratios.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
The method which attempts to achieve the thesis objectives was made
possible by using a combination of two techniques, "Financial Ratio
Analysis" and a statistical technique known as "Multivariate
Discriminant Analysis". The object being to distinguish between two
groups, namely "Solvent" and "Insolvent" firms by selecting from a
collection of "discriminating variables" measures which characterise
the expected differences.
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The "discriminating variables" used to form the model are traditional
financial ratios, calculated from The Construction Companies published
balance sheets.
Because of complexities of calculation involvinglmany different ratios
for a large number of companies it was impractical to achieve this
manually, because of time restrictions and precision of calculations.
Therefore, a computer program "ADNAN.FOR" was developed for the
purpose. Questionnaires concerning companies and interviews of
individuals were also incorporated. New data revisions were
continuously made to collection methods and analysis techniques, also
a second regression analysis model was developed and tested, and
ulthriately adopted in the selection of healthy contractors by London
Borough of Camden.
Further analysis was made of companies classified as potential
failures but not failing in the Short term and the reasons for their
survival considered.
A new tool "A-SCORES" was developed based on non-financial features
which identifies the items of failure extracted from case studies and
company literature.
Questionnaires were also designed to achieve this goal followed by an
evaluation of management deficiencies weighted for importance.
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Finally, a linkage between Z-Scores and traditional ratios with A-
Scores was developed to provide a practical system that is able to
predict the failure of companies in the constrmtian industry. In
conclusion the research work proved how the developed system offers a
contribution to failure prediction in the construction industry.
1.4 ACHIEVEMENIS
The research successfully achieved the following:
1. Failure prediction based on financial features using financial
ratios and Z-Scores as indicators of approadhing failure.
2. Failure prediction based on non-financial features which indicate
failure long before the signs of financial difficulties.
3. Identification of the factors influencing failure in construction
companies.
4. Identification of the mistakes companies made which may lead to
failure.
Finally, a significant adhievement was that the model was adopted by
London Borough Of Camden as an aid in the selection of healthy
contractors.
To support this research existing models of predicting failure were
reviewed and criticised. Also case studies of failed major
construction companies were investigated and the reasons ascertained.
Furthermore, the research successfully developed a new system to aid
Local Authorities in vetting construction companies in tender lists.
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1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS
Figure 2 illustrates the various steps taken in this research to
achieve the stated objectives. These steps are presented in eleven
chapters which are briefly described as a guide to the thesis.
Guide to The Thesis
Chapter 2: Presents a detailed literature ravimrof previous studies
relating to models for predicting the failure of a
company. Methods for prediction of bankruptcy are also
discussed.
ahapter3: This chapter provides the background knowledge of
"Multivariate Discriminant Analysis" and how the
technique can be utilised to classify companies into
"S61Ammt" and "Insolvent" groups.
Chapter 4: Presents the data collection and company groups used to
establish the models including the data collected for
testing the models.
Chapter 5: Presents a full description of the models together with
the constituent variables, relationships between
variables and contribution of each variable to the model,
also included are the statistical techniques and computer
packages used.
Chapter 6: Presents the resultant models including prior probability
and misclassification estimation method, also cut-off
value for the models are discussed.
1 0
Chapter 7: Presents the results from the models which support the
"prediction" power of the technique and includes Z-
Scores, trends and financial ratios as tools for
predicting
Mwter 8: Presents an attempt to validate the "NOPO technique and
ascertain the capabilities of the model regarding
discrimination between "solvent" and "insolvent"
companies. Also validation of the regression model at
London Borough of Camden is included. Finally validaticn
of financial ratios as a tool of predicting failure is
inCluded.
Chapter 9: Presents non-financial features of failure and what they
might indicate, management characteristics, management
mistakes contributing to failure and not covered by any
financial tool such as Z-Scores or financial ratios are
illustrated, furthermore, a questicnnaire was designed to
identify the managerial factors related to failure.
Chapter 10: Presents a full description of the A-Scores model and
method of scoring as a tool of predicting failure, the
results are also described. Finally, relationships
between the A-Scores and the Z-Scores are discussed.
Chapter 11: Presents conclusions drawn from the research and how the
developed system offers a contribution to the
construction industry as an early warning system of
failure and gives advice on corrective action to avoid
failure. Also these findings are included altogether
with recommendations for Implementation in vetting
construction companies for tender lists.
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The Appendices contain graphical presentations of the Z-Scores and
tables of results obtained from indiviclial companies.
Anonual for use with the computer package ADNAN.FOR and an example of
the programme application are included.
A manual for use with statistical computer package and sample of the
output are also included.
A sample of the questionnaire and basic statistical tests is also
contained in the appendices.
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Chapter 4
- Data collection.
- Data groups •
Chapter 8
Developing a link between
the Z-scores and critical
financial ratios.
Chapter 1 	
objectives
Chapter 2
- Review-of:previous- researeb work in
failure prediction.
- Literature review on the methods used to
predict failure in construction industry.
Chapter 3
- . Methods used to predict company failure
- The theory behind multiveriate discriminant
enalysic.
Chapter 5
Computer analysis
Chapter 6
Resultant discriminant and
regression models.
Chapter 8
- Validation of discriminant and regression
models on independent data extracted from
quoted companies.
- Validation of regression model at London
Borough of Camden.
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Chapter 9
- Managerial fectors . relpting to
companya failure in construction industry
- Literature review and came studies en
management deficiency and mistakes leading
to company failure.
- Companies survey.
Chapter 9
Managerial factors which can not predict
failure by 2-scores and financial ratios.
Chapter 7
Results obtained from data
used to develop the model
Chapter 7
Developing the financial
ratios as a tool for predicting
company failure.
H
Chapter 8
Validation of financial
ratios as a tool for predicting
company failure
Chapter 10
Weighing the factors relating to failure
according to importance in developing an A-score
Chapter 10
Developing a link between A•- scores and
Z- scores •
Chapter 11
Developing a system to link
Z-scorea and financial ratios
with k•
 scores.
- Conclusions and recommendation
for implementing the system in
vetting construction companies
in tender list.
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FIGURE 1.2: THESIS LAYOUT DIAGRAM
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CHAPI'ER 2 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES
2.1 General Introduction
2.2 The Traditional Financial Ratios
2.3 The Z-Score
2.4 Other Methods of Failure Prediction
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
2.1	 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Experience suggests that failure of a ocmpemy may be defined as its
having entered into receivership or voluntary or compulsory
liquidation or having received goverment assistance. Previcus studies
proved that bankruptcy prediction is both empirically feasible and
theoretically explainable, with much of a financial analyst's time
spent intuitively making judgements, assessing likelihoods,
forecastingetc.
2.1.1 Intratucticnto Failure Predicticn
This chapter reviews the devekprent of an operaticnal method which
has been used for the identification of companies in danger of
failure.
Section 2.2 begins with the traditional financial ratios as a tool to
predict company failure. Section 2.3 includes all the Z-score models.
Section 2.4 deals with other methods of failure prediction. The final
section briefly discusses the above methods, their weaknesses and
advantages and utility.
2.2	 THE TRADITIONAL FINANCIAL RATIOS
2.2.1 Introduction
The use of financial ratios to predict failure is not new. Ratios were
first used in the USA in the late 1920s.
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In 1942 Merwin [2] also in the USA, analysed six years trends of
ratios of a number of failed and non-failed companies. He found that
three ratios were particularly sensitive prediclua	  of failure.
Other work was later carried out an the same subject by Beaver [3,4,5]
and Pinches [6].
Finally, John Argenti [7] compared the financial ratios of two
companies which enjoyed approximately the same turnover and employed a
similar volume of capital, one of them considered successful and the
other a troubled one. He concluded that ratios will not on their own,
infallibly predict failure, his study is discussed in more detail in
Section 2.2.4 because it relates to British industry and is considered
the latest study in this field.
2.2.2 Merwin's Study
Merwin defined failure of a compapy "as those that had ceased filing
tax returns". This definition Includes not only bankrupt or
economically unsuccessful firms but also those which had ceased
operations voluntarily-or charged their form of business organisation.
Merwin analysed a large number of financial ratios calculated fromthe
financial data of a large sample of small corporations in five
manufacturing industries [2]. The sample Included continuing and
discontinuing companies during the period 1926-1936 in the USA.
The following ratios were dhown to be good discriminators between
failed and non-failed companies are:
15
1. Current ratio: i.e. a ratio of current assets to current
liabilities.
2. Net assets/total liabilities.
3. Working capital/total assets.
By omparing the industry mean ratios, Merwin found that the current
ratios of the discontinued firms were lower than those of the
continuing firms and moreover were shown to have declined three to
fiveyearsprior to cessation of business.
Empirical studies in the USA have subsequently reinforced the view
that the current ratio is a significant indicator of financial
difficulties.
Merwin also highlighted higher debt in the failed companies. Using the
ratio of net asset to debt, he found that whereas cray 26 percent of
continuing firms had a ratio less than unity, in 65 percent of failed
ones debt was greater than unity.
In over 70 percent of the failed firms the ratio of net assets to debt
declined whilst in the continuing companies it remained fairly stable.
Also working capital/total assets ratios showed the ratio in failed
firms, a year prior to bankruptcy was negative whilst in continuing
firms positive.
2.2.3 Beaver Study
Beaver defined failure of a company "as those defaulting on interest
payments, overdrawing their bank accounts or declaring bankruptcy".
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Beaver [3] analysed the ratios of 79 failed US firms in the period
1954-1964 and a corresponding number of non-failed firms.
The following ratios show there to be good discriminators between
failed and non-failed companies:
1. Total liability/total assets (leverage ratio)
2. Net profit/total assets (profitability ratio)
3. Cash flow/total debt (liquidity ratio).
The mean of the total debt/total assets ratio of the continuing
companies was 0.79 compared to 0.37 in the failed firms, one year
before failure. Also his study pointed to a sharp increase in the mean
of the debt/total assets ratio of failed companies over the five years
to failure. During the same period the means of the ratio remained
unchanged in the continuing firms.
Also, in Beaver's study, the low net profit/total assets ratio proved
to be one of the three major characteristics of failed firms. The
mean of this ratio in the failed companies was substantially lower
than that of the continuing firms period to failure.
Cash flow/total debt ratio also Showed that the mean of the ratio in
the failed firms a year prior to bankruptcy was negative (less than -
0.15), whereas In the continuing firms it was +0.45.
2.2.4 John Argenti Study
John Argenti [7] analysed the main financial ratios as performance
ratios as follows:
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1. The Acid Test Ratio on the Quick Ratio 
Quick assets/current liabilities: this is considered the "ultimate
test" by most financial specialists because it shows whether the
company has sufficient cash to meet its inm9diate liabilities. Quick
assets is defined as only current assetsndrus stock.
Current liabilities is any short-term liability including creditors
and provisions, taxation dividends and overdraft. This ratio is
considered to be one of the most important single failure prediction
tools. Finance specialists traditionally like to see this ratio at or
above 1.
2. Current Ratio
current assets
current liability
This is the twin brother of the quick ratio but is a little stringent,
a little less 'quick'. The only difference is that in this one stock,
or inventory are included in current assets definition. Nevertheless
the current ratio is much favoured. Financial specialists
traditionally like to see the current ratio at 2 to 1.
3. Capital Gearing 'Leverage' Debt/Equity
Debt includes long-termdebt and short term. This definition includes
all debt on which interest is payable, i.e. debt means total
borrowings. The ratio of 1 to 1 is high by British standards.
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4. Income Gearing or "Interest Cover" Ratio
Profit before tax and interest
Interest
This is the amount of interest the company is committed to pay on its
long- and short-term loans, as a ratio of its pre-tax profits. A
company opuld quite happily carry cn immense debts so long as:
a) its profits were high
b) interest rates were low.
Results show that most companies with a ratio of 5 to 1 are in a
comfortable situation.
5. Stock Turnover Ratio = Sales/Stocks 
or
Stocks x 52
Sales
This ratio measures how skilfully the ccmparyis controlling its stock
(which includes inventory, work in progress etc) in relation to
turnover. Conversely rising stocks and decrease of turnover leads to
a tightening cash flow position.
(Argenti considers the numerator the cost of sale instead of turnover,
and very often this ratio is expressed In weeks - i.e. the nuMber of
weeks stocks at the current rate of turnover).
It might be dangercus if the ratio falls i.e. turnover falls and
stocks rise, but it can also be dangerous if it rises under certain
conditicns. If turnover rises much faster than stocks this could
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indicate a condition known as "overtrading" where turnover expands but
the company does not have the resources available to finance the
expansion and runs out of cash.
6. Debtors Ratio or "Collection Period" 
Sales/Debtors or Debtors x 52
Sales
Most finance specialists like to see a collection period well below 6
or 7 weeks would be exceptionally good; 8 or 9 is common. Nbre than
10 is beginning to lock lax. Once again it depends on the nature of
the business.
7. Return on Capital 
Profits before interest and tax
Capital employed
Earnings 
Shareholder
These are most important ratios as measuring profitability, both of
which indicate the overall return earned an all the capital employed
including loans as well as equity. (Return on equity or shareholders
capital). Capital employed is taken as the average capital employed in
the year, return on capital, however measured is obviously the prime
criterion by which any company's performance should be judged. No
company can however continue in existence for long unless the return
on the capital it employs exceeds the cost of borrowing.
or
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8. Profit Margin Ratio
Profit and Loss
Sales
The version proposed here is probably the simplest and widest because
it compares trading profit and sales turnover.
An overall profit margin of 10 percent on sales turnover is good by
most standards today. This ratio should be compared with the average
of similar sectors.
Argenti concluded that a profit margin of 1 percent will almost always
indicate trouble, however, some companies deliberately operate a high-
volume, low-margin strategy and thrive for years on margins as low as
a few percent.
Falling margins do not always spell approaching doom and could merely
reflect a change in strategy, or the maturing of an industry (margins
normally fall as an industry matures) or simply that the company is
growing. Thus, while there is no fixed norm for this ratio, it is
possible to come to a rational and useful conclusion for any given
company in a given industry.
9. Assets Turnover Ratio
Sales 
Capital employed
The aim is to determine how effectively the company's assets are being
employed. Argenti concluded that a company with expensive capital
assets (either fixed or working) lying unused may be heading into
danger.
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2.2.5 Summary and Conclusions on Traditional Financial Ratios as
Predictive Tools of Failure
The table below gives the results of the financial ratios used as
discriminators between failed and non-failed companies.
Researcher and Year of Publication rwin Beaver JohnArgenti
1942 1968 1983
Country Studied USA USA GB
No of ccmpanies studied 200 79 2
NO of ratios tested Not known 30 Not knaan
The ratios
A. Liquidity Ratios:
1. The quick ratio; quick
asset/current liability
2. CUrrent ratio current
asset/current liability
3. Cash flow/total debt
B. Gearing Ratios:
1.Capital gearing: debt
equity
2. Income gearing: EBIT/INT
3. Net assets/total liability
4. Total liabilities/total
assets
C. Working Capital Ratios:
1. Sales/stocks
2. Debtors/sales x 52 weeks
3. Working capital/total
assets
D. Profitability Ratios:
1. Profit ratio: Ebit/capital
employed
2. Profit margin: profit/sale
3. Asset turnover ratio:
Sale/capital employed
4. Net profit/total assets
TUTAL DISCRIMINATOR RATIOS:	 3	 3	 9
TABLE 2.1: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES OF TRADITIONAL
RATIOS AS PREDICTIVE TOOLS OF FAILURE
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It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the risk involved in an
individual  company from a study of the financial ratios.
It is not sufficient for the analyst to know the failed firm had lower
ratios prior to bankruptcy, irrespective of whether this knowledge is
the result of multivariate analysis. A firm may fail as a result of
declining profits even if five years previously it had reported a
relatively high profitability. Similarly a firm suffering temporary
losses or low profits at a certain time may subsequently improve its
records as a result of new investment, and the previous studies
ccmmonly conclude that:
1. One can be misled by relying on only one or two ratios.
2. One can be misled by comparing the same ratios between companies
even in the same industry.
3. Using a small portfolio of key ratios may reflect the change in a
company's financial strength from one year to another.
Finally, predicting failure by ratio methods is mainly performed on
the basis of the dichotomous classification technique whereby the
firms are arbitrarily divided into two groups and arranged (for each
ratio) in ascending order. An 'optimal cut-off point' is chosen
through trial and error as the demarcation line for failing, i.e. any
firm below it being categorised as a failed firm. The results are then
compared with actual data to find the percentage of incorrect
predictions. Often many trials are repeated before the optimal cut-off
point is reached. This test is criticised because it decides the cut-
off point after looking at the actual status of the firms whereas in a
real situation the user of financial ratios has to make decisions
without access to this information and of course the set of firms is
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different from that used in the original sample to decide the cut-off
point. Thus predictions are always being made on a set of firms, other
than the set from which the cut-off point was derived.
The percentage error is calculated between the predicted status,
failed or non-failed, and the actual status. The ratio with the
smallest percentage of misclassification is considered the best
predictor of failure. Therefore, the ratio with the smallest error of
misclassification is considered to be the best. In contrast, the MDA
method does not suffer such a weakness, hence its interest to
analysts.
2.3	 Z-SCORE
2.3.1 Introdbction
It was shown in the previous section that the analysis of failed firms
based on a consideration of single ratios may present a confused and
unreliable indicator of financial difficulties.
The Z-score overcomes these difficulties. A company's Z-score is
calculated by adding together a number of ratios, each ratio having
been weighted according to its usefulness. Because the Z-score canes
out as one single figure, it is possible to set one simple pass mark
above which a company-may be oonsidEmed safe, but below which it must
be considered at risk of failure.
As the likely most appropriate statistical technique for Z-score
Altman in 1968 chose multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) using
financial ratios for failure prediction.
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A large number of Z-score models now exist and although they all
follow the concepts of the original one devised by Altman, they are
all different.
It is not yet possible to estimate how accurately and how far ahead
each of these models can be expected to predict failure. HOMBIAar,
there is a wide acceptance that the Z-score represents an important
ipnlovat:km, one that will surely play an increasingly useful role in
failure prediction.
Because of the weakness of the financial ratios method described
earlier, it is strongly recanmended that in addition to examining the
trends of the traditional ratios for any suspect canpany, the observer
should also calculate the carcany's Z-scores for the past few years.
The calculations are simple to make and the result will either canfirm
the story told by the financial ratios or it will not.
In either case an extra dimension will have been added to the
observer's knowledge. The various models so far developed are now
described leadirgto the latest work described in this thesis.
Section 2.3.2 begins with Altman's Z-score.
Section 2.3.3 includes a brief description of Taffler's model.
Section 2.3.4 covers the Mason and Harris' model.
Section 2.3.5 deals with the Castagra and Matolawinadel.
Section 2.3.6 includes Van Frederikstust model.
The final section briefly discusses the above models and draws
conclusions.
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2.3.2 Aatman's Z-scare
TWo samples of sixty-six US ocurpanies were chosen, half being failed
firms during the period 1946-1965, the non-bankruptcy firms were
chosen carefully on a stratified randanbasis [8] to match the failed
ones.
All the non-bankrupt companies were still operating in 1966 and had
assets between $1 and $25 million which corresponded to the size of
the failed companies. This range of size eliminated the giant firms,
as these rarely fail, and small firms for which data are usually not
available. Twenty-two ratios were considered represented by liquidity,
profitability, leverage, solvency and performance ratios.
Five variables were selected as providing the best combination of
ratios for the prediction of bankruptcy and the final discriminant
function is as follows:
Z = 1.2 X'
 + 1.4 X2
 + 3.3 X3
 + 0.6 X4 + 1.0 X5
Working capital Xi -
-	 Total assets
3c2 _ Retained earnings
Total assets
„Profit before Interest and tax
- 	
Total assets
Market capitalisationXA
a*	 Book value of debts
Sale XR -
Motel assets
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As can be seen Altman's equation consists of five terms, each of which
is a financial ratio and each ratio is given a weighting. Professor
Altman developed a computer progranme which determined that it was
this set of ratios with just these weightings, that test discriminated
between failed and non-failed companies over quite a range of size and
industry in the USA but not for retail, banks or railroads.
The definitions of financial terms are as follows:
Working capital	 = current assets less current liabilities.
Total assets	 = fixed assets + investments + current assets
= equity + loan + current liabilities.
Retained earnings 	 = accumulated reserves.
Market capitalisation = number of shares x share price.
Book value of debt 	 = all debts short- and long-term.
The pass mark for Altman's Z-score is 3. Ccmpanies scoring above that
level should be safe while companies scoring below 1.8 will be
classified as potential failures. Altman believes this equaticn can
discriminate between "solvent" and failure candidees pp to 2 or 3
years before the event.
Note: Altman added a ratio of market value as Shown in term 4 in his
model. It appears to be a more effective predictor of
bankruptcy.
2.3.3 Taffler's Z-Score
Equal size samples of 46 failed and 46 financially sound (non-failed)
manufacturing enterprises were used and a list of 80 financial ratios
were employed in analysis. The model was originally developed in 1977
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[11). Although Taffler has not published the detailed mathematical
equation, he has stated that:
a) A 53 percent contribution to the model is made by the
"profitability" measure:
Profit before tax
Average current liabilities
b) A 13 percent contribution is made by the "working capital"
measure:
Current assets
Total liabilities
c) An 18 percent contribution comes from the "financial risk"
measure:
Current liabilities
Total assets
d) A 15 percent contribution comes from the "liquidity" measure no
credit interval i.e. the number of days a company can finance its
operations from its immediate assets if it can no longer generate
revenue.
The Taffler model is valid for manufacturing canpanies, there is a
further equation for distribution companies. The pass mark for
Taffler's Z-score is zero.
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2.3.4 Mason and Harris' Z-score
Equal size samples of 20 failed (which failed between 1970-1977) and
20 non-failed companies, construction companies were used, and a list
of 28 financial ratios was employed in analysis.
The model was pUbliShed in 1979 [17] and contains six terms. It was
originally designed for use In the construction industry. The equation
contains six terms as follows:
Z = 25.39 - 51.18 X1 + 87.81 X2 - 4.84 X3 - 14.52 X4
- 9.10 X5 - 4.47 X6
where:
v _ Earnings before interest and tax
Net assets
v _ Earnings before interest and tax
'12	 Net capital employed
x _  Debtors 
3 Creditors
x _ current liabilities 
4	 current assets
X5 = Logic) days debtors
X.6 = Trend debtors
The definitions of financial terms are as follows:
Net capital employed = net assets + short term loan
29
2Trend Debtorsn - Deb-tors(n-2)
For net assets and net capital employed, the opening balance sheet
figure is used in preference to closing sheet figure.
Short term loans are taken as being the loan and overdraft.
Debtors.. + Debtorstn-D
Debtors(n_2)
The calculation of days debtors is as follows:
Debtors ( opening) + Debtors( closing) ) x 365Days Debtors = Turnover	 2
The pass mark for Mason and Harris' Z-score is 2.94. Companies
scoring above that level shouldte safe while =genies spacing 2.94
within these limits cannot be ocandently classified and can only be
oamsicktred as "vulnerable".
2.3.5 Other 'Z-Score' Mbdels
Castagna and Metolscy developed a model specifically designed for
use in the Australian economy.
- Van Frederikslust in the Netherlands.
Marais in oanjuncticrtudth the Bank of England.
- Altman himself are all actively engaged in the developing Z-score
technology.
2.3.6 Summary and Conclusions to 'Z-Score' Model
Table 2.2 gives the results of the Z-score models which are used as
discriminators between failed and non-failed companies:
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Generally, the Z-score approach is viewed as an extremely powerful
financial analysis tool in finance and credit management areas where
they are perhaps best placed of all to exploit the full potential of
the methodology.
Generally academics are lagging behind practitioners in the creative
application of the technique particularly for investment analysis. In
particular, the approach does not suffer from methodological weakness
leading to poor performance, because the Z-score model possesses true
operational utility in practical applications.
One final statistical issue that is worthy of note here is raised in
the recent paper of Mensah [18] [1984]. The author explores the
degree of stationarity of bankruptcy models over time by comparing
functions developed for different periods.
He concluded (page 391) on the basis of his evidence, that "bankruptcy
prediction models are fundamentally non-stationary, at least insofar
as the stability of the models' coefficients are concerned". Mensah,
in fact, shows that distance in time from when a model is developed
rather than state of the economy (recession, expansion) is more
important in determining the propensity for strualairal shift.
Taffler concluded that "Any researcher In this area would agree that
Z-score models need redevelopment when they grow old and tired".
However, in contrast, the continuing efficiency of Altman e s
 1968
original Z-score model demonstrates after almost 20 years when applied
to US data (but not UK data) longevity appears to be a hall mark.
Also some consideration needs to be given to the quality of a model in
predicting failure well before bankruptcy.
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XX
X
X
X
X
5 4
Researcher and Year of Publication Altman Taffler Mason &
Harris
1968 1977 1978
Country Studied USA UK UK
No of ccmpanies studied 66 92 40
No of ratios tested 22 80 28
Type of MN:Us-try Manufac- Manufac- Construc-
turing turing tion
Non-retall
A. Liquidity Ratio
X
1. CUrrent assets/total
liabilities
2. Log 	 debtors
B. Gearing Ratios 
1.Market capitalisation/
book value of debts
2. Current liabilities/
total assets
3. Current liabilities/
current assets
C. Wbrking Capital Ratios 
1.Working capital/total
assets
2.No credit interval
3. Debtors/creditors
4. Trend debtors
D. Profitability Ratios 
1.Retained earnings/total
assets
2. Earnings before tax and
interest/total assets
3. Sales/total assets
4. Earnings before tax and
interest/current liability
5. Earnings before tax and
interest/net assets
6.Earning before tax and
interest/net capital
employed
TOTAL DISCRIMINATOR TERMS IN MODEL:
X
X
X
6
TABLE 2.2: RATIOS SHOWN TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN FAILED AND NON-FAILED
COMPANIES IN PREVIOUS STUDIES
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Table 2.3 (taken from Taffler, 1984) summarises what happened in the
six years subsequent to model development to 115 out of the 825 (14%)
listed industrial companies on EXSTAT at risk of financial distress as
at the end of 1976. No fewer than 43% had suffered financial distress
in some sense and a further 29% were still at risk with less than 3
out of 10 appearing to have effected a permanent recovery.
Event
	
NO. of	 % of
Cbmpanies	 Cbmpanies
Financial distress
Receivership	 17	 15
Going concern, government, bank or other
emergency support	 12	 10
Acquisition etc as alternative to
bankruptcy	 13	 11
Major closures and disposals	 8	 7
50	 43
Still at risk (Ze0)	 33	 29
Recoveries (Z>0)	 32	 28
115	 100
TABLE 2.3: COMPANIES WITH AT RISK Z-SCORES AT THE END OF 1976. A
SUMMARY OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
Further, the writer tested Mason and Harris' model for companies
predicted at risk in 1976 after 10 years. The result shows that 33%
failed, the others changedtheirnames [17].
These statistics provide another useful benchmark for the potential
utility of such techniques in practice.
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Finally we can conclude that:
1. Multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) is an appropriate
technique.
2. Multivariate discriminant analysis is completely free of
methodological and statistical flows. Any prOblems are mainly due
to the lack of in depth knowledge by business researchers of the
statistical properties of discriminant analysis [Pinchim;, 1980,
p429].
3. Discriminant functions are robust and can work well, and do so
over quite a long period of time without requiring specification.
2.4 OTHER mimes OF FAILURE PREDICTION
2.4.1 Introducticn
There are essentially two methods of forecasting failure, one is to
study the suspect company's finances, the other is to study its non-
financial features.
The previous sections (2.2 and 2.3) have taught us to treat ratios and
Z-scores with considerable respect. These finance-based tools suffer,
however, from two major defects namely they:
- are dependent upon the availability of financial information
- may suffer from creative accounting problems especially in small
companies.
HOMBIAM;
 two sbatments can be made about the accounts of failing
companies. Firstly, the company may be late publishing accounts.
Secondly the ocapany may have practised "creative accounting". This
section is concerned with the non-financial features of failure.
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As a company fails it might display non-financial signs of
deterioration [7] as well as financial ones. Argenti has illustrated
a means of ascertaining the influence of the latter and this method is
summarised because it is the latest development. However the model's
predictive value has not been adequately tested in the field. In
this thesis the writer has thus taken the initiative to test the
model on construction companies data.
The last and final section briefly discusses the Above method and
gives guidance for further resemilwork which is more fully described
in Chapter 9.
2.4.2 A-Score
The concept behind an A-score developed for this research is based on
the belief that if a company is in financial trouble, it is because of
the management defects and errors that were perpetrated a long time
previously, and that these defects and errors could have been
corrected by a careful oteeTvem. before - maybe long before - the signs
of financial distress becanevisible.
The lists of these non-financial indications include typically "bad
nonagement". The A-score is an attempt to:
a) make a list of those non-financial indications
b) rank the items in order of importance
c) place the its in sequence.
The A-score has been designed to introduce ameasure of quantification
of weighted scores according to importance In the failure process and
can be produced as illustrated in the following example [7].
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Defects 
1. Autocrat
2. Chairman and Chief Executive (same person)
3. Passive Board
4. Ubbalanced skills
5. Weak Finance Director
6. Poor management depth
7. No budgetary control
8. No cash flow plan
9. No costing system
10. Poor response to change
Total for defects:
Pasq mark for defects:
Weighting
8
4
2
2
2
1
3
3
3
15
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10
Mistakes 
- High leverage
	 15
- Over-trading
	 15
- Big project
	 15
Total:
	 45
Pass mark for mistakes
	 15
Symptoms 
- Financial signs 	 4
- Creative accounting	 4
- Non-financial signs
	
3
- Terminal signs
	
1
Total for symptoms:
	
12
Overall maximum possible:
	
100
Pass mark:	 25
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Research conducted by Argenti [7] in the comercial sector found that
ccopanies scoring above 25 showed many of the signs which precede
failure, whereas companies that are not at risk score below 25 overall
pass mark.
While the observer may have insufficient reasons to make firm
conclusions on failure, A-scores coupled with a close and very careful
examination of the company's ratios and Z-scores, prediction becomes
mudircre reliable.
2.4.3 Conclusions to A-Score
The predictive value A-score has been explored in this research, but
some doubt still remains regarding absolute reliability, nevertheless
its power has been convincingly demonstrated.
2.5	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Early methods illustrate fairly useful approaches to the subject of
corporate collapse, but In the past decade researchers realised that
failure does not occur suddenly. Failure takes years, therefore an
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of financial and non-
financial features of companies becomes necessary to obtain a
sufficient earlywalrning to take acticn.
There are several methods of observing the approach of failure,
firstly, financial ratios. We have noticed that companies with
continuing problems TAU have:
a) a low or negative working capital
b) a high level of liabilities relative to total assets
c) low current assets to current liabilities
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but the deterioration of certain well-known ratios is not sufficient
an indicator of ccopany failure.
Secondly, the Z-score technique for assessing corporate failure
appears to be a reliable technique for the ommemoial sector andcruld
prove equally suited to the construction situation.
Thirdly A-scores show pnmase. While none of the above metlx)ds is
completely accurate i.e. sometimes give false signals in certain
circunstances, the use of a cornbination of these different methods has
been demonstrated in this research to give fairly confident
predictions.
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CHAPTER 3
THE TECHNIQUE OF MULTIVARIATE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS 
3.1 DrrRoDucrioN
A problem that arises frequently in the social and behavioural
sciences as well as in the biological sciences is that of classifying
an object into one of a number of possible categories. Linear
discriminant function analysis is a related approach for examining
between-group differences on a set of measures. HUMSPAM7, this appixmch
focuses more on understanding between-group differences than on
develogingrules to classdiyunitscre population or another.
The discriminant analysis technique is a useful tool for the
mechanistic assignment of observations from unknown groups or
populations to one of two or more mutually exclusive groups or
populations.
The related technique of linear discriminant function analysis
involves finding one or more linear combinations of the original
variables that maximise the between-group differences relative to
within-group differences.
If there are more than two groups, then more than onediscriminant
function may be necessary to characterise group differences
completely. In general, the number of discriminant functions
necessary to characterise between group differences canpletely is
equal to the number of groups minus one (g-1).
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For two groups, then, there will be one discriminant function that
will exhaust all between group differences, regardless of the number
of variables.
Although (MDA) had been used in the Biological and Behavioural
Sciences since 1930, it was not until the 1960s that MDA was used in
conjunction with financial ratio analysis. The leading pioneer in
this field at that time was Edward Altman [8] Who developed several
models usingUSA data, which he claimed could pm-edict bankruptcy.
Several other researchers have done work In the same field over the
past decade, the majority of than in the USA [19,20,21].
It is surprising, however, that the only extensive work to have been
carried out in Britain is by Dr Richard Taffler at City University
Business School [11,12,13,14,15]. The major part of his work has been
conducted using UK based data and he has produced several predictive
models for manufacturing companies.
In cooperation with the London stockbrokers, Laurence Prust and
Company, he also produced separate models for various industries [22],
one of these Industries was the construction indistry. In 1978 Mason
and Harris also developed a model to predict bankruptcy for
constmxticncompanies.
The next few sections of the thesis atbalpt to direct a path beginning
with the simplest illustration of the general concept of MDA in
Section 3.2. Section 3.3 illustrates the mathematical theory behind
MDA, Section 3.4 presents derivation of computational formula with
illustrative example, and Section 3.5 deals with the statistical
conputka' package and its use. The final sectioribmieflydisaoses the
application of linear discriminant analysis.
40
3.2 THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF MDA
The objective of linear discriminant function analysis is to derive
linear functions of the original variables that maximise between-group
variation relative to within-group variation.
The mathematical objective of the analysis is to weight and linearly
combine the discriminant variables in a function so that the groups
are forced to be as statistically distinct as possible. For example,
taking a number of variables and mathematically combining them in a
discriminant function results in a relationship of the following form:
Z = CO + CiVi + Cg2
 +	 + Cryln 	 (1)
where: Z	 = the score on the discriminant function
C1 to Cn = the weighting coefficients
Co	 = a constant
VI to Vn = the discriminant variables.
The statistical theory of discriminant analysis assumes that the
discriminant variables have a multivariate ncxmal distribution and
that they have equal varianoe-oovariance matrices within each group
[Donald G Morrison [23] on "The Interpretation of Discriminant
Analysis" Journal of Marketing, Vol 6, No 2, M ay 1969]. Covariance
analysis is used for the purpose of increasing precision, homive.r, the
practical research worker and the theoretical statistician take
different views of this case. The research worker sees it as an
opportunity for introducing experimental controls in a non-
experimental field, and the statistician sees it as a reason for
exercising the utmost caution and, often, as a sufficient reason for
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refusing to carry out analysis of covariance at all [Introduction to
Multivariate Analysis, George H Dunteman, [29].
As has been shown in previous works, in practice these conditions are
not always satisfied [O. Maurice Joy and John Ch Tollefson, [24] "On
the Financial Applications of Discriminant Analysis", Journal of
Marketing Research, Vol 6, No 2, May 1969, pp 156-163], but the
technique has been found to be very robust which means the assumptions
need not be strongly adhered to [Edward B. Deakin, [25] "Distribution
of Financial Accounting Ratios: Some Empirical Evidence", the
Accounting Review, Vol 51, No 1, January 1976, pp 90-96].
In the company bankruptcy situation we have two group cases where
samples of solvent and failed firms are used to form the
classificatory models. Once a set of variables has been found which
provides satisfactory discrimination for the cases with known group
membership, a classification functicn can then be derived which will
permit the classification of new cases with unknown memberships. The
discriminant variables used to form the model are typical financial
ratios, calculated from the companies published financial accounts.
More recently same researchers have adopted a quadratic discriminant
function (Q)F) methodology in an attempt to ovexcome some perceived
difficulties with (LDA) and currently conditional probability model
formulations (Logit and Probit) are enjoying mudh attention (e.g.
Zavgren, [26] 1985; lson, 1989; Mensah, [18] 1984; Marais et al,
1980 and Zmijewski, [27] 1984). However the underlying model building
approach does not differ significantly.
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3.3 THE MATHEMATDZAL THEORY BEHIND MDA
Before discussing the multivariate situation, let us discuss a
hypothetical univariate situation in which two possible categories are
involved and one measure is available on the object to be classified.
Let us assume that these two populations are nammaly distributed.
From Figure 3.1 we can see that there is overlap in the two
distributicns and that any rule we use for classifying into one of
these two categories. The optimal classification rule in this
situation is to classify the membership belongimg to each group as
shown In Figure 3.1. For examTae, if a score is less than B then
pqpilation 1 applies and if the score is greater than B the subject
b61ongs to group 2. The reascn for chcosingBastte decieionpaintis
that it is the score that has the same relative frequency for each of
the two populations. The mathematical theory behind MDA is
oamplicated, but well dammented [28,29].
FIGURE 3.1: THE TWO GRCUP-ONE VARIABLE
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FIGURE 3.2: THE TWO GROUP-TWO VARIABLE DISCRIMINANT MODEL
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Further ' conceptualising the approaches to consider the case of the two
group population with two discriminating variables V 1 and V2 . In the
case of failed companies if we plot the values of V 1 and V2 for the
companies in the continuing and failed groups, we arrive at Figure 3.2
(see Coley [28], pp 245).
Each ellipse on the diagram is the locus of points of equal density
(or frequency) for a group. For example, each of these ellipses may
define the regicrs within which say 95% of each set of observations
lie. The two points at which these ellipses intersect define a
straight line AB. If the second line OZ is drawn perpendicular to AB
and the points in the two-dimensional space are projected onto OZ
labelled Z-axis, the overlap between the two groups will be smiler
than for any other line, that the points could be projected onto.
This is the same as saying that the centroids of the two groups have
been pushed as far apart as possible, thus giving maximum
discrimination.
By projecting the groups onto a single axis, in this way, each
company's set of variables is transformed into a single Z-score by
vector algebra. The point B then divides the discriminant axis into
two regions, the solvent on one side and the failed on the other. A
cornpmlyudth a Z-score below B would then be agsigned to nembership of
the failed population and vice versa for a Z-score above the B point.
In this way company two-dimensional data is transformed into a single
Z-score.
With more than two variables the concepts become too difficult to
express visually. In this situation the intersection of the two groups
changes from being a straight line, AB, to being a plane. The
derivation of the discriminant coefficients is therefore done
45
mathematically. In general terms, it requires solving the general
eigenvector problem:
)elsrv = By	(2)
where: B and W are respectively the "between-" and "within-" groups
sums of squares and cross products matrices [28]
is known as Wilks' Lambda
The most discriminating function is achieved by maximising the ratio
B/W. This is another way of saying that we wish to make the "between
groups variable differences" large in comparison to the "within groups
differences".
This is where the theoretical importance of having equal variance-
covariance matrices, for the two groups, enters into consideration.
This can be highlighted if we refer back to Figure 3.2. If either the
variances of Vi and V2 or the V1V2 covariance, were different for the
two groups, the contours (ellipses) of the two groupsuculd not be the
same shape or orientation, and therefore AB would not appear as
straight line. This can lead to errors giving a classification bias
in the function.
In previous works the need for adherence to the "equal variance-
covariance matrices" and "separately distributed multivariate
populations" rules have beenthesutdect of argument. Whilst Morrison
[23] insists on adherence, Deakin [25] points out that:
"The ultimate test of a model lies not in adherence to
certain data assunptions but rather in its adherence to its
usefulness as a decisionmodel".
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In this study it was felt that Deakin's viewpoint was quite valid and
this was taken into consideration when investigating the distributions
of the discriminating variables.
3.4 DERIVATION OF CCMPUTATIONAL FORMULA
The mathematical derivation of the computatio nal formula for the two-
variables case is that developed by Paul [34] Lecturer at the
University of Alabama, as follcws. First define two groups, Group I
and Group II and two variables, X1 and X2.
Let Xpij represent the value of 	 for the jth observation in the ith
group,
where P =1,2
= 1,2
=1, ... ni and
ni
 . the number of observations in ith group.
Let Xpi represent the mean value of Xp for the ni individuals in that
group.
1. Define Zij = al Xlij + a2 X2ij
2. Then Zi	 + a2 X21
and	 a1 X12 a2 —X22
3. Let "A" be the variation between groups, then A = 	 --22)2
Substituting 2 in 3 we obtain:
A = [al (ill - TC12 ) a2 (121 122))2
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4. Let "B" be the variation within grouPs, then
2	 ni
B = i1 j1 (Zij - 2i)2
2 ni
7 [a (Xiii - Te	 + a2 (X21i - "i2i)g= i=
 1 j= 1
2 ni
E	 (a12 (Xlij -7i1i)2
= i=1 j=1
+ 2 a1a2 (Xlij -	 (X2ii - X2i)
+ a22
 (X2ii
 - i2i)2]
5. dp =	
- Rio2; di =	 - 5i12 ; d2 = X21 - R.22
2	 ni
E	
.	
1110/
.N
6. Spq = i=1 j=1 v lIpj	  "Iqij Xqi)
p = 1,2; q = 1,2; Spq = Sqp
7. Substitute 5 in 3 to obtain:
A = (aid). + a2d2)2
= a12 d12 -; 2 al a2 d1
 d2
 + a22
 d22
= al
 di (al d1 + a2 d2 ) + a2
 d2
 (al
 d1 + a2
 d2)
8. Substitute 6 in 4 to obtain:
B = a12 S11 +2 al a2 S12 4- a22 S22
= al
 (al S11 + a2
 S12 ) + a2 (al
 S12 + a2
 S22)
9. R=
The objective of the cavitation is to maximise the variation
between groups relative to the variation within groups. The
desired plane is therefore the plane for which a l
 and a2
determine the maximal', thus
DRSet	 - 0	 andDal
Ba  - AB
10. - ricL	 7E1 — 0
B2
11. BaA _ AaB
3 al AD a1
BA_13. Similarly, -a—  
it
..,a2
a2	 °
DB MA
14. 3,31 _ Aaal
DB	 BA
—
aa2. ftaa2
'DA	 OB	 DB	 DA15. -
3a1	 3a2	 Dal	a2
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16.*' = 2 al d12 + 2 a2 d1 d2
ad.
= 2 d1 (al d1 + a2 d2)
17.all' - 2 al d1 d2 + 2 a2 d223a2
= 2 d2 (al d1 + a2 d2)
lA aB	 9	 +
` "1 "11 • -2 -12,aal
19. E— — 2 (al S12 + a2 s22)
aa2
Substitute 16 through 19 in 15 and obtain:
2d1 (al di + a2 d2 ) 2 (al Si2 + a2 S22)
= 2 d2 (al	+ a2 d2) 2 (al S11 4- 82 S12)
al d1 S12 - al d2 S11 = a2 d2 S12 - a2 d1 S22
al (d1 S12 - d2	= a2 (d2 S12 - d1 S22)
ai d2 S12 -	 S22
20. Thus - A
82 '1
,
'-'12 - d2 Si'
A set of simultaneous linear equations can also be derived in the
following manner. nun 12
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2°3 - BaA A.note that E .Pi,a	 1@a	 @1	 1	 A R
21. Then 2 (al S11+ a2 S12 ) = ; 2 d1 (al d1 + a2 d2)
122. Let C = (al d1+ a2 d2)
23. al Sit+ a2 S12 = C
24. Similarly al S12 + a2 S
	 C d2
For the al and a2 case determined from equations 23 and 24, and in
which the unknown factor "C" cancels out When the values for "a, s" are
substituted in 9.
Illustrative Ekample
The simple problem is one of classifying insects as to race on the
basis of mean numbers of teeth in proximal combs and mean number of
teeth in distal combs. The individual values are presented in Table
3.1. The first group belongs to race AL, and the second group to race
B. There are eleven insects in the first group and twelve in the
second. The equations to be solved are:
al + S12 a2 = diSll
S12 al + S22 a2 = d2
where X1 = mean number of teeth on proximal comb
X2
 = mean number of teeth on distal comb
= 6.46545;.k11
5i, 21 = 5.32364
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X11 = 5.550
5-C22  = 4.72667
d1	 = Rli - 12.2 = 6.46545 - 5.55 = 0.91545
d2	 = 2.21 - 5T22 = 5.32364 - 4.72667 = 0.59697
S11 =	 1 = 2.6765011	 i=1 j=1 (X11j	 5-11)2
2.4	 ni
S12 = S21 = ft]. j=1 (X11j 5-11 ) (X21j
22 =	 (Xi=1 j=1
	—
2ii - X21 ) = 1.75454S
Substituting the data fribm the sample gives:
2.675 al + 1.2942 a2 = .91545	 (1)
1.294 al + 1.754 a2 = .5967	 (2)
The solution al = .27597 and a2 = .13671.
The linear discriminant function is as follows:
Z = .2759 X1 + .1367 X2
The "Z" values are listed in order of magnitude in Table 3.2. The
mean of the "Z" values in the first group is 2.5118 and the standard
deviation is 0.09372. The mean of the Z values in the second group is
2.17754 and standard deviation is 0.14966.
Statistical Test
The F-ratio indicates a significant difference between the two groups.
The tabular value of F is 5.85 with degree of freedom DF 1 = 2 and DF2
= 20 at the 1% significance level. The oanputedvalue of "F" is 19.18.
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The F-ratio is the ratio between two variances and is used to test for
hcmogeneity of variances and equivalence of two groups.
A value of "F" larger than the tabular value for the degrees of
freedom in the numerator (DPI) and the degrees of freedom in the
dencminator (DF2 ) at an indicated level of significance leads to the
rejection of the hypothesis that the two groups are samples from the
same population with a confidence level of 1% level of significance.
An increase in differences between the means of the variables or
decrease in the variability of the variables inproves the ability of
discriminant function to differentiate betw4NNIcpmups.
NO Race A Race B
X 1 X2 X 1 X2
1 6.36 5.24 6.0 4.88
2 5.92 5.12 5.60 4.69
3 5.92 5.36 5.64 4.96
4 6.44 5.64 5.76 4.80
5 6.4 5.16 5.96 5.08
6 6.56 5.56 5.72 5.04
7 6.64 5.36 5.64 4.96
8 6.68 4.96 5.44 4.88
9 6.72 5.48 5.04 4.44
10 6.76 5.6 4.56 4.04
11 6.72 5.08 5.48 4.2
12 - - 5.76 4.8
TABLE 3.1: DATA FOR SAMPLE PROBLEM
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Rank First Group
Values
Second Group
Values
First Group
I-tem No
1 2.63085 10
2 2.60341 9
3 2.57020 6
4 2.56493 7
5 2.54873 11
6 2.54082 4
7 2.52128 8
8 2.47137 5
9 2.47127 1
10 2.36626 3
11 2.33902
12 2.33345 2
13 2.32272
14 2.26733
15 2.24556
16 2.24556
17 2.23432
18 2.23432
19 2.17953
20 2.16819
21 2.08627
22 1.99767
23 1.81054
TABLE 3.2: "Z" VALUES FOR THE SAMPLE PROBLEM
3.5 STATISTICAL COMPUTER PACKAGE AND ITS USE
There are a number of software packages that can be used to conduct a
linear discriminant function analysis. The most popular package, is
probably SPSS, this package produces the following key outuuts: the
standardised coefficients for each discriminant function, the
oentamlids of the groups in the discriminant function space, and the
multivariate test to deteinuime statistical significance of successive
discriminant functions.
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The discriminant analysis performed for this research work was done
using the (SPSS version 10) subprogram 'DISCRIMINANT' through  the
Cbmputer Centre at Loughborough University. nor this research the
most interesting facility of the Discriminant program was the several
"stepwise methods" which enabled reduction of the number of
discriminating variables in the "function" from the original 31 to 7.
Later the writer reduced the number to 5 using the Minitab computer
package.
Since we need to select the variables which discriminate most, the
stepwise procedure available in the program was of advantage. The
program begins by selecting the single best-discriminating variable
according to a user-determined criterion.
Several criteria are available to the user but in our case the
criterion is the "overall multivariate F-ratio for the test of
differences among the grav centroids".
The variable which maximises the F-ratio also minimises "Wilks Lamdba"
a measure of group discrimination. The test takes into consideration
the differences between the group centroids and the cohesion within
the groups. The Wilks Lambda mentioned here is the same measure that
appeared in equation (2) in Section 3.3.
3.6 SUMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Discriminant analysis is utilised to classify individuals into one of
two or more classes by means of an index nuMber called Z-score. The
purpose of the canputation is to maximise the difference between means
of the groups relative to the variance of the groups. A cut-off point
"Z-score" is established In the two groups, for example, a company
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with a Z-score above the cut-off point B would be assigned to
meillbersMp of the non-failed population and vice versa for a Z-score
below the B point.
The analysis of failed firms based on the consideration of single
ratios may present a confused and unreliable indicator of financial
difficulties. In contrast the statistical technique MDA attempts to
derive a linear combination of these ratios which will best
discriminate between the groups. Also the model will have to indicate
which ratios are the most important indicators predicting failure,
What weight Should be attached to each ratio and how to establish them
Objectively. Thus the advantages of MDA may be summed up as follows:
a) Considers an entire profile of characteristics common to the
relevant firms and their inter-relationship;
b) Reduces the analysts space dimensionality i.e. from the number of
different independent variables to (g-1) dimensions wnere (g)
equals the number of original a priori groups. The discriminant
function of the form Z = V1X1 + G2 X2 + V/IXn transforms
individual variable values to a single discriminant score of Z
value which is then used to classify the object.
c) MDA results of multicollinearity sometimes yield an overall small
group of ratios [29].
d) The primary advantage of MDA is in dealing with classification
problems, one sees the entire variables profile rather than
individual ratios.
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Problems that might arise if the basic asstmptions of MDA related to
the main statistical issues are not met,  embrace the folio/ling:
a) MUltivariate normality is an important assumption [Pindhes, [6]
1980, pp 431-433] although in sample-based research it is the
presence of extreme observations (outliners) rather than the
general shape of the multivariate distribution that is the key.
Techniques are available to handle such problems in practice (e.g.
Taffler, 1982]. Nonetheless concerns over the distributional
form, inter alia, led to the adowtion of conditional probability
model formulations (Logit, Pribbit) In a nudber of cases [e.g.
Ohlson, [30] 1980] which do not depend on independent variable
distributional assumptions.
b) A multicollinearity problem could occur because of the high inter-
correlation among the variables. Researchers have found
difficulties in handling multicollinearity problems, in certain
cases tending to cverfit models. This led to serious sample bias
and poor performance on out of sample data [as illustrated by
Mensah, [18] 1984, pp 392-3] despite theoretical arguments this
should not be so [e.g. Eisenbeis, [31] 1977 but see Pinches, [6]
1980]. In addition variable coefficients may be highly unstable
between different samples. Some researchers circumvent
multicollinearity problems by transforming the original variables
to principal components since they are uncorrelated. This
transformation does not help much, however, if we are interested
in the effects of the original variables (anteman [29] pp 177).
c) Other key issues that are commonly not addressed relate to the
need to incorporate prior probability estimates of population
membership into the discriminant function and also differential
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misclassification costs [Pinches, [6] 1980]. Such issues are
typically ignored leading  to serious errors in interpretation
[e.g. see the discussion in Taffler, [12] 1982, p351 and poor out
of sample performance [e.g. see Taffler, [14] 1984].
(One of the perceived benefits of a conditional probability
approach is the lack of need to specify prior probabilities).
There is no reason to believe, for example, that there are equal
numbers of potential failure and solvent companies in the
population.
d) Finally, in all studies researchers have viewed continuing
cariparldes as possessing distinct characteristics front/Isar failed
companies. This is clearly incorrect as many presently live
companies possess financial profiles similar to failed ones
[raffler, [12] 1982].
The statistical problems that can arise are not taken to account for
the non-failed group of such firms before developing the statistical
model.
This research work will try to avoid the conoepimal and methodological
weaknesses which appeared in previous studies since potentially the Z-
score model has very oonvirx:ing statistical and associated evidence
that a properly developed model, based on its track record in
practice, has strong ex-ante predictability and high operational
utility. HOMBIAM7, any researcher in this area would agree that Z-
score models need redevelopnent when they grow "old and tired" [see
Mensah (18) pp 391].
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We may conclude finally that, in practice, at least most OUWE:ITS
regarding the statistical underpinning of the traditional linear
discriminant model Z-score approach are unfouneWd. For good reascrs
such discriminant functions are robust and can work well and do so
over quite a long period of time without reguirirg respecification.
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA COLLECTION AND FORMATICN OF THE DATA CROUPS 
4.1 3NTRODUCTION
This section is ooncernExiwith the data collection, data sources, data
analysis and formation of the data groups used to develop and verify
the discriminant model for construction companies.
The data analysed in this report was obtained mainly from the
following sources;
1. Extel Statistical Services Ltd (EXtel)
2. Companies Registration Offices (CRO)
3. Published data on the Business Ratio Reports.
Extel cards were used for the following reasons:
- Extel cards have very reliable data
- Sufficient financial information is included on EXtel cards
Discrepancies in data presentation from different scurces are
considerably reduced.
Extel cards were mainly limited to public companies while the
Oarpcmies Registration Office was suitable for private companies. Some
adjustments were needed to allow for "creative" amounting of some
small companies.
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4.2 DATA ANALYSIS
Both failed and non-failed companies were selected an a random basis.
Some exceptions were allowed, however, in the non-failed group, for
example, well known companies were included to increase the
discriminating power of the model and decrease the misclassifications
of non-failed cavardes as "failed". This point was first recognised
by Altman and Loris [10] and Taffler [11] amiNSeson [17].
Financial data used for both groups were the latest ones available.
The data for failed companies were obtained for the period 1978 and
1986 and included the data for the last three years before failure.
Failure being defined as voluntary or ccmpulsary liquidation, entry
into receivership but excluding companies re-organised for financial
reasons like taken over companies. These were treated as a separate
group. Some researchers have included taken over companies as failed,
e.g. Mason [17]. Such inclusions decrease the discriminatory power of
the model. Furthermore, including data from the last six years before
failure also decreases discriminating power germ:Tally because the last
three years is considered to be the most critical period.
In this research data for the non-failed group is mainly concentrated
on the four years prior to failure and included 1986. Some further
points of note are:
- Altman [8] initially matched his "failed" and "non-failed" groups
by industry and company size.
- Taffler [11] initially constructed models without matching
calvardes by industry and ccmpany size or financial year
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Mason [17] limited his study to the construction industry and avoided
matching company size and financial year considerations. This study
adopted the Mason approach for two reasons:
Firstly, empirical evidence indicates that financial ratios are
uncorrelated with company size [3]. Indeed the use of ratio
transforms removes the company size dimension. Also, a construction
company generally depends on secondary sub-contractors which sometimes
facilitates expansion of business activity according to the market
situation.
A similar argument applies to matching by financial year for both
groups, i.e. for non-failed companies some can be selected on their
historical performance and past reputation as being regular and well
known, typically public companies. Small companies cannot be selected
on this basis because:
- they are not well-known i.e. background information is innomplete.
- most were formed in boom periods where entry to construction work
was freely available without qualification of past experience.
Clearly therefore small companies do not provide a good standard and
would not be representative of a non-failed group.
4.3 FORMATION OF DATA GROUPS
Six groups of companies were used in this study as follows:
1. Failed 11 group
2. Non-failed 20 group
3. Taken-over 9 group
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4. Test "Continued 70" group
5. Test "failed 11" group
6. All 90 group.
The "Failed 11" and "!n-failed 20" groups were used to establish the
model and the remaining groups used to verify and validate the model
adequacy.
4.3.1 The "Failed 11" and "Test 11" Groups
The bankrupt set of companies from which the model was derived
consisted of companies which failed between 1978 through to 1986, a
period of 8 years, while the verification and validation groups
included companies failing pp to 1988.
There was a general problem in obtaining the required information for
a large number of failed companies caused mainly by a lack of
infatuation or change of ccupany name and after take-overs etc. These
were generally excluded from the model.
Thus finally only 22 companies could be found which met the "failed"
criteria from which a "Failed 11" group were used to derive the model
and "Test 11" used for verification purposes.
A list of companies included in these two groups can be seen in Tables
4.1 and 4.2.
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CanPanY
	 Date of Last	 Reasons for
Published	 Cbnclusion as Failed
Accounts
Beechwood Group plc
Cbcksedge Holdings plc
Crouch Group plc
David Charles Ltd
James H Dennis plc
Mears Bros Ltd
Milbury plc
Mbdern Engineering of
Bristol (Holdings) plc
Mass Engineering Group
plc
Southern COnstruction
Ltd
S W Farmer
30.6.83
22.11.84
24.8.83
5.11.75
1.9.83
7.2.78
19.7.84
7.6.83
1.12.81
29.5.79
31.3.86
Receiver appointed 1985
Receiver appointed 1985
Receiver appointed 1984
Voluntary liquidation 1977
Receiver appointed 1984
Voluntary liquidation 1979
Cbmpulsory liquidation 1985
Receiver appointed 1985
Receiver appointed 1983
Receiver appointed 1982
Receiver appointed 1986
TABLE 4.1: COMPANIES IN THE "FAILED 11" GROUP
Ccmpany	 Date of Published Accounts
A.C. and K. Builders Ltd
Allied Construction Ltd
Bowmate Construction Ltd
Bright Brook Builders Ltd
Comber Cbnstruction Ltd
Pevland Construction Ltd
Sphinx Building Construction Ltd
Staines Cbnstruction Ltd
Stevens and Scns Building Ltd
Stott Mills Building Ltd
Stream Star Construction Ltd
31.3.1986
31.3.1986
31.3.1986
31.3.1985
31.3.1986
31.3.1982
31.3.1985
31.3.1985
31.3.1983
31.3.1986
31.3.1985
TABLE 4.2: COMPANIES IN THE "TEST FAILED 11" GROUP
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4.3.2 "Non-failed 20" Group
The "non-failed 20" group and "Failed 11" group used data extracted
from Extel in order to reduce the discrepancy in data presentation in
cases using different information sources and to increase the
discriminant power of the model.
However it is stressed that the model was ccnstructed without matching
companies by size, or financial years. The non-failure was defined as
continuing in business for at least four years and also had to have
continued in operation for two years after the focal year of 1986.
The selection criterion adopted for the "non-failed 20" group,
resulted in not all the members of the "non-failed" 20 identified
being selected on a random basis. In this way an iummme in the
discriminating power of the model together with a decrease in the
misclassifications of the "non-failed" companies as failed was
achieved, principally by making assessments of solvency on a
qualitative ratio analysis basis.
Accounts used for the "non-failed" group covered the period of 1982-
1986. A list of companies In this group can be seen In Table 4.3.
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Cbmpapy	 Date of _Published Accounts
Aberdeen Construction Group plc
Barratt Development plc
Benlox Holdings plc
Benbailly Cbnstruction plc
C H Beazer Holdings plc
BICC plc
Brown and Jackson plc
Bryant Holdings plc
Boulton and Paul plc
M J Geeson Group plc
George Wimpey plc
Henry Boot and Sons plc
A, Mbnk and Cbmpany plc
Newarthill plc
Rush and Tompkins Group plc
Taylor Woodrow plc
Tarmac plc
Tilbury Group plc
Turriff Cbrporation plc
Wilson COnnolly Holdings plc
July 1987
Nbvember 1986
July 1987
December 1986
DeceMber 1986
May 1987
August 1987
Nbverliber 1986
October 1987
January 1987
July 1987
June 1987
August 1985
June 1987
August 1986
July 1987
June 1987
July 1987
June 1987
May 1987
TABLE 4.3: CCMPANIES IN THE "NON-FAILED 20" GROUP
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4.3.3 The "Taken-Over 9" Group
Some attelpt was also made to discriminate with a further grow
namely a "taken-over 9" group together with the "failed 11" group and
"non-failed 20" gnaw, see Chapter 6. Little was achieved and this
group was ultimately combined to form part of the verification
process. It should also be noted that previous studies included in
their definition of failure reorganisation for financial reasons, such
as take-over oanpanies. These were excluded in this research work to
increase the power of discrimination. A list of this group can be
seen in Table 4.4.
Cbmpany	 Date of Published Accounts
Braithwaite Group plc 4.7.1985
C H Pearce and Sons plc 21.10.1985
Fairclough Construction Group plc 15.4.1982
Glossop plc 6.7.1983
Mrchwill plc 8.3.1983
Mitchell Cotta Group Ltd 11.11.981
Richard Cbstain Ltd 25.5.1978
Robert Adlard plc 14.5.1986
Rowlinson Construction plc 27.6.1983
TABLE 4.4: COMPANIES IN THE "TAKEN-OVER 9" GROUP
67
4.3.4 The "Test Continued 70" Group
The companies in the "Test 70" group which were used to verify the
model were selected randomly from different sources. These calpanies
cansistedmainly of construction and civil engineering companies.
The complete list of campanies in this group can be seen in Table 4.5.
CcutPanY
	
Caipany
Bellway Builders Ltd
Bryant Construction Ltd
Bovis COnstruction Ltd
Charnwood Construction Ltd
Dalton Construction Ltd
Danbury Construction Ltd
Dave° Construction Ltd
Gargan Construction Ltd
Tarmac Homes Midlands
Tarrock Construction Ltd
Tarmac Construction Ltd
CBI Construction Ltd
Charles Gray Builders
Haymills Holdings Ltd
Ogilvie Holdings Ltd
Eve Construction plc
Alfred McAlpine Construction
R J MbLeod Construction
Shepherd Building Group
Rena Construction Ltd
Andrew Scott Ltd
Simons Construction Ltd
Whittaker Ellis Builders Ltd
Amec plc
Amoo Industrial Holdings plc
Costain Group plc
Robert M Douglas plc
Galliford plc
Higgs and Hill plc
Johnston Group plc
John Laing plc
Walter Lawrence plc
F J C Lillpy plc
Y J Lovell Holdings plc
John Mbwlem and Company
Sunley Holdings plc
John E Wiltshire plc
Babcock Construction Ltd
Balfour Beatty Ltd
Peter Birse Holdings
Bower and Kirkland Ltd
A F Budge Cbnstruction Ltd
Cementation Construction Ltd
Croudace Holdings Ltd
Hollandsche Beton Ltd
J M Jones and Sons Ltd
Kyle Stewart Ltd
James Longley and Co Ltd
R Mansell Ltd
May Gurney Holdings Ltd
The Miller Group Ltd
Noraest Hoist Ltd
Seddon Group Ltd
G Percy Tretham Ltd
Trollope & Coils Construe. Ltd
Wates Construction Ltd
Willett Ltd
Willmutt Dixon Holdings Ltd
City of Aberdeen Ass. Ltd
Condor Group plc
Consolidated Term Invest. Ltd
Dencora plc
Dean and Bowes Group Ltd
Duntcn Group plc
Exeter Building & Constr. Ltd
London and Clyde Holdings Ltd
MbLaughlin and Harvey Ltd
Gilbert House Investments Ltd
Bellway plc
John Elliott Group plc
TABLE 4.5: COMPANMES IN THE "CONTINUED 70" GROUP
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4.3.5 The "All 90 Non-Failed" Croup
In trying to determine the proportion of companies "at risk" in the
total population of quoted companies, the combined population of the
"non-failed 20" group and the "test continued 70 • group called the
"all 90 non-failed" group, was also considered. These can be seen in
Tables 4.3 and 4.5.
4.4	 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The statistical problems that arise if care is not exercised before
developing the model can lead to poor nodel performance. For example,
all previous researchers viewed continuing companies as possessing
different characteristics from their failed counterparts. This
conclusion would appear to be dubious as many presently active
companies possess financial profiles similar to failed companies and
may in due course fail.
This research therefore adopted companies for the "rxri-failed" group
as those appearing to be solvent, but not necessarily healthy
canpanies. Thus not all the nembers of this group were selected on a
random basis. The companies in the "failed" group were those which
had entered into receivership, voluntary liquidation, winding up by
order of the court. Thus companies with name changes or those that
had been reorganised for financial reasons such as taken-over
companies were excluded and comidered as a separategroup.
In summary the best problems for discrindnant analysis appear to be
those in which the group definitions are distinct and non-overlapping,
also efforts made to avoid arbitrary grouping.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DEVELOPED MODEL AND REGRESSION CFMRPCTERISTICS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This section describes the development of an operational model for the
identification of UK construction ccmpanies in danger of failure. The
model was developed using a combination of two techniques, Financial
Ratio Analysis aDd a statistical technique known as "Multivariate
Discriminant Analysis".
All aspects of the model's development are described, from the
financial ratios analysis, through to the ccmputer analysis, including
a short description of the computer package used to calculate the
financial ratios, and computer package "SPSS X" involved in developing
the model.
5.2 FINANCIAL RATIOS USED IN THE ANALYSIS
Altman selected 22 financial ratios in forming his model.
Taffler claimed 80 financial ratios in forming his model.
Mason and Harris selected 28 different variables including 23
oonventimal ratios and 5 trend measures.
Laurence, Prust and Company reported 500 ratios in forming their
construction model.
The first model attempted in this research omsidered 82 different
variables and was not successful because of the sensitivity of some
growth ratios [see AppendixA ]. As a COMBINTJETCle of these trials
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variable selection became very important, and their effectiveness
either in previous studies and their popularity in the literature was
one of the criteria adopted to guide the author.
In this manner a total of 31 different variables were subsequently
adopted consisting of 24 conventional financial ratios and seven trend
measures all computed from balance Sheet information contained on the
"Extel cards". These variables are Shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 where
several aspects of company structure are portrayed.
Furthermore empirical studies [39,40] in various countries showed that
firms operating in different industrial sectors tend to have
different financial ratios. This obliged the author to relate the firm
being examined to the ratios existing in its particular industry.
Also previous research by Deakin [25] indicated that financial ratios
very rarely fit a normal distribution. However, the population of
companies within a particular industry exhibited more normal
distribution than a population of companies from several industries.
Since this research concerned the construction industry only problems
of non-normality were able to be removed.
In addition the distribution was smoothed by averaging the amxrds of
"failed" and "non-failed" oanpanies for the last three and four years
respectively. Nevertheless, strict adherence to the rules of
normality had to some extent to be disregarded in view of Deakin's
conclusion [25] i.e. "probability statenents from a model based on
financial ratios may be subject to question because of the
distributions characteristics. A user may thus be better off with a
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NO Variable Description	 Financial Structure
1. EBIT/NA
2. EBIT/EQITY
3. EBIT/CL
4. EBIT/NCE	 PROFITABILITY
5. EBIT/TU
6. PAT/NCE
7. PAT/EQITY
8. FA/EQITY
9. LA/CL
10. WC/NCE	 WORKING CAPITAL
11. DR/CL
12. INT/EBIT
13. CL/NA
14. CL/NCE
15. DEBIT/ME	 FINANCIAL
15. CA/CL	 LEVERAGE
16. CA/CL
17. CA/NA
18. CA/EQITY
19. CA/NCE
20. LA/N5,
21. LA/EQITY	 LIQUID=
22. Logic) (DAYS-DEBTORS)
23. TV/InA	 ACTIVITY
24. STL/EBIT	 LIQUIDITY
25. TAX-TREND
26. PAT-TREND
27. DR-TREND
28. CRD-TREND	 TREND
29. INT-TREND	 MEASUREMENT
30. STL-TREND
31. LA-TREND
TABLE 5.1: FINANCIAL RATICG EMPLOYED IN THE ANALYSIS
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EBIT:
	
Earnings before interest and tax
NA:	 Net assets (total assets - current liabilities)
EQUITY:	 Share capital and reserves
CL:	 Current liabilities
NCE:	 Net capital employed (net assets + short term loan)
TU:	 Turnover
PAT:	 After tax profit
FA:	 Fixed assets
LA:	 Liquid assets
CL:	 Current liabilities
WC:	 Working capital (current assets - current liabilities)
DR:	 Debtors
INT:
	 Interest charged on all loans (payable interest)
DEBIT:	 Medium + long term loans (over one year)
DAYS DEBTORS: Av. DR x 365/TU
STL:	 Short term loan
CRD:	 Creditor
**********************************************************************
The trend ratios are calculated on the basis of the following formula:
Pn Pn-1 
2	 Pn-2
ABS. (Pn_2)
where: Tn is the trend ratio for year n
The P's are the balance sheet figures for years n, n-1 and n-2
of the trend being computed, e.g. Creditors, Tax etc.
Note: The dencoinator is taken as the absolute value, i.e. the sign
is ignored.
TABLE 5.2: KEY TO TABLE 5.1
Tn -
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rough estimate than no estimate at all". However, as the model was
developed, the more discriminant ratios appeared to be those which
displayed near normal distributions.
5.3 FINANCIAL RATIOS CALCULATIONS AND DATA MANIPULATION
5.3.1 Introduction
One major difficulty in the calculation of financial ratios, concerns
the large number needed in developing and testing the model. A
computer package was thus developed to speed up the process and
precision analysis in the form of a Fortran programme, PECAN.FOR,
which included:
The User Manual
The Programme Documentation
See appendix A.
5.3.2 Computer Package AN. FOR
ADNAN.FOR is a computer programme written in the programing language
FORTRAN 77 for use on a PC-IBM, core space required (169, 646) bytes.
The computer programme was written and developed for specific use in
the calculations required for the research.
The User Memel sets out how the programme may be used to perform the
calculations and the Programme Documentation section allows the
programme to be understood.
The programme calculates, from 18 pieces of financial information
obtained from company financial reports, a series of financial ratios
and measured 46 in all relevant to this study.
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The programme is in two parts:
-
the 18 pieces of financial information are read by the _computer
and printed out for checking
-
the programme calculates the 46 financial ratios and measures of
performance for a six year period as a maximum. The programme asks
the user the required number of years and name of file for output.
Also, the programme calculates the financial ratio means over the
required period, and prints the trend and Change in growth ratios for
the 18 pieces of data together with the means of the results. See
Appendix A.
5.4	 STATISTICAL COMPUTER PACKAGE
5.4.1 Introduction
Altman [8] appears to be the leading pioneer in applying the
multivariate discriminant analysis technique for financial ratios as
evidenced in his general equity models using (USA) data claiming
bankruptcy prediction capabilities.
Subsequently several other researchers published in the same field.
Indeed the technique is now considered to be a most reliable
predictive tool. This research builds on this evidence and uses the
particular computer package (SPSS X) available at the Canputer Centre
at Loughborough University of Technology for the analysis process.
5.4.2 Statistical Canputer Package (SPSS X)
The programme was originally produced at Chicago University, but is
now a carrnercial product belonging to SPSS Inc of Chicago. It has
powerful multivariate procedures for discriminant analysis. The
original 82 variables were initially reduced to 31 and subsequently
to a smaller, more easily handled 7. This was achieved by an
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interactive process whereby the programme selects the variables which
discriminate most using the stepwise procedure i.e. the best
discriminating variable is selected according to user-determined
criteria.
Several criteria are available to the user but in our case the
principal criterion was "Wilks Lambda", as mentioned in equation (2)
in Section 3.3. The method establishes the "F-ratio" and tests
differences amahggrcup centroict5, whereby thevariablemadmisingtte
F-ratio also minimises "Wilks Lambda", thereby measuring group
discrimination.
The test takes into consideration the differences between the group
centroids and the cohesion within the groups. Once the best
discriminating variable has been found using the selection rule
"minimise Wilks Lambda", the programme continues by pairing this
variable with each of the other variables in turn and ocmiNting Wilks
Lambda again.
The new variable which, In ccnjunction with the initial variable gives
a lower Wilks Lambda, is then selected as the second variable to enter
the function.
These two variables are then combined with each of the remaining
variables to form triplets, which are again evaluated on the
criterion. The triplet with the lowest Wilks Lambda value determines
the third variable to be selected for the fulcticch
This procedure of locating the next variable that wculd yield the
least Wilks Lambda score gives the variables already selected. This
continues until all the variables are selected.
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As variables are selected for inclusion some already in the function
may lose their discriminating power. This occurs because the
information that contained group differences is now better defined by
some ombination of the other included variables. Such variables thus
beccme redundant and are therefore removed from the equation. As a
consequence, at the beginning of each step each of the previously
selected variables is tested to determine if it still makes a
sufficient ocatritxtion to the discrimination. If any are eligible
for removal, the least useful is eliminated. Nevertheless a variable
removed at one step may re-enter at a later step if it satisfies the
least Wilks Lambda at that stage.
So, by eliminating the poor discriminators, a small number of
variables accounting for most of the discrimination are eventually
determined. This result is an optimal, rather than a maximal
solution. The assumption being that the stepwise procedure is an
efficient way of approximately locating the best set of discriminating
variables. In this research variables were ultimately identified as
being powerful discriminators.
Figure 5.1 dhows one particular step in the stepwise method. As can be
seen, at step 5, for example, 5 variables were entered into the
equation, together with remaining variables waiting to enter. The "F
to enter" is the value of the "F-ratio" needed to give access to the
equation. "F to remove" is the value of the "F-ratio" of that
variable When entering the equation. It can be seen from this
example that variable 23 was included in the equation at this step.
The variable with the highest "F to enter" will be the next to enter
the equation, provided the "F to enter" value is greater than the
minimum stipulated. In this case it will be variable 26.
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Figure 5.2 shows a summary of all the steps in the particular
analysis. The informationbere shows the variables entered or removed
at each step, and shows that variable 12 which entered at step 3 was
removed at step 9.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the final step of analysis at the value of the
"F to remove" and also the value of "Wilks Lambda". Both the "F to
remove" and the "Wilks Lambda" values are indications of haa much each
variable contributes to the discrimination where it may be observed
that 7 variables give good discrimination, at a "Wilks Lambda" of
0.175. The variables adding most to discrimination are those with the
highest "F to remove" values.
The programme also calculates the "standardised" and "umstandardisecr
discrimination function coefficients. The "unstandardised"
coefficients are the nest useful when multiplied by the raw values of
the associated variables to arrive at "discriminant Z-score".
The programme further calculates the "discriminant function evaluated
at group means (group centroids)". See Figure 5.4 for unstandardized
coefficients.
In order to use the model as a classification tool, the discriminant
fixIction coefficients have to be adjusted by calculatirg the mean
value of discriminant function coefficient for two groups and
matiplying throuctlait by two ignoring the sign.
As an extra check, the programme tests the adequacy of the derived
discriminant function. By classifying the cases used to derive the
function in the first place and comparing the predicted group
membership with the actual group membership, it empiriczaly measures
the success of the discrimination by observing the proportion of
correctly classified.
78
:1 : *	 * *	 *	 * * * * 2	 * * *	 * * *	 * * * $ 2 2 * *
	 * *	 * •
\c	 * * * * * * * * $ *
	 * * * * * * * * * *	 *	 *
AT STEP	 5 7 V23
	
WAS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS.
DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIF.
	 BETWEEN GROUPS
WM' LAMBDA
	
0.21584
	
5	 1	 29.0
EQUIVALENT F
	
18.1655
	
5	 25.0 0.'3000
VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS AFTER STEP
	 5
VARIABLE TOLERANCE F TO REMOVE 	 WILKS' LAMBDA
V6
V12
V17
V23
V25
0.7391182
0.7750358
0.4613530
0.4833676
0.7099661
18.359
10.117
22.483
4.4010
9.4367
0.37434
0.30318
0•40975
0.25383
0.29731
VARIABLES NOT IN THE ANALYSIS AFTER STEP 	 5
VARIABLE TOLERANCE
VI
	
0.1624146
V2
	
0.3136713
V3
	
0.3806102
V4
	
0.7955813
V5
	
0.2347246
V7
	
0.1832067
V8
	
0.8222383
V9
	
0.8045114
V10
	
0.8997728
VII
	
0.9506734
VI3
	
0.5104290
V14
	
0.5289365
VI5
	
0.6667331
VII
	
0.4778423
V'S
	
0.5911171
V17
	
0.3161685
V20
	
0.7993289
V21
	
0.7842791
V22
	
0.9279162
V24
	
0.1764195
V26
	
0.398161?
V27
	
0.9581067
V28
	
0.7964755
V29
	
0.8785336
V30
	
0.8329811
MINIMUM
TO
0.1624146
0.3136713
0.3493684
0.4604161
0.2347246
0.1832067
0.4537368
0.4254221
0.4502239
0.4613444
0.3737778
0.3717586
0.4277505
0.4351787
0.3124255
0.3161685
0.4276886
0.3921431
0.4513463
0.1902891
0.31362'76
0.4613283
0.4472866
0.4613127
0.4611340
F TO ENTER
1.8039
0.66703E-01
.34391
0.11050E-01
.27893
0.23031E-03
0.46010E-01
1.5414
0.12391E-01
.47651
1.0383
.15397
0.16095E-03
0.48119E-03
0.21271E-01
0.26753E-01
.27434
0.35405E-01
.79972
.12773
5.5418
.15811
.20464
.42074
2.765/
MKS' LAMB::
0.2007!
0.21524
0.2127Q
0.21571
0.21336
0.21581
0.21541
0.20281
0.21577
0.21161
0.20685
0.21444
0.21581
0.21587
0.2156!
0.2156E
0.21340
0.21552
0.2088E
0.21465
0.1753!
0.2144Z
0.2/401
0.21212
0.19351
0.2158 1V31	 0.9338558 0.4576507 	 0.14736E-03
\11420 MAY 88
	 Comparison of Profitable and Insolvent Comanies
\c	 PAGE
FIGURE 5.1: ONE PARTICULAR. STEP IN STEPWISE METHOD
79
r LE	 OR TOLERANCE OR VIN INSUFFICIENT FOR FURTHER COMPUTATION.
A1 4 : 1 lAY 88
	
Comparison of Profitable and Insolvent Companies
\c	 PAGE 15
Loughborough University	 Honeywell 68/80 Multics
MEF
ACTION
:)"ERED	 REMOVED
VARS
IN
SUMMARY TABLE
WILKS'
LAMBDA	 SIG.	 LABEL
1 ' 1 .66258 .0006
2 .47336 .0000
3 .	 2 3 .35081 .00eo
4 ,:! 4 .25383 .0000
5 .21584 .0000
6 .2 6 .17535 .0000
7 •74 .15087 .0000
8 .: 1 8 .13503 .0000
9 V12 7 .13517 .0000
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT F UNCTIONS	 •
PERCENT OF CUMULATIVE	 CANONICAL :	 AFTER
	
EIGENVALUE
	
VARIANCE	 PERCENT	 CORRELATION : FUNCTION UILKS L
	
\cAMB: :
 CHI-SOUARED
	
D.F. SIGNIFICANCE
0	 0.1351
\c694	 51.031
	
0. 0000
1:	 6.39813
	 100.0fl	 100.00	 0.9299627
FIGURE 5.2: THE SUMMARY OF ALL THE STEPS IN THE STEPWISE
METHOD
80
F TO ENTER
.46462
0.32042E-03
.80408
.45011
.50261
.13911
0.49684E-01
.64035
0.85863E-01
.28084
0.23381E-01
.49203
1:gitNE:13
.17501
.11248
0.45041E-01
.12648
.11060
.68119
0.69288E-02
0.13368E-01
.44794
0.67571E-01
WILKS' LAMBDA
0.13237
0.13517
0.13040
0.13246
0.13215
0.13432
0.13486
0.13106
0.13464
0.13347
0.13503
0.13221
1 . 1+11;	 I
0.13411
0.13448
0.1348?
0.13440
0.13449
0.13111
0.13513
0.1350
0.13217
0.134-6
r14	 MMO INCEIUVLV rftlin	 Mt WImLIDia.
WILKS' 1_4*1::m
	
0.13517
EQUIVALE4-
	
21.0224
DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIE.
	 BETUEEA\
7	 1	 27.0
7	 23.0 0.0000
VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS AFTER STEP
	 9
VARIABLE	 -!LERANCE
V6	 f f502124
V17	 f :447527
V23	 f :829541
V24	 f )434045
V25	 f f113777
V26	 f :479918
V30	 t 2915605
F TO REMOVE
29.295
29.648
16.182
13.928
19.161
8.5112
6.8454
inutg- LeBDA
v.30,34
0.30941
0.23027
0.21703
0.24772
0.18519
0.17540
VARIABLES NOT IN THE ANALYSTS AFTER STEP	 9	 ---
MINIMUM
VARIABLE Tr_ERANCE TOLERANCE
VI	 f. 546806 0.1546806
V2	 C.:903695 0.2306829
V3	 f.:526145 0.2643240
V4	 C.:003164 0.2795612
V5	 t.:270301	 0.1956506
V7	 C. '47145 0.1747145
V8	 f.E.336324 0.2810149
V9	 f.f'67617 0.2801188
V10	 C. 359510 0.2828644
V11	 e.:100130 0.2775873
V12	 0.'595183
	
0.1491418
V13	 0.4297389 0.2194048
8:3MIA
V16	 0.735249 0.2652799
V18	 f.f415379 0.2417479
V19	 O.:171498 0.2593306
V20	 0.-387956 0.2726227
V21	 0.-220602 0.2716766
V22	 0.627341 0.2793084
V27	 0.404892 0.2826655
V28	 0.-182636 0.2748877
V29	 0.042650 0.2795671
V31	 0.=175061 0.2792637
F LEVEL OR TCLERANCE OR VIN INSUFFICIENT FOR F1 7- HER CPPUTIATION.
\ 1 1420 MAY 88
	 Comparison of Profitable and I r: 31vsnt Companies\r	 C.Arr	 4=
FIGURE 5.3: SHOWS THE FINAL STEP OF ANALYSIS IN THE
STEPWISE METHOD
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UOSTANDARDIZED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
FUNC	 1
V6 -16.06449
V17 2.848277
V23 -.4894365
V24 .2345166
V25 -.6957342
V26 .6957439
V30 .5972381
(CONSTANT) -2.854138
,..NONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS EVALUATED AT CROUP MEANS :mur CENTROIDS)
GROUP	 FUNC	 1
FIGURE 5.4: THE UNSTANDARDISED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT
FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
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CASE	 MIS
\cINANT
SEGNUM	 VAL	 SEL
\c...
ACTUAL
GROUP
HIGHEST PROBABILITY
GROUP P(11/G)	 P(G/D)
2ND HIGHEST
GROUP P(61D)
DISCRIM
SCORES
1 1 1	 0.7082 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.4401
2 1 1	 0.1939 1.0000 2 0.0000 -3.1135
3 1 1	 0.6821 1.0010 2 0.0000 -2.2240
4
5
1
1
1	 0.0371
1	 0.1307
0.9179
0.9952
2
2
0082.0R 1
0.0048
0. 2700
-0.3030
6 1 1	 0.8858 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.9579
7 1 1	 0.8725 1.0010 2 0.0000 -1.9749
8 1 1	 0.2105 1.0100 2 0.0000 -3.0666
9
10
1
1
1	 0.8708
1	 0.1115
1.0100
0.9929 2 0:: 00;1 :16170.2;29
11 1 1	 0.8525 1.01110 2 0.0000 -1.6284
12 1 1	 0.8702 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.9778
13 1 1	 0.1149 1.0000 2 0.0000 -3.3910
14 1 1	 0.324 7 1.0010 2 0.0000 -2.7992
15 1 1	 0.3745 1.0000 2 0.0000 -2.7024
16 1 1	 0.2483 0.9992 2 0.0008 -0.6598
17 1 1	 0.4542 0.9999 2 0.0001 -1.0660
18 1 1	 0.406 : 1.0000 2 0.0000 -2.6437
19 1 1	 0.968 - 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.7752
20
21
22
23
24
1
2
2
...4
q
,
1	 0.884 -
2	 0.4487
2	 0.844f
2	 0.411!
2 0.030 :
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
0.9999
0.8843
2
1
1
1
1
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0001
0.1157
-14::55;40
3.4950
2.4775 '
1.1404
iv
.L.J 14 2 0.22t: 1.0000 1 0.0000 4.5116
26 2 2 0.462E 1.0000 1 0.0000 4.0330
27 2 2 0.43t z 0.7999 1 0.0001 2.5189
28 2 2 0.850 1 1.0000 1 0.0000 3.1102
29
30
31
2
2
2
2	 0.9364
2	 0.876:
2	 0.416:
1.0000
1.0000
1.0010
1
1
1
0.0000
0.0000
6.0000
3.
 3787
34541.
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CLASSIFICATION PROCESSING SUMMARY
31 CASES UER C PROCESSED.
0 CASES UERE EXCLUDED FOR MISSING -? OUT-O P -RANGE GROUP CODES.
0 CASES HAD AT LEAST ONE MIGGINC	 VARIA.BLE.
14 	  urnr isern rnn nnTurrn neurn.-
FIGURE 5.5: THE DISCRIMINANT CORES
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Classification is achieved by using classification functions, one for
each group. These functions are derived from the pooled within groups
covariance matrix and the centroids of the discriminating variables.
The resulting classification coefficients are to be multiplied by the
raw variable values, summed together, and added onto a constant. The
classification function for one group would appear as:
C1 = Ci1V1 C12V2 + • • • + CiriVn Ci0
where C1	is the classification score for group 1
Cil ... • are the classification coefficients
C10	 is the constant
Vi	 Vn are the raw values of the discriminant variables
There is always a separate equation for each group. Similarly,
classification functicns for group 2 appear as:
C.2 =	 + CjV2 +	 + CinVn +	 ...
Thus in this research each case has two scores. The case would be
classified into the group for which it had the highest score, see
Figure 55.
Under the assumptions of multivariate normal distributions the
clastion scores can be converted Into probabilities of group
membership. The rules of assigning a case to the group for which it
has the highest score is then equivalent to assigning the case to the
group for which it has the greatest probability of membership.
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Figure 5.5 Shows the highest probability with discriminant scores.
Further results of computer print outs are Shown in Appendiac,_.
5.5 REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR PREDICTING BANKRUPTCY
5.5.1 Introduction
Two further predicting models were developed In the form of regression
techniques, less complicated than the discriminant models, as follows.
The first was developed from the same financial ratios of "failed" and
"non-failed" groups which applied in the discriminant model described
in the previous section. The dependent variables were calculated from
the same Z-score as the developed model. This procedure further
reduced the number of discriminant variables from 7 to 5.
The &Wald model was also developed from the same financial ratios but
used the dependent variables calculated from the Mason and Harris'
model pUbliShed in 1979, updated for operational use.
5.5.2 The Multiple Regrcsosial Model 1
A simple regression analysis between Z-soores calculated from the
developed model and financial ratios, of "failed 11" and "non-failed
20" groups, was carried out. After using the stepwise technique
available in the Mini-tab programme, the following results were
obtained (by taking the value of Z-scores fnan discriminant scores and
converting the sign) (+) to (-):
Z = 2.81 - 2.84 Ci7 + 15.3 C6 - 2.08 Ci2 + .581 C25 + .282 C23
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where: C17 - as a ratio of current assets to net assets
C6
 - as a ratio of earning after tax and interest to net
capital employed
C12 - as a ratio of interest to earning before tax and
interest
C25 = Tax trend:
Tn + T(n_i)
2	 - T(n_2)
T(n-2)
C23
 - as ratio of turnover to net assets.
See Appendix C.
5.5.3 The Regression Model 2
A seoond regression analysis was performed between Z-values calculated
from Mason's model and financial ratios of "non-failed 20" groups.
Again after using the stepwise technique the following results were
obtained:
Z = 3.47 + 74.5 C4 - 14.7 C11 + 3.37 C26 - 5.17 C13
where: C4
 is ratio of earnings before tax and interest to net capital
employed
C11 is a ratio of debtor to current liabilities
C13 is a ratio of current liabilities to net assets
C26 : Earnings after tax trend
See Appendix C.
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5.6 DISCUSSION
The multivariate methodology used in this research is based upon the
following goals:
1. The variables used should be multivariate normal distributed.
The solution suggested in the previous sturlies is that the data
should be transformed on a univariate basis to improve univariate
normality and this should have the desired effect of increasing
the probability of multivariate normality.
2. The individual variable should measure different financial
characteristics.
Correlation between variables has been tested in a way that any
ratio which is highly correlated with other ratios that describe
similar aspects of the covany's financial structure should be
discretised as a result when the correlation between variables
was 0.7 or more. One of them was selected for inclusion in the
analysis. In this way the large number of variables was reduced
from 82 to 31.
Despite arguments that multicollinearity is not important in LDA
(e.g. Eisenbeis, 1977 [31]) it was considered for the purpose of
this study to be appropriate to limit the variables to measure
different financial structures.
3. A stepwise linear discriminant package SPSS-X was utilised and
after many runs the model developed.
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The procedure presented here is based on the unstandardised
coefficient. They are most useful when their values are multiplied by
the raw values of the associated variables to arrive at edismixdront
Z-score" taking into account that the function has to be multiplied by
twice the mean of classification scores for each group as an
adjustment factor.
The "standardised coefficients" which are related to weight of
regression analysis were rejected and not taken into account. Instead
the "inter-correlations in the variables set" were used to form the
model. "Standardised Coefficients" however are still accepted in some
literature [36] and further discussion will follow in a later sectim.
Two additional predictive models were developed during the research
based on the multiple regression technique, aimed at reducing the
number of discriminant variables in the final model and also to update
the Mason model to fit the changes in economy after ten years of
operational use.
Finally, the use of multiple regressian should not be considered as a
substitute for LDA and should be viewed as a method for unravelling
the complexities of WA .
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CHAPTER 6 
THE RESULTANT MODEL
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This section includes a description of the discriminant model, and its
constituent variables, together with the relationship between the
ratios and contribution of each ratio to the model. The cut-off
value for the model is also included.
The final prediction model produced in the research is made up of
seven variables, measuring five distinct aspects of a company's
financial structure. Good discrimination between "solvent" and
"failed" companies was evident. Considerable effort was made to
reduce the number of discriminating variables in the function from
seven to some smaller, more easily bandied, say five variables, using
regression techniques.
6.2 THE RESULTANT MODEL
The following seven variable linear function resulted:
Z = Co + C6V6 + C171117 + C23 V23 + C24V24 + C25V25 + C26V26 + C30/30
Where Co, C6, C17, C23 , C24, C25, C26, C30 denotes the coefficients.
V6 , V17 , V23 , V24 , V25 , V26 , V30 denotes the discriminant
variables.
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CO =
C6 =
C17 =
c23=
C24 =
C25 =
C26=
C30=
14.6
82
-14.5
2.5
-1.2
3.55
-3.55
-3
The modl e is :
Z = 14.6 + 82V6 - 14.5V17 + 2.5V23 - 1.2V24
+ 3.55V25	3.55V26 - 3V30
6.3 THE CCNSTITUENT VARIABLES
The constituent variables in the developed model are as follows:
1. V6: Ratio of earnings after tax and interest charge to net
capital employed.
This is a profitability measure, and takes into account all the
net assets plus the short term loan which is used to finance the
company. The net capital employed may be defined as fixed assets
plus working capital, and is often used for (RCCE) in published
accounts. i.e. return on capital employed (ROCE)
This ratio is a valuable guide to the profitability of the
companies. The values appear positive in solvent companies and
tend towards the negative in failed olompanies.
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2. V17 : Ratio of current assets to net assets:
This is a financial leverage measure. Failed firms consistently
have less current assets including cash than non-failed firms.
However, some failed firms also have a high ratio since net
assets decrease continuously leading to an increase in this
ratio. The ability of a firm to meet its short-term financial
obligations without having to liquidate its long-term assets is
an important factor in the consideration of lenders, the extreme
case of such an inability is bankruptcy.
3. V23 : Ratio of turnover to net assets
This ratio is one measure of how well a company has used its
productive capacity which is usually considered in failed firms
rather than solvent companies, due to lack of response to market
situation. However, some failed firms also have high ratios. An
experimental ratio may be that for increasing turnover/net assets
accompanied by decline in net assets. Also some failed companies
may be increasing turnover by overtradng, a usual phenomenon in
failed companies.
4. V24 : Ratio of short term loan to earnings before tax and
interest charget
Short term loans are taken as being the loan and overdrafts
appearing in the company's current liabilities statemnt. It
shows the relative safety of short-term loans compared to
earnings before tax and interest charges. This ratio is one
measure of a coMpany's liquidity.
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5. V25 : Tax trend
The tax trend tends towards the negative in failed ocmpanies. As
a company becomes "better off" the trend increases, beaming
negative in failed companies. In the author's case tax is a
portion of profit paid to the Goverment, thus when a company
does not achieve profitability, no tax is paid.
6. V25 : Earnings after tax trend
The earnings after tax trend tends towards the negative in failed
companies. Again as a company becomes "better off" the trend
increases, becoming negative in the failed companies.
7. V30 : Short term loan trend
The short term loan trend has the advantage of measuring the
liquidity over several years. The majority of construction
ompardes are dependent an short-term loans. In practice long-
term nature, for example, the bank overdraft which a firm obtains
or the credit extended to it by its trade creditors, will be
available to the company without any further negotiation, unless
drastic changes occur in the ccmpany or in the general eammy.
Generally, failed ccmpanies are highly dependent an short-term
loans more than non-failed firms. As a campany becares "wcame
off" the trend increases, reaching crisis level before the
collapse.
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Table 6.1 shows the constituent ratios and financial aspect
measurements.
Ratio No Description of Ratio Finanical Aspect
Measurement
6 PAT/NE PROFITABILITY
17 CA/NA FINANCIAL LEVERAGE
23 TURN/NA ACTIVITY/ASSETS TURNOVER
24 STL/EBIT LIQUIDITY
25 TAX-TREND )
26 PAT-TREND ) TREND MEASUREMENT
30 STL-TREND )
TABLE 6.1: THE CONSTITUENT RATIOS IN THE MCDEL
6.4 THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE RATIOS
As mentioned previously, the resultant model consists of seven
discriminant variables measuring four financial aspects. The
profitability measures were found to contribute much to the
discrimination followed by the financial leverage measure, asset
turnover and liquidity measure. The last three discriminators
representing the trend measures are the least discriminant of the
variables.
It seems that trend measurement was significant and confirmed in this
research, when the trend measurements were included. By comparing the
resultant model with previous studies, the author concludes that the
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profitability measure contributes the most because a firm earning
profit almost never fails. Also it may be concluded that inclusion of
TURN/NA ratio in the author's model produced similar results to
Altman, using the numerator of the ratio, turnover. The major
difference from all other models was its measures of profit after tax
and interest omitted elsewhere. Taffler [11] stipulated that only
ratios measuring different aspects should be in the same model. These
restricticns were postulated to reduce the Likelihood of sample bias
being present in the model construction. Nbt all previous works,
however, have agreed with these views [19][21]. IndeedNlasion included
two ratios measuring a similar dimension and, therefore, these two
ratios are highly correlated.
The author-derived model contained several measures of trends
apparently without detrimental effects. Table 6.2 shows the
oarrelatdonmatrix of the ccnstituent variables.
It is interesting to note the lack of correlation between the variable
set used to form the model since the purpose of this kind of study is
to limit the variables to measure different financial structures.
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PAT/NCE CA/NA TURN/NA STL/EBIT TAX-	 PAT-	 STL_
TREND TREND	 TREND
PAT/N 1.0
CA/NA 0.18239 1.0
TURN/NA -0.1858 0.5950 1.0
STL/EBIT -0.0261 -0.1759 -0.2075 1.0
TAX-TREND -0.1461 0.2572 0.1206 0.2221 1.0
PAT-TREND -0.1117 0.0340 0.4180 0.0316 0.2356 1.0
STL-TREND 0.2399 0.1034 0.0399 -0.0886 0.0489 -0.0193 1.0
TABLE 6.2:	 )OLED WITHIN-GROUP CORRELATION MATRIX
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Ratios
	
Altman Taffler Mason Abidali_ Financial Aspects
Measurement
EBIT/CL
	 X
EBIT/NCE
	 X	 Profitability
EBIT/NA	 X
EBIT/Total assets X
PAT/NCE
Retained Earnings 
Total assets	 X
No credit interval	 X
Log (Day Debtors)
	 X
STL/EBIT	 X
Liquidity
Turnover/EBIT	 X
Sales/total assets X	 Activity
Dr/Ct
Current assets/	 Working
Total liability	 Capital
Market Value of Equity
Book value of debt X
CL/Total asset	 X	 Financial risk
CL/CA	 X
CA/NA	 X
Tax trend	 X
PAT trend
	
X
STL trend	 X
Debtor trend	 X
TABLE 6.3: SHOWS THE DESCRIPTION OF RATIOS AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS
MEASURE:NOM ACHIEVED BY PREVIOUS STUDIES AND THIS STUDY
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6.5 calnumurioN OF EACH RATIO TO THE MODEL
There are three methods to measure the contribution that a ratio makes
to the overall discriminating power of the model as follows:
1. Standardise coefficients:
This is a conventional method measuring the standardised
coefficient, as weights of constituents, of the model. The main
disadvantage concerns not taking into account the "inter-
correlations" in the variable set used to form the model [11].
The value of using "standardised coefficients" however, is still
accepted in some literature [36].
2. Mbsteller and Wallace's Method [35]:
This mrdel measures relative discriminant per as follows:
- Ri2)
Ri - 	
j	 Ci(C1 2i2)
i =1
where: Rj = the relative proportion of discrimination that
variable j accounts for
j the mean value of variable j for group 1l
j2 = the mean value of variable j for group 2
Cj = the standardised coefficient of variable j
n = the total number of variables in the model
There has been much debate on this approach which was adopted by
Taffler using the Cj's signed (+ or -), with R j 's not summed to
1.
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Others believe that in practice the Ci (ij r-ii2)'s must all have
the same sign and if they do not, due to multicollinearity, then
it is not possible to interpret the associated variables in any
meaningful way. This concept was valuably demonstrated by Mason
[17], where the variables measuring profitability showed high
correlation. On this evidence, the relative contributions of the
different variables, using the Mbsteller and Wallace method, are
questionable.
Similar conclusions can thus be made on why Taffler made the
restriction that only ratios measuring different aspects s'holiLd'
be In the same model.
3. Conditional deletion:
Qualitatively measures method of the additional contribution of
each variable to the discriminant function with the other
variables included, resulting in a ranking of the constituent
variables, from F to inter or remove values. Altman adopted this
method.
The results for the three methods are shown in Table 6.4.
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Using standardised
coefficients method
Using Mbsteller &
Wallace method
CordilAcrod
deletion method
(F-value ranking)
V6 PAT/NCE 15 9 2 (29.295)
V17 CA/NA 20 11 1 (29.648)
V	 TURN/NA23 19 15 4 (16.182)
V24 STL/EBIT 12 40 5 (13.928)
V25 TAX TREND 14 15 3 (19.161)
V26 PAT TREND 11 8 6 (8.5112)
V30 STL TREND 9 2 7 (6.845)
TABLE 6.4: SHCWS CONTRIBUTION OF RATIOS TO MODEL
Both Taffler [11] in his multivariate study, and Beaver [3] in his
univariate study conclude that short term liquidity is less important
in determining a firm's solvency than permanent aspects. It appears
Altman's method of using conditional deletion is more convincing than
Taffler's method in measuring the contribution of each variable to
discriminant function. Furthermore, the standardised coefficients are
used when the variables are standardised to a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one, which is impossible in financial ratios.
Therefore, the unstandardised coefficient method seems more reliable.
However, the magnitude of the unstandardised coefficients is not a
good index of relative importance when the variables differ in the
units in which they are measured. Nevertheless variables with large
coefficients are thought to contribute more to the overall
discriminant function (see pp 91 [36]).
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6.6 THE CUT-OFF BEIWEEN CROUPS AND GFEY-ARER
6.6.1 Introduction
The aim of this section is to determine the cut-off between grcups in
order to minimise the total number of misclassifications by locating
the Z-value for which the company cannot be classified as belonging to
failed or solvent groups. The overlap between the distribution of "Z"
values for both failed and non-failed groups where misclassification
can occur. In this region two types of error occur, namely type I
errors, are defined as misclassification of "failed" company as "non-
failed", and type II errors as misclassifications of "non-failed" as
failed. Ignoring the cut-off between groups gives rise to serious
errors in interpreting the results from application of a derived
discriminant functim, for example, Altman and Eisenbeis [33] show
that when the prior probabilities are arbitrarily set to 0.01 and 0.99
for a bankrupt and non-bankrupt firm respectively, then the type I
error (misclassification of a bankrupt as a non-barialiptoccurs).
Experierce with the TisShaw (1976) [37] model for the analysis of
privately owned manufacturing companies in practical application
provides a low type I error rate but a wide number of type II errors.
Taffler (1982) suggested for privately owned manufacturing and
omstruction enterprises a cut-off point of (-1.6), though in one of
his prrevims studies in 1976 he suggested a zero cut-off point.
Altman (1968) suggested a cut-off point of -2.99. The procedure which
was adopted in this study to determine the cut-off point was based on
two methods:
- mathematical methods
- prior probabilities and misclassification costs estimation method.
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After determining the cut-off point, furthermore, there will be a need
to set "grey area" limits in order to minimise the total number of
misclassifications.
6.6.2 Mathematical Derivation of the cut-Off Point
The mathematical derivation of the amputational formula of the cut-
off point for the two groups, presented here, was developed by Paul
[34]. In order to set the cut-off point mathematically it is possible
to determine the desired value if the distributicns of "Z" values are
known on the assumption that the distributions are normal, the cut-off
point which minimises the total number of misclassifications is found
by locating the "Z" value for which the ordinates are equal. The area
of misclassification is the sum of the integrals of the two density
functions evaluated from the cut-off point to positive infinity for
the distribution having lesser mean and from negative in infinity to
cut-off point for the distribution having the greater value as shown
in Figure 6.1.
This area can be minimised by setting the first derivative of the
function so is defined equal to zero, and solving for the cut-off
point. The derivative of the definite integral above is the difference
between the two density functions at the cut-off point, the
ccmputaticns are as follows:
0 1 = mean of the first group
11 2 = mean of the second group
al = standard deviation of the first group
02 = standard deviation of the second group
Zc = cut-off point "Z" value.
as shown in Figure 6.1.
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FIGURE 6.1
(ZC-111)2	 (Zc-u2)2
1 	
. e-1/2 02	 =01. 1 	 e-1/2 G1	 -
12Tr.01
	 2n.02
,Z x- , ZFI.L 2 )N 2	 0 - 412
2. 02 .e112/ k 02	 - 01' e 11'2k 01 
I
3. By logarithiming both sides:
1 Zc -u2 2	 1 ,Zc-u1.2log a2 + 2 ( 02  ) - log al
 + 2 t  01  )
Zc2-2Zcu2+u224. log 01 - log 02 - 	
4022
Zc2-2Zcui+u3.2
401
2
5. ( 1	 1	 2 + Ili	 u22 ) Zc	(	  	 ) Z +
	
4 022 4 a1	  01
2 2 w2, 2 c
( u22 ul2
4 022 4 0 1
2 - log a l + log 02 ) = 0
This equation can be solved by use of the quadratic formula.
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where:
a = ( 1	 - 	)
a22 4 a 1
2
b = (	 -  112	  )
2(1 i2 2 22
u22
	ul2C = (	 - 	
 - log a l + log a2)
4 22 4a12
To determine Zc:
_ -b ib2
 - 4acZc
	2a
A graphical representation of the distribution of "Z" values actually
computed for the individua l s in the sample problem is made in Graph
6.2.
The range of "Z" values is divided into segments of 3 units, and the
frequency indicated on the graph is the number of "Z" values failing
within a particular segment.
The histograms closely reseMble the superimposed normal curves as
Shown in Figure 6.2 which represent the distribution of "Z" values
based on the assumption that the population are normal, and that the
samples means and standard deviation are the population means and
standard deviations (see Appendix E).
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There is only a very slight overlap in the "Z" value over two graphs
and the F ratio indicates a significant difference between the two
groups. Statistical test is shown in Appendix E.
The determine the cut-off point mathematically, by applying the
formula:
(	 1 _	 1 ) z 2 4. ( ul _	 u2	 )Z
A0 2 A- 2 c 2012 2	 c
'2	 2 '2 ul 4 02
U22
+ ( 	 ul
2
- log al + log 02 ) = 0
4 0 22 4 01
2
a=(	 _(	 11 
4022 4012
ulb - ( 	
 - 
U2 
2 )2012
 202
U22 u 2
c- - ( 	  
	  - log al + log a2)
4 022 4 012
z _ -b ±/ b2 - 4ac
2a
ul = 9.60 u2 = -14.3
al = 6.324
022 = 6.123
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\a = 0.00042
b = 0.11977 + .1908 = 0.316
c = 204.5 _ 91.5 
-0.8 + 0.7869 = 0.777150	 159.7
= 1.3633 - 0.5729 - .80 + 0.7869 = 0.777
Therefore zc
 = -3.48.
••••
•
-15 -12 -9 -6 -3 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
FIGURE 6.2: THE CUT-OFF BETWEEN "NON-FAILED 20" AND "FAILED 11"
GRCUPS
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6.6.3 Prior Probability and Misclassification Costs EstimaticnEthod
Previous studies discussed these issues. Tollefson [24] and Mbrrison
[23], Pincher (1980), Taffler (1982, 1984) all concluded that ignoring
such issues leading to serious errors in interpreting the results from
application of a derived discriminant function.
The classification procedure used In this study takes into account
differential prior probability estimates and misclassification costs
in determining an appropriate cut off.
The assignment functicns used are those used in many previous studies
and are of the form:
P(g) _  ez 
ez + L
and P(f) -  e-z	 (1)
e-z + .1
where: P(g) = probability with which the company under investigation
should be classed as resembling the "non-failed 20"
grouP
P(f) = probability with which the company under investigation
should be considered to resemble the "failed 1'1" group
L = the 'likelihood' or 'probability-cost' ratio
= odds ratio x costs ratio
_ P2 , C21
C12
(2)
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where P1 and P2 are the prior probability estimates (failedlvent).
C12 and C21 are the estimated costs of misclassification of a
"solvent" firm" as "insolvent" and vice versa respectively (type
I:type II errors).
In the two groups linear discriminant model that if f 1(X) and f2(X)
are the multivariate normal distributed probability density functions
for the "solvent" and "insolvent" populations and the conventional
equality of dispersion matrices assumption holds then
fl(X) _ ez
f2(X)
By applying Bayesian formula, if H1
 represents the statement that a
firm belongs to the "solvent" population and H2 that it belongs to the
"insolvent" population then the posterior probability p(Hi/x) taking
into account differential prior probabilities and misclassification
costs is given by
0
P1C12P(X/H1)p(Hl/X) -
P1C '12P(X/H1) P2C21P(X/n2)
Plcl2f1(x)
P1c12f1(x) P2c21f2(x)
Therefore p(g) -  ez 
ez + L
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and	 p(H2/X) 1 - p(Hi/X)
Therefore p(f) -  e-z 
e-z 4. 1
In practice the prior odds ratio can be gained from statistical
evidenoe, but the misclassification costs ratio is more difficult to
estimate and is generally reached through subjective estimation. The
costs ratic)used in previous work has varied but has generally-been, of
the same magnitude. Laurence, Prust and COmpany and Taffler [12] in
their studies used a cost ratio of 40/1 and Altman [9] in one of his
studies suggested a ratio of 35/1.
The prior odds ratio has been approximated using the information in
Table 6.5.
Year	 Approx NO of	 Approx NO of Firms	 A/B
Insolvencies (A)
	
in the Industry (B)
1982 1422 63169 1/44
1986 1914 75810 1/39
TABLE 6.5: SHOWS THE INSOLVENCIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The average ratio for two years is approximately 1/41.5.
If we considered a "costs ratio" of 40:1 as used in previous studies,
we arrive at a "probability-cost" ratio L of unity, the same as
concluded by Mason [17]. In this study the cut-off point is specified
as the point where there is equal probability of belonging to the
"failed" and "non-failed" groups or equal numbers of potential
failures and solvent ccmpanies in the population. That is to say:
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P(g) = P(f) = 50%
and from	 p(g) _  e 
ez + L
where L = 1.0.
We arrive at a cut-off point of Z=0. This is a mathematical proof for
Z-model based on prior probability and misclassification costs. By
canparing this result with the mathematical approach it seems too
cautious in determining the cut-off value from -3.48 to zero.
Therefore, any company having a positive Z-soare on the model will
have a higher probability of membership of the 'non-failed" group than
the "failed" group and will be classified as "non-failed". Similarly,
a negative Z-score will classify a company as "failed".
6.6.4 Grey-Area
Previous studies specified "grey-areas" for example Altman [8] and
Mason [17]. This 'area' is one within which an aaAmate classification
of a company is not possible, i.e. the overlap region where
misclassification can occur. This is to say that the difference
between the probabilities of group membership D = P(g) - P(f) is
small.
Some advocates of this system appear to be too cautious in setting
their "grey-area" limits. Their limits were set at P(g) = 95% and P(f)
= 95%. However these limits mean that companies confidently
classified in a particular group have to have odds of 19 to 1 or more
of belonging to that group.
These odds seem very restrictive and odds of 10 to 1 or 5 to 1 might
be more appropriate. Laurence, Prust and Co [22] in one of their
studies used an "odd ratio" 1:10 and commented "this will of course
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e-Z + 1
vary over time with economic situation". Therefore, it needs
subjective estimation based on the economic environment. Furthermore
the "grey-area" limits should be set by users of the model.
This study set two probabilities at 95%. The limits are calculated
using the same function used in calculating the cut-off value:
P(g) _ ez	 and	 P(g) -	 e-z
zz + 1
By putting P(g) = 95% and P(f) = 95% the "grey-area" limits are t
2.94.
6.7 sumunr AND CONCLUSIONS
The results from applying the linear discriminant analysis technique
produced a linear discriminant model made up of seven variables,
measuring five distinct aspects of a company's financial structure,
namely profitability, liquidity, activity, financial leverage and
three trend measurements, as Shown In Table 6.1.
The computed F-statistic for the overall model was 40.5 and tabular
ratio was 5.42 where degree of freedoms were 2 and 29 at the 1%
significance level. Therefore it has been concluded that the ability
of the discriminant model to differentiate between groups is good (see
Appendix E).
Two issues should thus considered. Firstly, the influence of each
variable in a model. Previms studies suggested a number of methods
which were attempted to determine the relative importance of
individual variables. Five such methods were cansidemed by Eisfarteds,
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Gilbert, and Avery [32]. A sixth method had been suggested by
Mmteller and Wallace [35] and Joy and Tollefson [24]. Therefore the
selEtion of methods which were used in this research study were based
on their credibility among the model builders. Three methods were
eiployed in this research programme as Shown in Table 6.4. It was
=lauded that the F-deletion method was suitable for discriminant
analysis.
As dente seen from the results (see Table 6.4) both profits after tax
trend and short term loan trend are the least discriminant of the
variables, while tax-trend is relatively ruLe important than theother
trends. Whereas the profit after tax as a ratio to net capital
eiplayed and current assets as a ratio to net assets are consistently
good discriminators. Short term loans as a ratio to pre-tax profit is
less important compared to other fundamental aspects of company
financial structure such as profitability and financial leverage
ratios.
The seoond issue to be considered is the cut-off and grey-area of the
model. Two approaches were undertaken in determining the cut-off
between two groups, as demonstrated in Section 6.6.
Clearly it was ccncluded that the mathematical approach indicated
validation of the technique. The cut-off value of the distribution of
Z-values for both the "non-failed 20" and "failed 11" groups as shown
in Figure 6.2 are approximately equal to the calculated value of the
cut-off point derived from this equation Zc = 73.48. The Z-value is
that a company cannot be classified to belong to a failed or solvent
group. This is the critical approach to the classification of a
oartimmy, in order to use the model for operational classification
purposes.
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It is necessary to specify "grey-areas". The "area" within which an
accurate classification of a company is not possible, the overlap
region in the original sample where misclassifications can occur. As
shown in Figure 6.2 there is only a very slight overlap in the "Z"
value over two distributions, in this region two types of error can
occur. Type I errors, defined as misclassification of failed company
as non-failed and type II errors, defined as misclassification of non-
failed companies as failed.
By considering prior probability and misclassification costs estimates
arrivirbg to cut-off zero-value, this was reached through subjective
estimation and grey-area limits of i 2.94. Thus any company having a
Z-score within these limits cannot be confidently classified and can
only be considered "vulnerable"
The Lachenbruch Ur-test errors indicated no type I errors and two type
II errors for both models within these limits. This is a clear
indication of the success in the selection of the limits. The type II
errors were not considered to be misclassifications. As the sample of
"non-failed" firms was not restricted to healthy firms, one would
expect to find a few weak firms in the "non-failed" sample and it is
these firms that have been aRsigned low Z-soores.
Finally, the existence of such a "grey-area" dbes not detract fran the
usefulness of the LDA method, it simply Obliges the analyst to make
further and more detailed analysis of the firm in this range of Z-
scores.
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RESULTS FMM 1 11E MCIDELS
7.1 INI'RODUCrION
The model was verified using the data described in Section 7.2, and
includes the results obtained from the "Non-failed 20" and "Failed 11"
groups.
The model also deals with prior year Z-score analysis for both "Non-
failed 20" and "Failed 11" groups, and briefly illustrates the
characteristics of both groups.
Section 7.3 includes the results obtained from the failed and non-
failed group by using the alternative regressiciamod61.
Section 7.4 includes the results obtained from the failed and non-
failed groups by updating Mason's model.
Section 7.5 illustrates the trend analysis for an groups.
Section 7.6 explains the use of financial ratios as a means of
predicting failure.
The final section briefly discusses the results and summarises results
in graOhical and tabular form.
A comprehensive listing of results for all the companies used in the
study appears in Appendix D.
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7.2 RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "NON-FAILED 20" AND "FAILED 11"
GROUPS
7.2.1 Introduction
The model was first examined with the data used to form the model in
order to check the performance of each company added to the model
itself. This procedure was carried out for two reasons: firstly, to
identify the companies in danger of failure. Secondly, because of the
difficulty in Obtaining financial information suitable to explore such
amodel.
The following summarises the results.
7.2.2 The Results of "Non-Failed 20" and "Failed 11" Groups
The results obtained from the "non-failed 20" and "failed 11" groups
used to form the model are Shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 and further
portrayed in histogram form in Figure 7.1.
Ignoring the 'grey area' developed in Section 6.6 and using the cut-
off as a classification boundary, we can see that 18 out of 20 in
solvent area and all companies in the failed-11 group were correctly
classified respectively.
However taking into account the 'grey area' limit ( t 2.94) we reach
the situation, Shown In Table 7.3 where 90% were correctly classified
with confidence in the "non-failed group" and 10% classified as
'vulnerable' 100% of "failed 11" group were correctly classified. Noi
misclassification existed in both groups.
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1983 1984 1985 1986 Mean
Aberdeen Const Ltd 15.5 12.8 14.8 10.0 13.27
Barratt Development 1.19 4.28 -14.3 13.19 3.59
Benlox Holdings plc 18.14 4.15 26.0 11.4 14.9
Benbailly Const plc 22.0 12.3 21.0 2.84 14.53
C H Beazer Holds 6.8 11.0 5.9 1.96 6.4
BICC plc 7.7 4.8 7.4 8.8 7.1
Brawn and Jackson 4.3 4.5 2.5 2.8 3.52
Bryant Holdings 10.3 7.5 5.7 4.8 7.07
Boulton & Paul plc 15.9 23.4 15.3 18.3 18.22
M J Geeson Gboup 18.24 32.0 18.0 13.5 20.4
George Wimpey plc 7.1 5.0 4.8 8.4 6.32
Henry Boot and Sons 4.5 4.6 -11.2 -5.3 -1.85
A Monk Cb Ltd 14.6 17.8 20.0 6.58 14.74
Nwarthill plc 12.0 8.6	 7.4 5.0 8.25
Rush & TOmpkins 1.38 .28 1.8 -3.7 -0.06
Taylor Woodrow 6.3 8.3 15.8 12.8 10.8
Tarmac plc 20.4 11.2 19.8 19.7 17.7
TilburyCcup plc 10.5 -2.0 3.0 9.2 5.17
Turriff Cbrp plc 6.0 -2.3 6.9 16.7 6.8
Wilson Cbnnolly 23.6 12.4 11.5 14.9 15.6
Averages: 11.34 9.0 9.10 8.59 9.6
TABLE 7.1: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "NON-FAILED 20" GROUP
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Years Prior to Failure
an
Failed Cbmpanies -3 -2 Last year
Beech Wood Group plc -1.07 -1.5 -9.8 -4.1
Cocksedge plc -35 +2.3 -35.5 -22.6
David Charles Ltd -18.7 -9.7 -25 -18.8
Crouch Group plc -6.4 -9.5 -14.5 -10.13
James H Dennis plc -6 -1 -19.4 -8.8
Mears Bros Ltd -7.7 -6.8 -34 -16
Milbury plc -17.7 -26 -11.4 -18.3
Modern Engineering Bristol -11	 -20 -33 -21.3
Moss Engineering Group -11 -13 -30 -18
Southern Cbnstruction +1 -12 -12.8 -7.66
S W Farmer +7.3 -27 -14.6 -11.5
Averages: -9.66 -11.5 -21.6 -14.3
TABLE 7.2: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "FAILED 11" GROUP
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4
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0
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	 0	 -3	 0	 -9 -12 -15 -18
FIGURE 7.1: HISTOGRAM OF THE "NON-FAILED 20" AND "FAILED 11" GROUPS
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The results indicate that the model is disarildmating between failed
and non-failed well in spite of the high risk of the oomicicuction
business.
Groups
Classified as
Failed Vulnerable "Nbn-failed"
"Failed 11" Group
"Non-failed 20" Group
11 (100)
-
-
2 (10)
-
18 (90)
TABLE 7.3: CLASSIFICATION OF THE "NON-FAILED 20" AND "FAILED 11"
GROUPS
(Figures in brackets are percentages of total groups)
7.2.3 Prior Year Z-Soore Analysis
Perhaps the most significant way in which to view the prior year's
analysis is to plot the average-scores for the different groups for
prior years. This plot can be seen in Figure 7.2.
We can see that although the "non-failed 20" group's mean Z-score
varies from year to year, it is constantly above the 'grey area'. The
"failed 11" group, on the other hand, is generally below the 'grey
area' This is a clear indication of the discriminating power of the
model.
The trend in the mean Z-scores reflects economic changes in the
constructicn industry from year to year with a downward trend durirxj
the period 1982-1986.
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Table 7.4 shows the model classifies 75% of the "non-failed" group as
"solvent" at year 4. Furthermore, taking 'grey area' limits (+2.94)
improves the mcdel classification by 15% and gives some indication of
discriminating per of the model, although the "non-failed 20" group
mean Z-score varies from year to year.
Table 7.4 shows prior years classification of the "non-failed 20"
group (figures in brackets are percentages of total groups).
Years 1983 1984 1985 1986
Solvent 19 (95) 17 (85) 16 (80) 15 (75)
Vulnerable 1	 (5) 3 (15) 2 (10) 3 (15)
Failed 2 (10) 2 (10)
Total: 20 20 20 20
Average Z-score: 11.34 9.0 9.1 8.59
TABLE 7.4
Table 7.5 shows prior years classification of the "failed 11" group.
Classification
Accounting year prior to company failure
-3 -2 Last year
Solvent 1	 (9)
Vulnerable 2 (18) 3 (27)
Failed 8 (73) 8 (73) 11 (100)
Total: 11 11 11
Average Z-score -9.66 -11.5 -21.6
TABLE 7.5
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The Z-soore fell below the cut-off level in the last year for two out
of 20 companies. These companies were as follows:
1. Henry Boot and Sons.
2. Rush and ToMkins Group plc.
We can thus conclude that a single Z-score for a particular period
may be insufficient to predict failure and a company's continuing
dependence on its capability.
Table 7.5 Shows how well the mcdel behaved with data in the year prior
to failure. It would be useful to consider how far in advance of
failure a firm starts to resemble previous bankrupts.
The results appear good with the model classifying 73% of the group as
failed up to three years prior to failure.
The Z-soore trends during the period 1982-1986 for the "non-failed 20"
firms and the last three years before failure of the "failed 11" firms
appear in Appendix D.
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7.3 mums FROM ITUE "TAKEN-OVER 9" CROUP
The results obtained from the "taken-over 9" group are Shown in Table
7.6 and prior years classificaticn of the "taken over 9" group as
shown in Table 7.7 below.
TAKEN-OVER COMPANIES -4 -3 -2 Last Year
Braithwaite Group plc
C Pearce and Sons plc
16.6
14.8
13
6.27
11.67
32
-14
5.6
Fairclough construction 13.6 17.9 14.7 22
Glossop plc 2.2 2.0 -2.7 2.4
Marchwiel plc 8 -23 -33 -7
Mitchell 0:instruction 13.2 -7.2 10.7 7.5
Richard Construction 17 14.3 17.6 15
Roberts Adlard plc 17 12.9 17.6 16.9
Rowlinson Cbnstruction 3.8 6.9 4.1 0.7
TABLE 7.6: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "TAKEN OVER 9" GRCUP
Classified as
Accounting year prior to company take-over
-3 -2 -1 Last year
Solvent 8 (89) 7 (78) 7 (78) 5 (56)
Vulnerable 1 (11) 1 (11) 2 (22)
Failed 2 (22) 1 (11) 2 (22)
Total: 9 9 9 9
Average Z-score 11.8 6.7 8 5.45
TABLE 7.7: PRIOR YEARS CLASSIFICATION OF THE TAKE OVER 9" GECUP
(Figures in brackets are percentages of total groups)
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The "taken-over" group have Z-scores ranging between "failed" and
"non-failed", indicating that there were no financial features
identifying the taken-over company. Also the results indicate that:
2 out of 9 companies were considered failed at last year
2 out of 9 companies were considered vulnerable.
The remaining five companies positively scared, but their Z-score
deteriorated from year to year. Similarly the Z-score approach can be
used to anlayse merger activity (e.g. Taffler, 1985 [16]).
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7.4 RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "NON-FAILED 20" AND "FAILED 11"
GROUPS BY USING AN ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION MDDEL
7.4.1 Introducticn
The alternative model (see Section 5.5.2) was developed from the
original Z model (see Section 6.2) using a regressicn technique and
was tested with data used to form the model. The results are
summarised below.
7.4.2 The Results of "Non-FaiLed 20" and "Failed 11" Groupe
The results obtained from the "non-failed 20" and "failed 11" groups
are given in Tables 7.8 and 7.9. By using the cut-off point Z 0 as
the classification boundary it can be seen that all 11 failed
companies were correctly classified, and 17 out of 20 non-failed
ccmpanies were correctly claczsified.
The model thus seems to be discriminating between solvent and
insolvent groups well. For the "failed 11" group the result appears
good with the model classifying 100% correctly. Table 7.10 shows the
classificaticn of the "non-failed 20" and "failed 11" groups using the
multiple regression model.
124
1983 1984 1985 1986 Mean
Aberdeen Const Ltd 2.96 2.39 2.3 1.44 2.272
Barratt Development 1.8 .77 -.5 1.118 0.797
Benlox Holdings plc 3.78 2.4 5.7 .36 3.06
Benbailly Const plc 11.7 -.82 -8.3 -5.8 -.800
C H Beazer Holds 1.433 4.5 .86 .386 1.794
BICC plc .67 .427 -5.22 +.685 -83
Brown and Jackson -.63 5.18 3.08 2.10 2.43
Bryan Holdings 1.68 1.237 2.02 .63 1.39
Boulton & Paul plc 2.98 2.53 2.24 2.84 2.64
M J Geeson Grcup 4.011 1.668 1.362 3.42 2.6
George Wimpey plc .391 -.34 .967 .508 0.38
Henry Boot and Sons 1.22 2.92 3.33 -1.2 1.567
A Monk Co Ltd 2.68 1.548 -.41 .242 1.013
Newarthill plc 2.4 1.837 1.218 .71 1.54
Rush &Tcutpkins -.296 -.165 -.18 -1.81 -.61
Taylor Woodrow 1.922 1.27 2.3 4.02 2.38
Tarmac plc 3.33 2.185 2.76 2.99 2.813
Tilbury Group plc 2.53 2.61 1.255 .8 1.79
Turriff Corp plc .048 -.728 .0238 1.79 0.283
Wilscn Connolly 4.77 2.42 2.26 3.66 3.27
Averages: 2.47 1.72 1.1 0.878 1.4969
TABLE 7.8: THE RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "NON-FAILED 20" GROUP BY
USING AN ALTERNATIVE MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
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Year Prior to Failure
Failed Cbmpanies -2 -1 Last year
Beech Wood Group plc -2.85 -1.27 -1.82
Cbcksedge plc -.94 -9.13 -3.17
David Charles Ltd -1.7 -3.55 -5.18
Crouch Group plc -2.15 -.62 .657
James H Dennis plc	 - -6.7 -1.1 -.76
Mears Bros Ltd -4.11 .53 -5.3
Milbury plc -6.7 -4.73 -2.16
Modern Engineering Bristol -4.36 -3.68 -5.7
Mbss Engineering Group -.75 -.187 -.87
ScuthernCOnstruction +.83 -9.34 -6.4
S W Farmer -2.816 -3.27 -4.012
Averages: -2.93 -3.4 -3.155
TABLE 7.9: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "FAILED 11" GROUP BY USING AN
ALTERNATIVE MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
Group
Classified as
Failed Vulnerable Nan-failed
"Failed 11" Group
"Non-failed 20" Group
9 (82) 2 (18)
9 (45) 11 (55)
TABLE 7.10: CLASSIFICATION OF THE "NON-FAILED 20" AND "FAILED 11" BY
USING MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
By taking the grey-area between -1.60 to zero, 82% are correctly
classified as failed, 55 are correctly classified as non-failed and
45% classified as vulnerable. The results do not appear as good as the
90% result of the "non-failed 20" group used to form the discriminant
model.
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For the "non-failed 20" group, three companies scored negatively in
the last year and these were:
3 - Rush and TOmkins Group plc
1 - Benbailly COnstruction plc
2 - Henry Boot and Sons plc.
7.4.3 The "Grey" Area of the Multiple Regression Mbdel 
The previous section has set a cut-off point Z = 0 as the
classificatian boundary, which divides the discriminant space into
solvent and Insolvent area.
This section attempts to develop the "grey-area" for the multiple
regression model in order to use the model for operational
classification purposes. This "area" is cne within which an accurate
classification of a company is not possible. An optimal line is
chosen through trial and error on the demarcation line for failing,
i.e. any firm below it being classified as a failed company. The
results are then compared with actual data to find the percentage of
incorrect predictian.
The ratio with the smallest percentage of misclassification is
considered the best predictor of failure. In our case, it was found
to be the (-1.6) threshold. Therefore, any company with a Z-soore less
than -1.6 was classified as failed whilst those firms with Z-scores
between zero and -1.6 were considered as vulnerable, so any company
having a Z-score within these limits cannot be confidently classified.
Finally, those firms .with a Z-score greater than zero (i.e. positive
scoring) may be assumed to lie in the solvent zone and can be
omfidently classified as "non-failed".
127
7.4.4 Prior Year Z-Score Analysis
Figure 7.3 shows that the mean Z-score of the "non-failed" group
varies from year to year but is constantly above the cut-off limit
i.e. the cut-off limit zero.
A canparison of the mean values of Z-scores for the "non-failed" group
for both models during the period 1982-1986 reveals 11.34, 9, 9.10,
8.59 and 2.47, 1.72, 1.1, .876 respectively which again varies from
year to year but were constantly Ngher • than the cut-off limit.
Applying both models for the last three years before failure produced
-9.66, -11.5, -21.6 and -2.93, -3.4, -3.155 respectively.
The trend of Z-scores in both models appears similar, see Figure 7.3.
Indeed for 10 out of 11 companies of the "failed 11" group their Z-
scores in the three years prior to failure scored negatively. One
company in particular, namely Southern Construction Ltd , had a Z-
spore in the three years prior to failure deteriorating from +0.83 to
-6.4. Thus it was classified as failed in its seoond year prior to
failure, althop4h it was apparent from the rate of decrease of its Z-
score that it was failing.
An exception was the Croudh Group plc, classified as failing in its
last year prior to failure, In spite of increasing the rate of Z-
=We. Hbwever looking at reasons for failure reveals that in spite
of the company's turnover increasing rapidly, severe losses had
occurred since April 1983 due to poor trading cncartracts obtained at
tight margins during a period of recession (see case study in Appendix
D). This is an ocomrrence which is impossible to forecast. Therefore
it may be concluded that any company overt:rading in its business may
produce a misleading Z-score.
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7.5 RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "NON-FAILED 20" AND "FAILED 11"
GROUPS BY UPDATING MASON'S MODEL
7.5.1 introduction
The updating of Mason's model (see Section 5.5.3) was developed from
data collected during this research work combined with Z .-SC:GT*3S from
Mason's original model for 1976 and also that data obtained for the
regression technique. The developed model (see Section 6.2) was
tested using the same data used to form the model itself. The
following summarises the results.
7.5.2 The Result
The results obtained from the "non-failed 20" and "failed 11" groups
are given in Tables 7.11 and 7.12.
Iglxximg the 'grey area' and using the cut-off as a classification
boundary it can be seen that 16 out of 20 in the solvent area, 2 out
of 11 of the "failed 11" group were also in the solvent area and only
9 of this group were correctly classified.
Figure 7.4 Shows that the mean Z-score of both non-failed and failed
groups varies from year to year. However for the non-failed group is
constantly above the classification boundary ( t
 2.94), labile for the
failed group the mean Z-score at the second year before failure lies
inside the classification boundary, but decreases dramatically at the
year of failure.
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1983 1984 1985 1986 Mean
Aberdeen Const Ltd 3.85 2.47 1.72 2.04 2.52
Barratt Development 10.0 2.7 -6.0 5.17 2.96
Benlox Holdings plc -7.1 1.65 -6.7 -6.6 -4.68
Benbailly COnst plc 3.8 5.2 -5.4 -6.6 -2.55
C H Beazer Holdings .72 9.7 8.7 6.27 6.3
BICC plc 2.07 -0.9 2.62 3.47 2.017
Brown and Jackson -.3 -5.3 1.14 -1.14 -1.4
Bryant Holdings 11.7 11.2 9.8 9.3 10.5
Bculton and Paul plc 5.3 14.5 6.9 7.4 8.52
M J Geeson Group 5.3 9.4 9.4 11.2 8.8
George Wimpey plc -.3 -.33 -.2 4.14 .827
Henry Boot and Sons 1.73 .9 11.5 -4.2 2.48
A Monk Co Ltd 5.9 14.0 4.4 -.06 6.0
Newarthill plc 6.85 8.4 2.62 3.38 5.3
Rush and Tompkins Group plc 7.4 .86 .44 -2.8 1.47
Taylor Woodrow 8.5 8.4 10.7 10.26 9.47
Tarmac plc 4.57 12.6 7.0 8.15 8.08
Tilbury Group plc 5.12 8.4 1.98 1.37 4.2
TUrriff Corp plc 7.0 -8.3 -9.9 .74 -2.6
Wilson Connolly Holdings 13.9 15.0 17.2 20.4 16.6
Averages: 4.8 5.56 3.4 3.6
TABLE 7.11: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "NON-FAILED 20" GROUP BY USING
AN UPDATED MASON MODEL
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Year Prior to Failure
Failed COmpanies -3 -2 Last Mean
year
Beech Wood Group plc -7.2 -5.6 -4.1 -6.63
Cocksedge plc 2.9 14.3 -9.0 +2.73
David Charles plc -0.57 -0.57 -3.45 -3.38
Crouch Group plc -1.2 -7.2 -9.4 -5.93
James H Dennis plc -11.6 -2.0 -4.26 -6.9
Mears Bros Ltd -5.5 4.3 -4.6 -1.93
Milbury plc -3.4 -4.1 -0.55 -3.68
Modern Engineering Bristol -9.7 -.0.4 +1.27 -2.94
Mbss Engineering Group plc -.19 -4.2 -10.9 -4.93
Southern Construction Ltd 2.6 -22.0 -32.0 -17.1
S W Farmer plc -6.1 1.8 -6.5 +0.73
Means: -3.63 -2.33 -7.6
TABLE 7.12: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "FAILED 11" GRCUP BY USING AN
UPDATED MASON MODEL [3]
Table 7.13 shows the model classifying 70% of the "non-failed" as
solvent up to four years prior to failure, but decreases to 55% in the
last year. Taking the grey-area limit of t 2.94 considered very high
in this model 15% are misclassified i.e. 3 out of 20 companies are
predicted as failed that do not fail.
Years 1983
,
1984 1985 1986
Solvent 14 (70) 11 (55) 9 (45) 11 (55)
Vulnerable 5 (25) 7 (35) 7 (35) 6 (30)
Failed 1	 (5) 2 (10) 4 (20) 3 (15)
Total: 20 20 20 20
Average Z-soores: 4.8 5.56 3.4 3.6
MIME 7.13: SHOWS PRIOR YEARS CLASSIFICATION OF THE "NON-FAILED"
GROUP BY USING AN UPDATED NASONVCDEM [3]
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-2 -1 —Last Year
Solvent
Vulnerable
Failed
-
5 (45)
6 (55)
1 (9)
4 (36)
5 (45)
-
2 (18)
9 (82)
Total: 11 11
•
11
Average Z-soore -3.63 -2.33 -7.6
TABLE 7.14: SHOWS PRIOR YEARS CLASSIFICATION OF THE "FAILED 11" GROUP
BY USING AN UPDATED MASON MODEL [3]
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7.6	 TREND ANALYSIS
7.6.1 Introduction
This section attempts to show the trend analysis for discriminating
variables for the three Z-models developed in this study. The
attempts were made for non-failed and failed groups and 11 graphs were
plotted to show the trend for two groups over four years.
7.6.2 Wend Analysis
The discriminating variables included in three Z-models are shown in
Table 7.15 and a graphical representation of the trends of
discriminating variables is made in Graphs 7.5 to 7.15.
Financial Ratios Mbdel 1 Model 2 Model 3
1 PAT/NCE X X
2 EBIT/NCE
3 CA/MA X X
4 CL/MA
5 TURN/NA X X
6 STL/EBIT X
7 INT/EBIT X
8 DR/CL
9 TAX-TREND X X
10 PAT-TREND X
11 STL-TREND X
TABLE 7.15: SHOWS DISCRIMINATING VARIABLES INCLUSION IN THE THREE
MODELS
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The method of analysis required the arithmetic means of variables to
be used in the calculation, these being the average of one year's data
for all the companies in a group. It is obvious that when the data of
many companies are grouped together to produce an aggregate, the
results are in many respects an improvement on the financial data. The
following is thus a brief description of non-failed and failed groups
trend analysis.
Figure 7.5 profit after tax to net capital employed trend ratio. The
trend for "non-failed" companies varies slightly from year to year,
and shows a drop in the first year followed by a slight rise in the
nexl:year, then another slight drop in the last year. While for the
failed group a drastic drop from year to year occurs, thereby
reflecting the losses in profit over the period for failed oovardes
which varies between +7% to -19%, while for "non-failed" companies the
average ratio varies between 7.7% to 9.4%.
Figure 7.6 current assets to net assets trend ratio. The trend for
"non-failed" companies varies slightly from year to year, and shows a
drop in the first year followed by a slight rise for the last year of
the study. While the graph of failed companies fluctuates widely
reflecting instability of current assets in failed ocmpardes. Also
the increase in current assets to net assets does not reflect the
strength of the company since net assets decroNmdmg continuxisly lead
to an increase in this ratio. The average ratio in the "non-failed"
companies varies between 1.23 to 1.14, while in the failed group
varies between 1.24 to 2.10.
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Figure 7.7 turnover to net assets trend ratio. The trend for "non-
failed" companies varies slightly from year to year, and shows a rise
in the first year followed by a slight drop, then a rise in the last
year. The failed group indicates the dramatic rise in the ratio is not
real since a drastic decrease in net assets should increase the ratio,
i.e. some failed companies may be increasing turn-over by overtrading,
a usual phenomenon in failed companies.
The average ratios in non-failed companies varies between 3.19 to 3.3,
't
while in the failed group increases drastically from 1.94 to 4.3 in
the year of failure. The graph also shows there is no ordering of the
groups.
Figure 7.8 short term loans to earning before tax ratio. The trend for
the "non-failed" group varies from year to year for the first two
years increase, followed by a drop, while for the failed group a sharp
rising trend is evident, so reflecting the dependence of a failed
company on short term loans. The ratio varies between 1.18 to 1.49 in
solvent companies while in the failed group it varies between 4.08 to
5.62.
Figure 7.9 Tax trend. The graphs for both groups followed a very
oalsiEftent pattern. Both graphs Showed tax trends for solvent groups
higher than the failed group, with the failed group Sharply decreasing
in trend, and varying between +1.2 to -.58.
Figure 7.10 Profit after tax trend. Although the trend for this "non-
failed" group fell from year to year, it was positive, while the trend
for the failed group was sharper and varied between +.25 to -.44. The
"non-failed" companies varied between .538 to .148. The negative
values reflect the losses made by the failed company.
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Figure 7.11 Short term loan trend. The trend for the "non-failed"
group varies from year to year for the first two years and the fell,
followed by a rise. For the "failed" group the rise was constant to a
crisis level. The trend varied for non-failed and failed groups from
doubled every year in the failed group, reflecting high dependence of
failed companies on short term loans. Also the two graphs differ from
each other.
Figure 7.12 Earnings before tax and interest to net capital employed
ratio. The trend for both failed and non-failed groups varies from
year to year. The two graphs differ from each other, reflecting the
rising profits and growth for the "non-failed" group. The ratio varies
between .10 to .117, while for the failed group it varies between
0.077 to .059. In conclusion failed companies may make losses after
paying interest and the costs of short term loans.
Figure 7.13 Debtors to current liability ratio. The trend for solvent
oarpardes showed a fall in the first year followed by a rise for the
last two years, while for the failed group there was constant
deterioration, reflecting an increase of current liabilities, when
debtors reduced facilities to the failed corrpany.
The two graphs differ from each other reflecting rising debtor
facilities to solvent ccupanies.
Figure 7.14 CUrrent liability to net assets ratio. The trend for the
"ncn-failed" group varied from year to year and fell in the first
year, followed by a slight rise, while for failed companies the ratio
rose constantly to crisis level 1.52. The rxm-failed group varied
between 0.85 to 0.73; also the two graphs differ from each other.
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Figure 7.15 Interest to earnings before tax and interest ratio. The
trend for solvent canpanies showed a slight rise in the first year,
followed by a decline for failed companies, with a slight drop
followed by a sharp increase, thus reflecting the high interest paid
by failed ccmpanies. Also the two graphs differ frcm each other.
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7.6.3 Conclusions
The analysis of trends leads to the conclusions:
- The trend in profitability for solvent companies is always
positive, while for the failed group it declines sharply and
beolares negative in the year of failure. See Figures 7.5, 7.10
and 7.12.
The trend in current assets for both groups is positive and rises,
but the net assets in the failed groups always decline and
fluctuate widely, thus reflecting instability of current assets in
failed groups. See Figure 7.6.
- The trend in turnover is not significant since failed companies
may increase their turn-over by cvextraddng and which cannot be
predicted by statistical tools. See Figure 7.7.
- The trend in gearing ratios is very significant for identifying
the failed company when the trend in net assets gearing rises
constantly to crisis level. In contrast solvent groups are
generally stable. See Figure 7.14.
- The trend in income gearing for failed groups rises sharply to
crisis level at the year of failure, while for the solvent group
it is stable. See Figure 7.15.
- The short term loan trend for the failed group rises sharply,
while for the solvent group it is stable. See Figure 7.11.
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The trend in liquidity for the failed ompardes always falls for
the last four yearsbefore failure, reflecting that debtors
decrease their faciliti es to the failed company when current
liabilities are increasing constantly. Solvent companies are
considered stable. See Figure 7.13.
The trend in tax for solvent companies is always positive while
for the failed group it declines sharply and becomes negative for
the last two years before failure. See Figure 7.9.
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7.7 FINANCIAL RATIOS AS A MEANS OF PREDICTING FAILURE
7.7.1 Introduction
Initially ratios measuring liquidity and gearing were considered for
the following reasons:
1. Liquidity ratios predict failure better than non-liquidity assets
ratios for the period of one or two years to failure, whereas the
non-liquidity ratios perform better prediction in long periods
prior to bankruptcy. Beaver [5] In a later study returned to a
more detailed analysis of the liquidity ratios and their potential
as forecasters of failure.
2. Gearing ratios show the extent to which a firm depends on borrowed
funds. The greater the use of gearing, the greater the inability
of the firm to withstand sudden changes in market conditions and
so the higher the probability of its failure as in the
constructicn companies. The data shows that prior to bankruptcy
failed firms operate with a higher degree of gearing than the
continuing companies.
3. Ratios predicting failure in long periods to bankruptcy such as
profitability ratio are not included since its inclusion in the
discriminant model.
In this section various ratios are calculated for samples of the
"failed 11" and "non-failed 20" cuccenies, and the mean values
were canpared for two groups.
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The ratios of the failed firms were consistently lower than those
of the "non-failed" companies. Furthermore in most cases the
ratios declined several years prior to bankruptcy or failure. In
particular three ratios were sensitive predictors of failure in
the short term.
7.7.2 The Three Financial Ratios
The most discriminating financial ratios among 31 ratios tested were:
1. Current ratio: this current ratio indicates to what extent short
term assets are adequate to settle short-term liabilities.
The study indicates that the current ratios of failed companies
are ocnsistently lower than those of oontinldng firms. The mean
ratios for failed and non-failed groups were 1..16 and 1.66
respectively. A ratio lower than 1.5 is worrying on the grounds
of liquidity. In the manufacturing industry the current ratio
limit much favcured is about 2 to 1 (Argenti), while this study
suggests that 1:1.5 is the more likely ultimate limit for
construction firms.
Surprisingly the quick ratio was not significant, reflecting work
in progress as being easily convertible to cash in the
construction industry. Current ratios of discontinued firms were
lower than those of the continuing firms and moreover declined
three years prior to cessation of business.
2. Net assets to current liabilities ratio: Current liabilities
include creators, bills pay back, overdrafts, provisions and
amounts such as corporation tax payable within one year. Net
assets is the sum of fixed assets, intangible assets and total
current assets less current liabilities.
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Using the ratio of net worth to debt, i.e. net worth equals
shareholders, funds less intangible assets, the mean of net
assets/current liabilities ratio of continuing companies is 1.76
as canpared to 0.81 in the failed firms.
The study revealed that 4 out of 20 of the continuing finished a
ratio less than unity, while 7 out of 11 of the failed firms
current liabilities were greater than net assets over two years
to failure, and eventually all the failed companies had a ratio
of less than 1.0 In the last year of failure.
In 65% of the failed firms the ratio of net assets/current
liabilities declined whilst in the ountinuing firms it ranaired
fairly stable. The conclusion being that a ratio of less than
1.0 places the company in danger of failure. Similarly, by
comparison in over 70% of the failed firms in Merwin's [ 42]
sample, the ratio of net worth to debt deoLinExl, whilst in the
ocntiming corporations it remained fairly stable.
The increasing reliance on borrowed funds over a relatively long
period as substantiated by Beaver's study [3] is Shown by the
sharp increase In the mean of the debt/assets ratio of the failed
ainpanies over the five years prior to failure. During the same
period the means of the ratio remained unchanged in the
ocntiruing firms.
3. Income gearing or "interest cover": This is the amount of
interest the company is carmitted to pay an its long and short
term loans as a ratio of its pre-tax profits. The mean of pre-tax
profit/interest ratio of ocritirmdng companies is 4.7 as compared
to 1.44 in the failed firms.
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Nine out of 11 of the failed companies had a ratio of less than
2.0 in the last year of failure. The ratio is considered to be
one of the most important single failure predictors in the year
of failure. Therefore, we can conclude that a ratio less than
2.0 places the company in danger of failure.
7.7.3 Summary and Conclusions
Additional to discriminating variables in Z-models the following
financial ratios are considered the important failure predictors.
Current assets/current liabilities
Net assets/current liabilities
Pre-tax profit/interest
A °caparison of the mean ratios for both the failed and non-failed
groups concludes that the current ratio of failed ocmpanies is lower
than the "non-failed" group. The mean ratios for the failed and "non-
failed" groups were 1.16 and 1.66 respectively. Also the current ratio
In the failed group deteriorates three years prior to failure. Also 10
out of 11 of the failed companies have ratios less than 1.5 in the
last year of failure and the mean of the ratio when less than 1.5 and
which has deteriorated over at least two years maybe considered as a
failure sign.
The mean ratios for both the failed and non-failed groups, indicates
that the net assets/current liabilities ratio of the failed group is
laver than the "non-failed" group. Seven out of 11 of the failed group
had a ratio less than unity and the mean of the ratio is less than
unity anddbteriorating over at least three years may be considered as
a failure sign.
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A comparison of the mean ratios for both failed and non-failed groups
shows that the pre-tax profit/interest paid of failed group is lower
than 2.0 in 90$ of cases, i.e. the mean of the ratio when below 2.0 in
a single year may be a sign of failure.
A summary of results for the non-failed and failed groups is shown in
Tables 7.16 and 7.17.
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Ratios CA/CL NA/CL EBIT/INT
Nal-failed Co 84 85 86 84 85 86 84 85 86
Fauxieen COnst Ltd 0.98 1.1 1.05 1.05 2.1 1.8 4.5 2.1 1.58
Barratt Development 1.8 2.5 2.7 1.28 2.0 2.59 2.9 3.8 3.3
Benlox Holdings plc 1.17 1.2 1.8 1.4 1.33 1.1 9.4 6.8 5.37
Benbailly Const plc 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.02 0.77 0.99 3.0 0.71 0.58
CH Beazer Holds 2.3 2.8 1.88 1.7 2.2 1.55 4.7 5.6 3.3
BICC plc 1.36 1.38 1.3 0.93 0.96 0.90 5.8 5.0 8.3
Broan and Jackson 2.5 2.3 3.1 2.0 1.8 2.8 3.8 5.1 3.7
BryanHoldings 1.6 1.56 1.68 1.28 1.18 1.4 10.0 10.0 5.8
Boulton & Paul plc 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.5 26.0 25.0 25.0
MJ Geeson Group 1.06 1.14 1.12 0.83 1.08 1.11 2.7 4.0 5.0
George Wimpey plc 1.66 1.8 1.66 1.42 1.5 1.5 2.2 2.3 3.2
Henry Boot and Sons 1.4 0.9 0.96 1.0 0.5 0.45 4.0 4.8 1.13
A Monk CO Ltd 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.02 0.9 1.0 2.0	 1.8 2.1
Newarthill plc 1.6 1.33 1.5 2.3 1.7 1.58 6.2 5.0 3.4
Rush & Tanpkins 1.4 1.16 1.8 1.88 1.42 0.8 1.09 1.17 0.88
Taylor Woodrow 1.5 1.4 1.22 2.1 2.2 2.1 7.3 10.0 11.9
Tarmac plc 1.17 1.4 1.5 1.25 1.56 1.56 6.4 5.7 7.5
Tilbury, Group plc 1.3 1.44 1.58 1.3 1.23 1.03 33.0 33.0 33.0
Turriff Corp plc 1.25 1.16 1.12 0.6 0.56 0.7 3.3 3.8 11.0
Wilson C:onnolly 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 52.0 52.0 52.0
Means 1.66 1.68 1.72 1.57 1.54 1.52 4.6 4.5 4.5
MMKE 7.16: THE RESULTS OF THE DISCRIMINATOR RATIOS OBTAINED FROM THE "NON-
FAILED 20" GROUP IN UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS
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Ratios CA/CL NA/C1 EBIT/INT
Years
Failed Companies -3 -2 -1 -3 -2 -1 -3 -2 -1
Beech Wood Group plc 1.6 1.56 1.25 1.59 1.49 0.93 1.07 0.55 1.08
Cocksedge plc 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.54 0.43 1.9 6.2 1.13
David Charles plc 1.77 1.9 1.5 1.12 1.3 0.98 0.2 3.7 1.03
Crouch Group plc 0.59 0.52 0.66 1.06 1.28 0.9 1.37 0.9 2.0
James H Dennis plc 1.2 0.88 0.95 1.7 0.8 0.56 1.8 0.25 0.5
Mears Bros Ltd 1.25 1.2 1.3 0.54 0.75 0.75 0.74 2.9 0.4
Milbury plc 1.3 1.49 1.25 0.6 0.64 0.7 0.58 0.4 1.16
Nbdern Eng Bristol plc 1.4 1.2 1.07 1.6 0.8 0.52 0.58 0 0
Moss Eng Group plc 1.47 1.28 1.1 1.05 0.73 0.6 4.4 1.3 0.75
Southern Construction Ltd 1.49 0.85 0.85 1.2 0.25 0.29 4.3 0 0
SW Farmer plc 1.4 1.44 1.25 0.5 0.55 0.33 2.5 3.2 0.9
Means: 1.26 1.16 1.06 0.99 0.83 0.63 1.79 1.78 0.76
TABLE 7.17: THE RESULTS OF PREDICTING RATIOS OBTAINED FROM THE "FAILED
11" GROUP IN UN1VARIATE ANALYSIS
Note The year indicates years before failure:
- CA/CL:	 Current assets/ current liabilities
- NA/CL:	 Net assets/current liabilities
- EBIT/INT: Earnings before interest and tax/interest
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7.8 SUMARY AND CONCLUSICINS
The results obtained fran the "non-failed 20" and "failed 11" groups using
the developed model (1), regression model (2), updated Mason model (3) and
using the cut-off as a classification boundary anti ignoring 'grey area'
developed in section 6.6 are shown in Table 7.18:
Groups
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(-) Z (+) Z - Z + Z (-) Z + Z
"Failed 11" Group 11(100) - 11(100) - ]9(82) 2(18)
"Igon-failed 20" 2 (10) 18(90) 3 (15) 17(85) 4(20) 16(80)
Group
TABLE 7.18
Both models 1 and 2 100% correctly classified the failed group, while
model 3 had a lower discriminating power i.e. 8 2 %.
For the "ncn-failed" group both models 1 and 2 90% and 85% correctly
classified, while model 3 had a lower discriminating power of 80%.
Models 1 and 2 discriminate better than model 3. However taking into
account the 'grey area' limit (± 2.94) for model 1 and cut off point zero
for model 2, because it has been developed by regression technique, it
must be observed that all companies in the "failed 11" group were
correctly classified, while 85% were correctly classified in the "non-
failed" group with 15% classified as vulnerable. No misclassifications in
both groups.
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For the failed group the mean values of Z-score by applying both models
for the last three years before failure were: -9.66, -11.25, -21.6 and
-2.93, -3.40, -3.15 respectively. Ten out of 11 companies of the "failed
11" group scored negatively in the three years prior to failure reflecting
the discriminating power of both models.
The following ratios are considered an ultimate test of a company's
solvency if their values decrease to limits as calculated:
- Current assets/current liabilities 1.5
- Net assets/current liabilities
	
 1.0
- Pre-tax profit/interest
	
2.0
Also the study suggests that while the traditional financial ratios are
most useful tools, tried and tested, these cannot by themselves give a
reliable overall picture of performance of a company and only pinpoint
particular areas of ccncern, ratios cannot on their own predict failure,
they only arouse anxiety. Z-scores also are not foolproof, and may be
influenced by the economy (e.g. a rise in interest rates would cause a
deterioration in all ccmpanies gearing).
Finally, Rush and Tompkins plc announced its failure in April 1990,
therefore further investigaticns were made and it was found that the Z-
sanys for the period 1987-1989 were -1, -4, -16 respectively. Clearly the
Z-score declined continuously and declined Sharply at least one year
before failure. Therefore it was concluded that the average length of time
between the company registering an at risk Z-score on 31 March 1986 and
the recent announcement was four years.
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Additional to the Z-model prediction, the three financial ratios which are
developed in Section 7.7 also successfully predicted the same. Table 7.16
shows that the current ratio, net assets/current liability ratio and pre-
tax profit/interest ratio were lower than the solvency limits (1.5, 1.0
and 2.0 respectively). Furthermore these ratios deteriorated in 1986 when
the company registered an at risk Z-score.
Thus it is essential to use at least two different methods of prediction
before coming to a conclusion relating to a suspect company.
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CHAPTER 8 
VALIDATION OF THE Z-MODELS AND FINANCIAL RATIOS AS A TOOL
FOR PREDICTING FAILURE
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents the procedure taken to validate the developed
model and regression model, hcwever the Mason model was excluded due
to the high percentage of misclassification errors. Results of the
validaticn were obtained with independent data such as "Test failed
11" and "Test Cbntinued 70" groups.
Section 8.2 includes validation of the developed discriminant analysis
model.
Section 8.3 includPs validation of an alternative regression technique
model and also includes validation of the model in the London Borough
of Camden.
Section 8.4 presents validation of the three financial ratios as tools
for predicting failure.
The final section briefly discusses the validation of the model linked
with critical financial ratios as a tool for predicting failure. A
=mazy of the results is also included.
8.2 VALIDATION OF DENTIAMED MODEL
8.2.1 Introduction
This section deals with validation of the developed MDA model using
independent data, being appropriate to check the model with data as
follows:
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- The "Test failed 11" group with a "failed 11" new group called the
"All failed 22" group.
- A "Continued 70" group with the "non-failed 20" group used to
develop the model itself, so forming a new group called the "All
non-failed 90" group.
This procedure was adopted for two reasons: firstly, to analyse the
prior year Z-score for both failed and non-failed groups. Seandly to
determine the proportion of ccmpanies "at risk" in the population of
continued companies. The combined population of "non-failed 20" and
"continued 70" groups called the "All non-failed 90" group needs to be
considered.
8.2.2 Results from the "Test Failed 11" and "Continued 70" Groups
The results obtained from the independent data for "Test failed 11"
and "Cbntinued 70" groups as shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.2 and taking
into account the 'grey area' t2.94 produces results as shown in Table
8.3:
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Companies
-3 -2 Last Year
1.	 A.C. & K. Builders Ltd -41 -29 -42
2.	 Allied Construction Ltd -28 -10 -18
3.	 Bowmate Construction Ltd +7.0 -7.9 -14
4.	 Bright Brook Builders Ltd +9.7 +13.5 -31
5.	 COmber Construction Ltd -4 -13.6 -67
6.	 Pevland Construction Ltd
- - -20
7.	 Sphinx Building Cbnst. Ltd +20 -72 -19
8.	 Stevens & Sons Building Ltd +19.6 -24 -19
9.	 Staines Construction Ltd +37 -32 -35
10.	 Stottmills Build. Ltd
-1.6 -31 -132
11.	 Stream Star Cast. Ltd -2 -34 -35
Average Z-soores
-12 -24
-39
TABLE 8.1: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "TEST FAILED 11" GROUP
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Canpanies 1984 1985 1986 1987
Amec plc 17.2 15.0 15.0 1.65
no Indus Hold plc -1.0 17.0 -2.90 -
Babcock Cant Ltd -14.0 -6.2 -8.0 -
Balfour Beatty Ltd -2.5 -3.2 -6.7 2.135
Be11w-ay Builders Ltd -8.4 -24.0 -8.3 -
Peter Birse Hold -36.0 -14.0 17.9 9.9
Bowmer & Kirkland Ltd 16.9 18.9 -3.0 15.0
Bryant Const Ltd -38.0 -2.9 -9.5 -
Bovis Ccnst Ltd +80.0 69.0 - 38.3
A F Budge Cont Ltd 14.2 14.6 15.7 -
CBI Ccnst Ltd 54.0 33.0 14.4 -23.0
Canentaticn Const Ltd 2.1 -12.4 5.5 -
Charles Davies - - -17.0 -
Charles Gray Bids -21.0 33.0 - -
Charnwood Const Ltd 6.77 27.0 9.0 -
City of Aberdeen Ass 7.3 9.8 11.5 -
°cinder Group plc - -29.0 47.0 -5.6
Consolidated Tern Inv - -6.4 -6.61 -
Ocetain Group plc 8.8 14.8 15.0 9.3
Croudace Hold Ltd 13.6 8.9 10.9 -
Dalbm Ccnst Ltd -.58 0.85 - -
Danbury Const Ltd 12.0 4.45 -5.9 -
Davco Canst Ltd 31.7 17.6 13.2 53.0
Dencccra plc - 5.4 .74 16.9
Dean & Bowes Group - 51.0 41.7 -
Robert M Douglas plc -2.0 1.06 -4.8 -2.0
Duntcn Group plc - 18.6 16.3 9.7
John Elliott plc - 4.4 4.77 13.0
Eve Ccnst plc - - 4.8 9.0
Exeter Bdg & Const 1.3 - - -
Galliford plc 9.4 12.0 7.7 33.0
Gargan Ccnst Ltd 26.0 18.0 8.40 -
Gilbert House Invest 24.0 14.3 16.1 -
Haymills Holds Ltd 13.0 12.3 5.9 15.1
Riggs & Hill plc 3.24 5.1 13.9 22.4
Hollandsche Beton - - -2.8 -
Johnstcn Group plc 2.6 14.8 15.6 16.37
John Laing plc 4.2 2.03 2.5 -.25
J M Jules & Sons - 11.0 -43.0 -7.6
Kyle Stewart Ltd - -.05 12.4 34.0
Walter Lawrence plc 54.0 53.0 1.96 8.2
F J C Lilley plc -4.4 1.77 7.2 2.09
Lonicn & Clyde Hold 10.7 3.3 -.37 -
Jars Lcngley & Co - -22.0 15.9 -
Y J Lovell Hold plc -3.0 -4.9 6.3 62.8
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__Cbmpanies 1984 1985 1986 1987
Alfred MbAlpine Con - 1.4 -2.3 8.9
McLaughlin & Harvey 7.9 9.0 2.9 -
R J McLeod Cont - -3.0 -10.5 36.0
R Mansell Ltd - -25.0 15.0 17.6
May Gurney Holds Ltd - - 8.0 21.5
The Miller Group Ltd - - 3.4 4.3
John Mowlem & Co 64.0 61.0 74.0 15.9
Norwest Hoist Ltd - - 5.6 .17
Ogilvie Holds Ltd - - 24.0 -
Rea Corot Ltd 9.6 6.9 5.07 -
Andrew Scott (Civ) - 50.0 19.7 -
Seddon Group Ltd - 15.5 14.7 -
Shepherd Bldg Group -5.9 -7.9 -7.0 12.7
Simons Cbnst Ltd 11.9 11.9 5.7 -6.8
Sunley Hold plc - -	 1.0 -
Tarmac Const Ltd 4.3 4.2	 11.0 -
Tarmac Homes Midland 12.0 15.0	 20.0 -
Tarrock COnst Ltd 8.47 11.8	 i	 2.05 2.1
G Percy Tretham Ltd - 15.4	 1	 -23.0 -
Trollope&CollsConst - 5.5	 -4.0 -9.0
Wates Cbnst Ltd - -1.04	 41.0 -
Whittaker Ellis Bag 5.7 21.5
	
-9.4 -
Willett Ltd - -13.5 -1.05 -22.0
Willmott Dimon Holds - 8.8 15.1
John E Wiltshire plc 4.6 -10.0 73.0 -
Average Z-score 8.96 8.56 9.4 11.56
TABLE 8.2: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "TEST CONTINUED 70" GROUP
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FIGURE 8.1: PRIOR YEARS Z-SCORE MEANS TREND OF THE
"TEST CONTINUED 70" AND "TEST FAILED 11"
GROUPS
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Groups Classified asFailed Vulnerable "Non-failed"
"Test failed 11"
Group
"Test COntinued 70"
Group
11 (100)
9	 (13)
-
14 (20)
-
47 (67)
TABLE 8.3: CLASSIFICATION OF THE "TEST FAILED 11" AND "TEST CONTINUED
70" GROUPS
One hundred per cent are correctly classified as failed, 67% are
correctly classified as non-failed and 20% claqRified as vulnerable.
At first sight control does not appear as good as the 90% result of
the "non-failed 20" group, see Table 7.3, used to form the model.
Also 13% of "tested continued 70" classified as potential failures do
not fail. These companies need further investigation, because of
critical financial ratios before coming to a conclusion. In addition
statistical evidence is necessatythat sulAlrxxkds predict better than
chirre or straight classification of all cases as non-failed.
8.2.3 Results frau the "Test failed 11" and "All failed 22" Groups
The classification results for the year prior to failure for the "test
failed 11" group are shown in Table 8.4:
Classified as
Non-failed Vulnerable Failed
- - 11 (100)
Total in Group:	 11
TABLE 8.4: CLASSIFICATION OF THE "TEST FAMED 11" GROUP
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Taking into account the 'grey area', the mcdel classified 100% of the
"test failed 11" group correctly. This result is as good as the
"failed 11 " group used to form the mcdel. This is the real measure of
themdel's success as a classification device.
Furthermore inspection of the classification results in Table 8.5,
indicates a very good result of the total failed sample, 100% are
correctly classified as "failed".
Classified as
Non-failed Vulnerable Failed
- - 22(100)
Total in Group:	 22
TABLE 8.5: CLASSIFICATION OF THE "ALL FAILED 22" GROUP
8.2.4 Prior Year Z-Score Analysis from "Test Failed 11" Group
Having seen how well the model works on data in the year prior to
failure, it would be instructive to consider how far in advance of
failure a firm starts to reseMble previous bankruptcies.
The results for the "Test failed 11" group are shown in Table 8.6.
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Classified as
Accounting year Prior to Cbmpany Failure
-3 -2 Last
"Non-failed" 4 (40) 1 (10)
Vulnerable 2 (20)
-	 (-)
Failed 4 (40) 9 (90) 11 (100)
Total: 10 10 11
Average Z-Scores -12 -21 -39
TABLE 8.6: PRIOR YEAR CLASSIFICATION OF THE "TEST FAILED 11" GROUP
(Figures in brackets are percentages of total groups)
For the "test failed 11" group the results appear good with the model
classifying 90% of the group as failed up to two years prior to
failure, and 100% in the last year before failure.
8.2.5 Results from the "Test Cdntinued 70" and "Non-failed 20" Croups
Comparison of the mean Z-scores for "test continued 70" and "non
failed 20" groups for the last three years (1984, 1985 and 1986) gives
8.96, 8.56, 9.4 and 9.0, 9.10, 8.59 respectively i.e. both groups seem
related to similar populations thereby indicating successful selection
particularly-of solvent companies.
Figure 8.1 shows the Z-scores of both "test continued 70" and "test
failed 11" groups for those prior years. For "test continued 70" group
they are constantly above the 'grey area', whereas the "test failed
11" group is generally below the 'grey area', i.e. a clear indicaticn
of the discriminating power of the model.
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The change in the mean Z-scores is an indication of the changes in the
construction industry from year to year, particularly in the case of
the "continued" ccmpenies. It was not until 1985-86 that construction
cartpazdes experienced a real improvement in demand while the years
1987, 1988 improvements were mainly in private housebuilding and
private sectors (ICC report) [1].
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8.2.6 Prior Year Z-Scores Analysis from "Continued 70" and "Non-
failed 20" Groups
The classification results for the "continued 70" group are shown in
Table 8.7.
Years 1984 1985 1986 1987
"Non-failed" 29 (62) 38 (62) 39 (60) 25 (66)
Vulnerable 7 (15) 8 (13) 14 (20) 7 (18)
Failed 11 (23) 15 (25) 14 (20) 6 (16
Total: 47 61 67 38
Average Z-score 8.96 8.56 9.4 11.56
TABLE 8.7: PRIOR YEARS CLASSIFICATION OF "CONTINUED 70" GROUP
(Figures in brackets are percentage of total group)
A amparison of the classification results for both the "non-failed
20" and "continued 70" groups are Shown In Tables 7.4 and 8.7. It may
be seen that more companies are classified as "non-failed" in the
"non-failed 20" group than in the "continued 70" group i.e. success
was achieved in selecting particularly solvent companies in setting up
the "non failed 20" group.
An attempt to determine the proportion of companies "at risk" in the
population of continued companies requires consideration of the
canbined population of "non failed 20" and "Test continued 70" groups
called the "All 90" group. The classification results for this group
are sham in Table 8.8.
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1984 1985_ 1986 1987
Non-failed 46 (68) 55 (68) 54 (62) 25 (66)
Vulnerable 10 (15) 9 (11) 16 (18) 7 (18)
Failed 11 (17) 17 (21) 17 (20) 6 (16)
Total Co: 67 81 87 38
Average Z-score: 8.97 8.64 9.2 11.56
TABLE 8.8: PRIOR YEARS CLASSIFICATION OF THE "ALL 90" GROUP
(Figures in brackets are percentage of total group)
Ruxttbese results it can be seen that on average approximately 18% of
the continuing companies In the industry appear to have profiles
similar to bankrupts and are therefore "at risk". Further to this on
average another 16% of companies are in a "vulnerable" position.
The proportions of companies in danger, however, changes as the
socncmic oandition of the country changes and in classifying a company
it is important to view the company in relation to the performance of
the rest of the industry in the same year.
It can be seen in Figures 8.2 to 8.5 which show the results for the
"A11-90" group presented the population of ooastanaction conpanies for
the years 1984-1987, that the histograms closely resemble the
superimposed normal curves. This distribution can provide an
indicaticn of the performance of a specific ompanyover the fair year
period by relating the particular Z-Score to the average of all
ccmpanies in its sector of industry.
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FIGURE 8.2: THE Z-SCORE DISTRIBUTION OF THE "ALL 90"
GROUP FOR YEAR 1984 WITH SUPERIMPOSED NORMAL
DISTRIBUTION
'
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FIGURE 8.3: THE Z-SCORE DISTRIBUTION OF THE "ALL 90"
GROUP FOR YEAR 1985 WITH SUPERIMPOSED NORMAL
DISTRIBUTION
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FOR YEAR 1986 WITH SUPERIMPOSED NORMAL
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FIGURE 8.5: THE Z-SCORE DISTRIBUTION OF TEH "ALL 90" GROUP
FOR YEAR 198 7 WITH SUPERIMPOSED NORMAL
DISTRIBUTION
..
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The company's Z-Score movement may be judged and its position
identified at any specific time, for example Figure 8.4 gives a view
of the results for the "All 90" group for a particular year, 1986. It
can be seen that the histogram closely resembles the superimposed
nmmaa curve. The distribution may be used to give an indicaticn of
the perfonllance of a particular company. If the ccupapy's Z-score for
1986 is less than the mean for 1986, then its performance is obviously
less than average.
8.2.7 The Relationship Between Bankrupt and Z-Score Trend
Possession of a bankrupt profile is a necessary condition for failure
but may be not sufficient if not also associated with a bankrupt trend
for the whole industry, as illustrated in Figure (8.6) where the
change in the mean Z-Scores provides an indication of movement from
year to year.
Clearly for the period concerned it was not until 1985, that
construction companies experienced a real impramment in demand as
dxmn, the trend drop after 1985. The years 1986-1987 were it may be
noticed best for the private house building and private sectors.
Overall bankrupt trend slightly rose over the years 1983, 1984 and
1985 followed by a fall in years 1986 and 1987. In contrast the mean
Z-Scores of industry reduced during 1984 and 1985. Rising sharply
thereafter reflecting the improvement in ccnstructicn industries as
shown in Figure 8.7.
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8.2.8 Prediction of Bankruptcy Using the Discriminant Mbdel
A prediction of failure is based on the Z-score gained from the model
and it is reasonable to assume that the lower the Z-soore for a
ampany and the more years the company is classed as "at risk" the
more likely that the company is to fail.
Alt±icugh a "bankrupt" profile is a necessary condition for failure,
it is not a sufficient one. Unhealthy firms may be taken over as an
alternative to bankruptcy, the government may bail than out, or they
may simply be Able to recover.
Finally, when a company is classed "at risk" the fate of the canpany
depends on the actions of its debenture holders, bankers and
creditors. Therefore, Z-score alone cannot predict failure but can
only provide a financial indicator which gives a quantitative
indication of the solvency of companies in the hands of the decision
makers.
The model can only say that a certain company has a profile very
similar to a failed company and therefore has a high probability of
failure. Therefore, prediction of bankruptcy using the discriminant
model is possible, if the probability of a company actually failing
when it is classified "at risk" is calculated.
Sane indication of risk can be determined statistically by using a
Bayesian approach as follows:
P(Cf/F) 
p(F/Cf p(cf/F) p(cf/NF)
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P(F/Cf ) = probability of a company failing given that it is
classified as "failed"
P(Cf/F) = probability of a company being classified as "failed" given
that it will actually fail
P(Cf/NF) = probability of a ccmpany being classified as "failed" given
that it will not fail.
Table 6.5 dhows insolvencies in the construction industry during 1986,
approximately 3%. Tables 7.5 and 8.6 dhow that approximately 100% of
failed ccmpanies were classified as "failed" in their last year.
From this information we can say that:
P(Cf/F) = 100% x .03 = .03
The denominator of equation
p(Cf/F) + p(Cf/NF)
cantle approximated by taking the percentage of companies in the "all
90" group that are classified as "failed". From Table 8.8 we can see
that it is 20% for 1986. Thus the probability of a company,
classified "at risk" actually failing, can be calculated as:
P(F/Cf)= (0).2 - 15%
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Therefore, statistically there is a a high probability that about 15%
of these firms, classified as "at risk" will actually fail in 1987.
A list of companies classified as "failed" in 1986 is as follows:
1. Bellway Builders Ltd
2. Bryant Construction Ltd
3. Danbury Construction ltd
4. R J McLeod Contractors.
5. Shepherd Building Group.
6. Whittaker Builders Ltd.
7. Robert M Douglas plc.
8. Babcock Construction Ltd.
9. Balfour Beatty Ltd.
10. Boomer and Kirkland Ltd.
11. JM Jones and Sons.
12. G Percy Tretham Ltd.
13. Trollope and Colls Construction Ltd.
14. Consolidated Tern Investments.
15. Henry Boot and Sons.
16. Rush and TOmkins Group plc.
17. Charles Davies Ltd.
We expected 15% of these companies to fail in 1987:
17 x 0.15 = 2 companies
The probabilities tell us that two companies will fail in 1987.
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Our study successfully achieved its goal In which the following
oarpanies having been predicted as failed companies in 1986 actually
failed the following year:
1. Charles Davies Ltd.
Liquidation Voluntary on 20 November 1987.
2. Whittaker Builders Ltd.
Dissolved aa 1 September 1987.
Moreover, those "at risk" companies that do not fail in 1987 will not
necessarily recover for example J M Janes and Sons Ltd and Rush and
Tcmkins plc failed in 1989 and 1990 respectively.
It has been shown that failing ccmpanies exhibit negative Z-scores for
several years prior to failure, so a single year Z-score is not
sufficient for prediction failure. Therefore, the indivirtW Z-scores
SMNS to rank the ccmpanies in terms of their solvency. The lower the
Z-score the more likely a company is to fail.
Thus in conclusion a Z-score alone is insufficient evidence for
failure prediction and further financial analysis for companies
exhibiting "at risk" Z-scores will be necessary to reinforce the
prediction.
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8.3 VALIDATION OF AN ALTERNATIVE MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
8.3.1 Introduction
This section includes validation of an alternative model using the
independent data described in Section 8.2 and also including the
previous groupings as follows:
"Test failed 11" group
"All failed 22" group
"Test continued 70" group
"All continued 90" group
Part of the validation process was undertaken in cooperation with the
London Borough of Camden. The final section briefly summarises the
validation of the alternative model.
8.3.2 Results from the "Test Failed 11" and "Cbntinued 70" Groups
The results Obtained from the independent data for "Test failed 11"
and "Continued 70" groups as Shown In Tables 8.9 and 8.10 and taking
into account the 'grey area' limits -1.6, are Shown in Table 8.11:
Ompanies -3 -2 Last
year
1 A. C. and K. Builders Ltd -32.0 -32.0 -35.0
2 Allied Ccnstruction Ltd -8.5 -5.7 -4.7
3 Bowmaba Constructicn Ltd +8.0 -2.4 -2.6
4 Bright Brook Builders Ltd -15.0 -11.5 -6.4
5 Comber Construction Ltd +6.7 -0.22 -6.38
6 Pevland Construction Ltd - - -3.85
7 Sphinx Building Cast Ltd -14.8 -7.36 -7.8
8 Staines Construction Ltd -13.6 -9.3 -10.2
9 Stevens & Sons Build Ltd +4.8 0.2 -2.85
10 Stott Mills Build Ltd -38.0 -62.0 -46.0
11 Stream Star Cbnst Ltd +4.3 +4.64 -32.0
Averages: -9.8 -12.6 -14.0
TAME 8.9: RESULTS OBTAINED FRaM THE "TEST FAILED 11" GROUP BY USING
MULTIPLE REGREMON MODEL
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Companies 1985 1	 1986 19871984
Charles Davis Ltd - -	 -4.7 -
Bellway Builders Ltd -2.29 -3.4	 -6.6 -4.66
Bryant Const Ltd -5.8 -7.8	 -2.43 -2.35
Bovis Const Ltd 11.8 9.65	 18.0 4.56
Charnwood Co-st Ltd -10.0 -11.9	 2.8 5.7
Dalton Const Ltd -18.7 9.9	 -7.0 -
Danbury Ccnst Ltd -2.5 3.78 1.75 -2.8
Davao Ocnst Ltd - 5.57 1.08 -1.0
Gargan Ccnst Ltd - 4.64 1.0 3.94
Tarmac Homes Midland -4.9 -1.76 -2.74 -1.87
Tarrock Ccnst Ltd - 0.055 0.47 +0.38
Tarmac Const Ltd 0.35 1.41 1.58 3.02
CBI Const Ltd 5.6 -1.8 -3.3 19.8
Charles Gray Bids -0.19 -3.76 2.45 -
Haymills Holds Ltd - 2.02 2.03 2.34
Ogilvie Holds Ltd -7.1 -8.7 - 3.8
Eve Ccnst plc - - - +0.28
Alfred McAlpine Con - 5.92 -0.36 +0.92
R J McLeod Cont - 1.16 -0.5 +0.34
Shepherd Bldg Group - 0.79 0.43 -1.5
Remo Oonst Ltd 3.2 0.71 1.18 1.17
Andrew Scott (Civ) 4.7 -3.9 12.4 -5.5
Simons Ccnst Ltd 2.75 0.7 4.2 -2.3
Whittaker Builders Ltd 1.7 -0.76 3.4 -1.67
Mac plc - 1.65 1.54 2.08
Antic Indus Hold plc -0.42 3.4 -3.7 -
Rush & Tompkins plc - -2.12 -1.25 0.14
Costain Group plc -2.97 2.4 2.57 1.87
Robert M Douglas plc - -0.4 0.42 1.14
Galliford plc 2.4 1.85 1.36 5.10
Higgs & Hill plc 1.27 1.56 2.15 3.9
Johnston Group plc 2.7 2.68 3.3 3.01
John Laing plc 0.02 0.137 -0.02 -0.147
Walter Lawrence plc 2.8 8.4 -0.30 1.14
F J C Lilley plc - 0.37 0.8 5.5
'Y J Lovell Hold plc 4.18 -0.13 0.9 10.6
John Mowlem & Co 3.9 9.07 1.13 3.06
Sunley Hold plc -11.0 -16.0 0.14 -
John E Wiltshire plc 1.3 -4.8 7.3 -
Babcock Ocnt Ltd -1.0 -1.7 -1.0 -
Balk= Beatty Ltd -1.28 -2.3 -1.9 -1.5
Peter Birse Hold -0.37 1.87 3.13 2.1
Bowmer & Kirkland Ltd 2.06 -3.8 2.75 -0.014
A F Buc3ge Ccnt Ltd 2.75 2.45 3.4 -
Cementation Const Ltd -0.9 -3.5 -0.75 -
To be continued
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Canpanies 1984 1985 1986 1987
Croudace Hold Ltd 2.5 1.6 2.23 -
liollandsche Beton -8.5 - -4.7 -
JM Jones & Scns - 0.9 -5.9 -7.2
Kyle Stewart Ltd 1.6 -0.27 -0.467 4.2
James Longley & Co
R Mansell Ltd -0.86 1.79 2.09 1.844
May Gurney Holds Ltd - 1.77 -0.57 3.45
The Miller Group Ltd -0.54 -0.96 -0.25 -0.26
Norwest Hoist Ltd - -2.48 -1.25 -0.81
SeidalGrcup Ltd 4.16 1.082 3.36 -
G Percy Tretham Ltd 0.95 0.538 0.096 -
Trollope & Coils Oonst -1.02 -0.104 -2.32 -1.84
Wates Const Ltd -3.3 -2.05 -1.53 -
Willett Ltd -0.46 -4.4 -0.34 -1.0
Willmott Dixon Holds - -0.6 -1.67 -0.864
My of Aberdeen Ltd -0.144 0.57 0.616 -
Cbnder Group plc -6.11 -8.87 -1.867 -2.4
Consolidated Tern Inv Ltd 2.34 -4.25 -15.8 -
Dencora plc 1.4 -4.8 -1.02 1.47
Dean & Bowes Group - 8.9 7.23 -
DunbmGrcup plc 4.0 3.27 1.928 3.4
Exeter Bdg & Const Ltd -2.2 - - -
London & Clyde Hold Ltd 1.924 -0.47 -0.346 -
MCLaughlin & Harvey Ltd 1.15 0.60 0.28 -
Gilbert House Invest -2.27 1.44 -6.5 -
John Elliott plc - -0.553 0.58 0.54
TABLE 8.10: RESULTS OBTAINED FROM THE "CONTINUED 70" GROUP BY USING
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL (2)
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Classified as
Groups
Failed Vulnerable Non-failed
"Test Failed 11"
Group
"Test Continued 70"
Group
11 (100)
14	 (20)
-
16 (23)
-
40 (57)
TABLE 8.11: CLASSIFICATION OF THE "TEST FAILED 11" GROUP AND "TEST
CONTINUED 70" GROUPS
It can be seen that 100% of firms are correctly classified as failed
with 57% classified as non-failed and 23% classified as vulnerable.
These results are clearly not as accurate as the model described
previously.
Morty per cent of the "Test cal-timed 70" group are classified as
failed compared to 13% in the previous model, reflecting the
sensitivity of the model which classified 23% of "Tests =tinted 70"
group as vulnerable. In other words these results reflect the
inherent risk of the danstniction industry.
8.3.3 Result fram the "Test Failed 11" and "All failed 22" Groups
The classification results for the year prior to failure for the "Test
failed 11" and "All failed 22" groups are shown in Tables 8.12 and
8.13.
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Classified as
Non-failed Vulnerable Failed
- - 11 (100)
Total in Group = 11
TABLE 8.12: CLASSIFICATION OF THE "TEST FAILED 11" GROUP
Classified	 as
Non-failed Vulnerable Failed
-
- 22 (100)
Total in Group = 22
TABLE 8.13: CLASSIFICATION OF THE "ALL FAILED 22" GROUP
The model classified 100% of both "Test failed 11" and "A11 failed
22" groups as failed for the year prior to failure, i.e. as good as
previously indicating that both models classified the failed companies
correctly in spite of differences of sensitivity.
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8.3.4 Prior Year Z-Score Analysis from "Test Failed 11" Group
The results for the "Test failed 11" group are shown in Table 8.14.
Classified as
Accounting year prior to company failure
-3 -2 Last year
"Non-failed" 4 (36) 2 (18) -
Vulnerable
Failed 7 (64) 8 (72) 11 (100)
TABLE 8.14: PRIOR YEAR CLASSIFICATION OF THE "TEST FAILED 11" GROUP
The model classified 64% of the group as failed up to three years
prior to failure, and 72% up to two years, i.e. as good as the results
of the previous model.
8.3.5 Results franthe "Test Continued 70" and "Nal-Tailed 20" Groups
By comparing the results of Z-scores for companies classified as
failed between the discriminant model and the regression model using
the same data of "Test continued 70" and "Nm-failed 20" groups, both
nakas appear to classify similarly, i.e. 17 canpanies are classified
as failed by the discriminant model, while the regression model
classified 10 out of 17 as failed with the remaining 7 cavardes
classified as vulnerable in 1986 as shown in Table 8.8. Clearly this
test is useful in that both models are measuring the same aspect but
ate different scale.
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The following canpanies were classified as failed in 1986 in both
models:
- Bellway Builders Ltd
- Bryant Cbrotruction Ltd
- Danbury Cbnstruction Ltd
- Whittaker Builders Ltd
- Balfour Beatty Ltd
-
JM Jones and Sons Ltd
- Trollope and Coils Construction Ltd
Consolidated Tern Investments Ltd
Henry Boot and Sons plc
- Rush and Tomkins Groups plc
8.3.6 Prior Year Z-score Analysis from "Continued 70" and "Nbn-failed
20" Groups by the Multiple Regression Model
The classification results for the "Continued 70" and "Nn-failed 20"
groups both called the "All 90" group are sixian in Table 8.15:
Classified as 1984 1985 1986 1987
Nn-failed 47 (66) 54 (63) 55 (64) 26 (53)
Vulnerable 10 (14) 10 (12) 15 (17) 13 (27)
Failed 14 (20) 22 (25) 16 (19) 10 (20)
Total Co: 71 86 86 49
TABLE 8.15: PRIOR YEARS CLASSIFICATION OF THE "ALL 90" GROUP BY USIW
MULTIPLE REGRESSION MODEL
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From these results we can conclude that the average of the continued
caugandes in the industry which have profiles similar to bankrupts in
both models, are approximately the same as 18% for the last four
years, see Table 8.8.
This is a real test of both models. They classify similarly the
failed companies but they differ in classifying the non-failed and
vulnerable companies. Also we can conclude that the regression model
classified companies as vulnerable substantially larger than the
developed model, therefore it has less discriminating power than the
dalmaqpN1 model in spite of its classification of the failed ompany,
better than the developsdnlodel.
8.3.7 Validation of MUltiple Regression Mbdel at London Borough of
Camden
It was decided to test the multiple regression second version model
the LaldalBorough of Camden for three reasons:
- Firstly the true predictability-of the mcdel is in practice
- Secondly, the model is simple and contains five discriminating
variables measuring five different aspects of company
structure.
Thirdly the model classified the failed companies (privately
owned companies) better than the developed model. The model
classified 64% of the failed companies as failed up to three
years before failure, while the developed model classified 40%
for the same period.
The discriminant model was originally developed for medium size to
large ocmpanies, while the multiple regression second version was
pnmmed better for private ocmpanies because of its emptumis on the
Income gearing ratio, which is indeed an indicator of financial
weakness in snall canpanies.
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Practically, the practitioner needs to know who is at risk. The model
has been applied on 200 construction companies dealing with the London
Borough of Camden. By taking the classification boundary -1.6 as
threshold, the results ahowed that the discriminating power of the
rrcdel was better than Altman's model which was mainly developed for
manufacturing companies.
Although the model is the second model developed in Britain after
Mason's model for the construction indisialrekming the past decade, it
proves its operational use asatool in vetting construction companies
on tender lists. Whatever the success the model has achieved, the
model should however never be used as the sole decision tool. The
experts are aware of the potential dangers of relying exclusively upon
the results of a single test (see letter from London Borough of Camden
in Appendix D). The aims of this report have been matched to the
experts approach of company failure by using different tools to
approaching failure.
8.4 VALIDATION OF FINANCIAL RATIOS AS A TOOL FOR PREDICTING FAILURE
8.4.1 Introduction
This section includes validation of the following financial ratios as
a tool to predict company failure which are researched in Section 7.6:
Current assets/current liabilities ratio
Net assets/current liabilities ratio
Pre-tax profit/interest ratio.
Also this section includes a validation link between the Z-score and
these financial ratios as a tool for predicting failure, by dividing
the "All quoted 90" group into two groups:
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Group 1 includeq 73 companies which are classified as none failed in
1986 by both Z-score models.
Group 2 includes 17 companies which are classified as failed and
vulnerable in 1986 by the same Z-score models. A ccmparison of the
finarcial ratios In both groups provides us with a link between Z-
sxme andthese ratios, to enhance the predictability for both Z-modes
and these ratios.
8.4.2 Results from the "Test Failed 11" Croup
The results Obtained from the "Test failed 11" group for the last
three years before failure are Shown in Table 8.16.
Test Failed Cbmpanies CA/CL NA/CL EBIT/INT
-2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1
1 A.C. & K. Builders Ltd .51 0.01 -.15 1.0 2.2 1.06
2 Allied COnstruction Ltd 1.38 3.05 0.41 2.03 1.7 0
3 Bowmate Cbnstructio Ltd 1.08 1.015 0.33 0.17 0 0
4 Bright Brook Build. Ltd 1.0 0.93 1.0 1.0 0.28 0.37
5 Caber COnstruatton Ltd 0.63 0.81 0.207 0.23 0.5 1.06
6 Pevland Cbnstruction Ltd - 0.84 - 0.028 - 1.36
7 Sphinx Builders Ltd 0.66 0.11 0.15 0.77 0 0
8 Staines COnstruction Ltd 0.66 0.73 0.33 0.65 0 0
9 Steven & Sons Build Ltd 3.1 3.5 2.2 2.59 0 0
10 Stott Mills Build Ltd 0.6 0.45 0.02 0.29 0 0
11 Stream Star COnstr Ltd 1.48 0.68 1.04 0.04 0 0
TABLE 8.16: THE RESULTS OF DISCRIMINATING RATIOS OBTAINED FROM THE
"TEST FAILED 11" GROUP IN UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Note: The year indicates years before failure:
CA/CL	 - current assets/current liabilities
NA/CL	 - net assets/current liabilities
EBIT/INT - earnings before interest and tax/interest
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The results show that the current ratio i.e. the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities for the "Test failed 11" ccrnpanies are
worse than those in the "Failed 11" companies in Section 7.7, where 8
out of 11 group has a current ratio < 1.0, while the "failed 11"
group, 4 out of 11 group has a ratio less than 1.0. Relatively the
ratio is less than 1.5 which is worrying on the grounds of liquidity,
and therefore it was decided to reduce the value of this ratio to 1.0
as an ultimate test of company solvency.
Also the results show that the ratios of net assets to current
liabilities for the "Test failed 11" group are worse than those In the
"Failed 11" group In Section 7.7. Eight out of 11 have a ratio of
<1.0 for the last three years before failure, while 7 out of 11 of the
"Failed 11" group have a ratio less than unity.
Also closer scrutiny of the results of the "Test failed 11" group with
the "Failed 11" group in Section 7.7 reveals that the "Test failed 11"
group had a gearing ratio worse than those in the "Failed 11" group,
whereas all the "Test failed 11" companies the ratio was less than
2.0. In the "Failed 11" group 9 out of 11 had a ratio of less than
2.0. Thus suggesting that any company reseMbling failure probably has
at least two ratios below a specific limit, for example, Bright Brock
Builders Ltd has a ratio net asset/current liabilities > 1, but its
current assets/current liabilities <1 and pre-tax profit/interest <2.
Similarly Bowmate Construction Ltd has current assets/current
liabilities > 1.0, but its net assets/current liabilities <1 and pre-
tax profits/interest <2.
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The remaining companies in the "Test failed 11" group had the three
critical ratios below the specific limit in this study. The "Test
failed 11" group with "Failed 11" group are now coMbined to form a new
group called the "All failed 22" group, with results as follows:
The current ratio for the "All failed 22" group dhows that 17 out of
22 of the group is less than unity. Also the net assets to current
liability ratio for the "All failed 22" group in 15 out of 22 of the
group is less than unity, i.e. percentages of misclassification are
23% and 32% respectively in this group.
Furthermore the pre-tax to interest ratio for the "All failed 22"
group in 20 out of 22 of the group is less than 2.0, i.e. percentage
of misclassification is 9%. Indeed 2 out of 22 of the group had two
ratios above the specific limits while the remaining group had all the
three ratios below the specific limit.
By comparing the above results with results obtained from the "non-
failed 20" group (see Section 7.4), they show that one out of 20 of
the group is less than unity. Also the net assets to current liability
nMd.os for the "non-failed 20" group, 5 out of 20 of the group, is
less than unity, i.e. percentages of misclassification are 5% and 25%
respectively. Furthermore, the pretax profit to interest ratio for the
"an-failed 20" group, 4 out of 20 of the group is less than 2.0, i.e.
Percentage of misclassification is 20%. Nevertheless 3 out of 20 of
the group bad two ratios below the specific limits. The ratio with the
snallest error of misclassification and therefore the best single
Predictor was current assets/current liabilities followed by income
gearing ratio and net assets/current liabilities ratio. This was done
mainly on the basis of the dichotomous clsqsification technique [see
Beaver ( 3)] .
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The dichotomous classification technique predicts the likelihood of
bankruptcy through the use of a given financial ratio only.
The firms are arbitrarily divided into two groups and arranged (for
each ratio) iniascending order. An optimal cut-off point is chosen
through trial and error as the demarcation line for failing i.e. any
firm below it being categorised as a failed firm. The results are then
compared with actual data to find the percentage of incorrect
predictions. Often many trial times are repeated before the optimal
cut-off point is reached.
8.4.3 Validation of the Z-Score Linked with Discriminating Financial
Ratios as Predictors
It was decided to validate the discriminating financial ratios linked
with the Z-score for two reasons. Firstly, there may a company that
does not respond to Z-score models and gives freak results. Seccndly,
the experts warn of relying exclusively upon the results of a single
test.
The results of critical financial ratios for ccmpanies classified as
nal-fadled by both Z-models group (1), and companies classified as
failed or vulnerable by both Z-models group (2) are shown in Tables
8.17 and 8.18.
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Ccupanies_ CA/CL NA/CL EBIT/INT
-2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1
1 Babcock Const Ltd 0.83 0.83 0.27 0.3 3.6 10.0
2 Balfour Beatty Ltd 1.8 1.1 0.3 0.3 10.0 8.0
3 Benbailly Ccnst Ltd 1.6 1.6 0.97 0.99 0.71 0.58
4 Bowmer & Kirkland Ltd 1.2 1.1 0.7 0.45 27.0 6.0
5 Bryant Corot Ltd 0.72 0.63 0.43 0.67 3.17 2.7
6 Consolidated Tern Inv 0.97 0.78 0.38 0.08 0.3 0.4
7 Danbury Ccnstr Ltd 0.96 0.81 0.83 0.82 2.0 2.0
8 J.M. Jones & Sons Ltd 0.7 0.96 0.28 0.22 5.6 3.7
9 Henry Boot & Sons Ltd 0.9 0.95 0.46 0.42 5.0 1.12
10 G. Percy TrethmiLtd 1.14 1.1 0.89 0.69 2.3 2.8
11 R.G. McLeod (Dont Ltd 1.4 1.33 1.0 0.98 11.0 10.0
12 Rush & Tcrnkins plc 1.16 1.01 1.48 0.81 1.17 0.88
13 Robert M. Douglas plc 1.04 0.99 0.66 0.73 3.0 6.4
14 Shepherd Build Group 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 8.4 13.0
15 Trollope & Coils Con 1.9 1.7 0.91 0.73 2.0 2.0
16 Whittaker Build Ltd 1.33 1.35 0.6 0.52 15.0 16.0
17 Bellway Ccnst Ltd 0.52 0.5 0.54 0.71 1.8 1.1e
TABLE 8.17: THE RESULTS OF DISCRIMINATING RATIOS OBTAINED FROM THE
"CLASSIFIED FAILED 17" GROUP
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Oxpanies
CA/CL NA/CL BBIT/INT
-2 -1 -2 -1 -2 -1
Bads Const Ltd 1.6 1.6 0.55 0.53 62.0 62.0
Charnwood Const Ltd 0.21 0.37 1.53 6.2 1.6 0.58
DaltanCalst Ltd 1.35 1.25 0.5 0.33 25.0 2.0
Davco Const Ltd 1.23 1.58 0.81 1.3 2.0 2.0
GarganConst Ltd 0.9 1.0 2.9 1.5 0.9 2.5
TankX: Hams Midland 1.8 1.47 0.9 0.72 13.0 1.0
Smock Const Ltd 1.25 1.33 0.5 0.55 2.0 0.55
TarmacConst Ltd 1.0 0.96 0.17 0.17 2.0 2.0
CBI Const Ltd 1.4 1.35 0.58 0.43 0.77 1.7
Omrles Gray Bids 1.28 1.1 0.5 0.4 1.1 2.2
%pills Holds Ltd 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.0
Ogilvie Holds Ltd 0.66 1.1 0.1 0.8 7.0 2.6
Eve Oonst plc 1.5 1.5 1.05 1.0 22.0 22.0
Alfred McAlpine Con 1.29	 1.28 0.5 0.5 10.0 10.0
Remo Const Ltd 1.6	 1.66 0.94 1.05 10.0 10.0
Andrew Scott (Civ) 1.92	 2.2 1.35 1.63 5.0 10.0
Simms Const Ltd 1.4	 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.47 0.63
Alux3plc 1.13	 1.08 0.58 0.52 14.0 18.0
Amec Indus Hold plc 1.0	 1.0 0.6 0.6 3.0 0.8
OmtainCroup plc 0.77	 0.66 1.72 1.85 6.0 5.0
Galliford plc 1.16	 1.1 0.62 0.55 12.0 12.0
Higgs & Hill plc 1.5	 1.66 1.13 1.25 8.0 17.0
almstalCroup plc 1.8	 1.66 1.7 1.85 14.0 14.0
JohnLaing plc 1.28	 1.28 0.52 0.5 10.0 11.0
WalterLawrence plc 1.4	 1.56 0.61 0.73 2.1 3.7
F J C Lilley plc 1.4	 0.9 1.07 0.25 3.0 11.0
Y J Lovell Hold plc 1.58	 1.56 1.01 0.85 5.5 7.0
alm Madan & Co 1.01	 1.2 0.68 0.9 5.5 7.8
Sunley Hold plc 2.3	 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.6 1.6
aphriE Wiltshire plc 1.1	 1.1 0.25 0.25 2.17 1.08
PeterBirse Hold 1.38	 2.6 0.87 0.68 8.0 13.0
A F Budge Cbnt Ltd 1.33	 1 1.1 1.88 2.3 3.8 5.5
CanentatictiConst Ltd 1.2 1.4 0.33 0.57 10.0 10.0
Croudace Hold Ltd 1.4 1.66 1.7 1.73 1.6 2.3
Hollandsche Beton 0.76 0.9 0.04 0.2 4.0 1.4
Kyle Stewart Ltd 0.9	 0.96 0.5 0.5 2.6 2.5
James Lcagley & Co 1.7	 0.96 0.5 0.5 2.6 2.5
R Mansell Ltd
May Gurney Holds Ltd
1.01	 I
0.67
1.CG
0.67
0.44
1.09
0.45
1.17
10.0
5.0
10.0
1.1
The Miller Group Ltd 0.72 0.66 0.7 0.83 1.92 2.4
Narwest Hoist Ltd 1.25	 1.4 0.5 0.73 6.5 2.6
SecUaaCktup Ltd
Mat esS Const Ltd
4.0	 I
1.53
4.0
2.1
4.6
0.53
5.0
1.18
10.0
2.0
10.0
2.0
Willett Ltd 1.9 1.9 0.92 0.94 1.2 6.4
To be continued
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Companies
CA/CL NA/CL EBIT/INI
-2 -1 -1 -2 -1
WiUnbolt Dixcn Holds 1.1 1.1 0.5 0.58 1.0 0.9
City of Aberdeen Ltd 2.1 2.9 1.14 2.09 4.6 4.3
Calder Group plc 1.0 1.1 0.35 0.31 0.4 1.4
Dencora plc 1.29 1.12 4.0 2.8 0.3 0.54
Dean & Bowes Group 1.24 1.52 0.95 1.31 20.0 20.0
amtcn Group plc 1.4 1.85 1.62 3.5 2.8 3.0
Exeter Bdg & Oonst Ltd 1.32 1.18 0.91 0.65 2.0 0.79
Lan & Clyde 1iold Ltd 1.7 1.76 1.03 1.12 3.0 2.6
McLaughlin & Harvey Ltd 1.4 1.35 1.04 1.1 5.2 4.47
Gilbert House Invest 0.84 0.43 5.9 3.3 0.72 0.22
John Elliott plc 1.1 0.97 0.31 0.176 3.4 32.0
Aberdeen Constructicn plc 1.1 1.05 2.1 1.8 2.1 1.58
Barratt Development 2.5 2.7 2.0 2.59 3.8 3.3
Benlox Holdings plc 1.2 1.8 1.33 1.10 6.8 5.33
C H Beazer Holdings 2.8 2.88 2.2 1.55 5.6 3.3
BICC plc 1.38 1.30 0.96 0.90 5.0 8.3
Brown and Jackson 2.3 3.1 1.8 2.8 5.1 3.7
Bryant Holdings 1.56 1.88 1.18 1.4 10.0 5.8
Boulton and Paul plc 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.25 25.0 25.0
M J Geeson Group 1.14 1.12 1.08 1.11 4.0 5.0
George Wimpey plc 1.8 1.66 1.5 1.5 2.3 3.2
A Monk Company plc 1.6 1.6 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.1
Newarthill plc 1.33 1.5 1.7 1.58 5.0 3.4
Taylor Woodrow 1.4 1.22 2.2 2.1 10.0 11.9
Tarmac plc 1.4 1.5 1.56 1.56 5.7 7.5
Tilbury Group plc 1.44 1.58 1.23 1.03 33.0 33.0
Turriff Corporation plc 1.15 1.12 0.56 0.7 3.8 11.0
Wilson Connolly Holdings 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.3 52.0 52.0
TABLE 8.18: THE RESULTS OF DISCRIMINATING RATIOS OBTAINED FROM THE
CLASSIFIED AS "NON-FAILED 73" GROUP
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The results obtained from groups 1 and 2 for 1986 Z-scores indica-te
that 6 out of 73 of group (1) have current asset ratios less than
unity, while for 8 out of 17 of group (2), the ratio is less than
unity. Also, 30 out of 73 of group (1) have net assets/current
liabilities ratio less than unity compared to 15 out of 17 of group
(2). In addition 14 out of 73 of group (1) have pre-tax to current
liabilities ratio less than 2.0, compared to 4 out of 17 of group (2).
Furthermore 12 out of 73 of group (1) have two critical ratios less
than the specified limits in contrast to group (2). Seven out of 17
have two critical ratios less than the specified limits.
These tests indicate that companies in group (2) classified as failed
using Z-models, have critical ratios less than those classified as
non-failed.
Clearly the Z-scores linked with the critical ratios are good
predictors of failure. Indeed, there were a few canpanies classified
as nn-failed using may Z-models but had two critical ratios below
the specified limits indicating that some companies do not fully
respond to the Z-model and need further analysis like financial
ratios.
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8.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A1t1xmigh the results of validation of both Z-models were oonvircing
and performed well on the data used in this study for quoted and
Lin:Noted companies, application of the model at the London Borough of
Carden proved a very rewarding real experience in vetting canpanies
for tender lists in particular, and generally the smaller unquoted
oanpanies.
Homier, in conclusion unfortunately not all companies responded to
the Z-model and other extra indicaLuL such as traditional ratios
tried and tested by time, are invaluable support evidence,
particularly the critical ratios which have Shown deterioration over
several years.
This study was especially successful in using the Z-model with
critical ratios in identifying a short list of companies at risk with
confidence. However too much reliance on this aspect should be
avoided in that a certain canpany may ally have a profile very similar
to a failed company indicating a high probability of failure, but the
fate of the company always depends on personal judgement of debenture
holders, bankers and creditors etc.
Nevertheless it is reasonable to expect that the lower the Z-score,
and deteriorating ratios foracompany, and the more years the company
is classified at risk, the more likely that company is to fail.
However, unhealthy firms may be taken over as an alternative to
barimurrtcy, government assistance may be at hand, or they may simply
be able to recover.
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CHAPTER 9 
MANAGMRIAL FACTORS RELATED TO COMPANY FAILURE
9.1 INTROLUCTION
The previous sections continued to treat Z-soores and financial ratios
with considerable respect as both these finance-based tools suffer
from two potential defects; firstly, creative accounting, and
seoax111;r management mistakes which cannot be predicted statistically.
agarganies generally fail because of inadequate management, the ;imple
expedient of applying accounting ratios to all companies will not
necessarily give a true reason for the reasons of failure. Furthermore
some companies identified as certain failures by any accounting
method, can survive because experienced managers adequately deal with
the adverse situation.
Generally two indicators may be observed as a company moves towards
collapse, namely financial, as has already been seen in Z-scores and
traditional financial ratios. Unfortunately an indication appears
only towards the end of the long process of failure, probabayonly in
the last two years and sometimes even later.
Secrndly, long before financial distress becomes visible, many non-
financial signs are often apparent such as management mistakes.
Imbed many financial experts stress that balance Sheet information
alone is not enough to predict catastrophic factors such as bad
manayment, econanic down turn, overtrading, acquisition of a failed
company, excessive inventories, too much paper work and so on should
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not be overlooked. Thus some form of non-finance based analysis is
also needed to classify a campany at risk of failure.
Section 9.2 identifies particular factors in failure by a case study
approach.
Section 9.3 briefly explains the management defects and managament
mistakes as evidenced in other investigations and a case study.
Section 9.4 describes a survey conducted into management defects and
managanent mistakes.
The final section briefly discusses the managerial factors related to
=Rummy failure and provides a summary of the survey results.
9.2 PARTICULAR FACTORS OF FAILURE BY A CASE STUDY APPROACH
9.2.1 Introduction
It is essential to identify the factors behind failure before coming
to a conclusion relating to a suspect company. A case study is a very
sensible approach to identify particular factors in failure. Indeed a
substantial amount of work has already been carried out into the
reaSCES for particular failures via case studies, particularly COrk
Gully, see Appendix D for example. The following companies were
declared bankrupt with Cork Gully appointed as liquidator:
1. Southern Construction Ltd
2. Crouch Construction Ltd and Crouch Group plc.
3. Mears Bros Holdings Ltd.
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9.2.2 Case Study (1)
Southern Construction Ltd entered into receivership as a result of a
fall in turnover over several years, with the major reason for this
deterioration being related to acquiring the Calf in Division. of Ernest
Ireland Group, including its offices at Rickmansworth and various
employees, plus an assignment of several ocritracts. Ultimately the
acquisition decision proved disastrous due to the fact that the new
firm's activities did not fit in well with the existing business [see
Appendix D].
9.2.3 Case Study (2)
Crouch Conslalaction Ltd became a wholly owned subsidiary of Crouch
Group plc in April 1978 and embarked upon a rapid expansion in
aontraA: work, particularly local authority housing.
The =paw then suffered severe losses beginning around April 1983
culminating in the holding company changing the board of directors of
this company. The report stated that the trading position of Crouch
OxIstauction Ltd during 1983/84 suffered as a result of poor trading
an =tracts taken on at tight margins during a period of reoassim
Further problems had also arisen from the numerous changes in
directors and senior staff.
Furthermore the company suffered from a continuing shortage of working
capital caused by tied up funds in the stock of land forprivatehouse
building purposes. With continued losses on contracts, Crouch
Constructicn Ltd went into liquidation. The Group Board then found it
impossible to continue trading without additiccal bank support. The
Bank was unable to agree to provide an increased facility in excess of
the existing borrowing. Legal advice was taken, and the Directors
considered they had no alternative other than to request the Bank to
awant Receivers [see Appendix D].
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9.2.4 Case Study (3)
Mears Bros Holdings Ltd was the parent canpany of a group of building,
civil engineering and contracting companies.
In the mid 1970's the Group decided to expand its activities overseas.
As part of this effort Mears Ccnstructicn formed Mears International
to act as civil engineering contractors in the Middle East. During
this period Mears Construction also expanded its UK operations, the
bulk of which consisted of civil engineering work such as roads,
mmavoirs, sea defences, pUblic building work and pUblic housing.
After 1978 the trading position had deteriorated considerably. It was
reported that the failure of the Group was attributed by the Directors
of Mears Holdings to the following factors:
1. Certain major contract loss-making due to adverse weather
conditicns and the tight price of ccntracts.
2. The delay by clients in the settlement of certain substantial
claims on crittracts.
3. The demands made upon the Group banking facility due to losses
incurred by other canpanies within the Group.
4. The financial drain caused by attempts to establish a contracting
trading base overseas.
5. The short term cash effects of the move to Swindon.
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9.2.5 Conclusions
In reviewing the reasons for failure for these examples of failed
companies, failure might be displayed in non-financial signs of
deterioration as well as financial ones.
The failure of Southern Construction was caused by a deteriorating
turnover observed in balance Sheet information as well as managerial
acts such as acquiring a disastrous company such as Caf fin Division of
Ernest Ireland.
The failure of Crouch Construction Ltd and Crouch Group plc were due
to deteriorating profits, also as Shown in balance Sheet infonmatim,
as well as managerial acts like too many changes of directors and
senior staff.
Also, the failure of Mears Bros Holdings Ltd was due to deteriorating
liquidity also to be seen in balance Sheet informaticn as well as
managerial acts such as the delay in claim settlements and losses on
overseas contracts.
The following managerial acts could be included as leading to company
failure:
1. Acquisition of a failing firm.
2. Overtrading.
3. Losses in contract claims.
4. Losses in overseas contacts.
5. Inexperienced staff
6. Passive board of directors.
7. High leverage trading.
8. Weak response to market change.
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9.3 MANAGEMENT DEFECTS AND MANAGEMENT MISTAKES
9.3.1 Introducticn
The purpose of this section is to describe a number of specific
defects observed to be existing in ccmpany management. For decades
managers, receivers, academics have made lists of these defects, as
published in financial journals and previous studies. In particular .
John Argenti [7] describes SOMB in his latest remmmiliccdk in the UK.
Such deficiencies lead management into mistakes.
9.3.2 Management Defects
The following are considered the major deficiencies in a company's
maniacxrient:
1. Autocratic Chief Executive:
The autocrat may be distinguished fnan the team lesdPr by the
way he dominates the company, especially indicated by
preservation of a position of sole authority.
2. The same person as both chief executive and chairman:
Ancet important task of the company chairman is to be able to
dismiss an inadequate chief executive; someone who is both is
unlikely to do this.
3. The company board ccmprises too many nal-contributing directors
or persons not working in the company.
4.	 Lack of engineering skills.
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Lack of a strong finance director:
It is not enough for finance directors to exercise financial
Skills, they must also be able to make financial decisions. An
indication of a weak finance director is Shared responsibility
for financial decision making.
6.	 Defective managerial skills:
Companies may fail from defective finance or poor human
relations, or inadequate marketing or legal skills as much as
franpoor engimmaJng experience.
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5.
7.	 Incomplete accountancy system:
a) Inadequate cash flow plan. The fix-tam:JAI department either
has no cash flow plan, or one that is not updated or
rriewecipariodically.
b) Poor budgetary control system The company either has no
budgets prepared at all, or the budgets are prepared but are
not reviewed periodically.
8.	 Defective bidding system
When senior management are insufficiently experienced in
bidding or bidding decisions are taken without cross-referring
withotter senior management.
9.	 Poor marketing skills:
A main task of the board is to review the perspective of the
market. Indeed there is almost complete agreement among
specialists in this field that canpanies that fail are those
which have either not noticed a change in their business
market, or have not responded to it.
Typically many construction companies have invested heavily in land
all property during boom periods, subsequently %sten prices slowed down
and interest rates increased, substantial or occasionally critical
losses have been incurred.
9.3.3 Management Mistakes
Mamgment sanetimes make a mistake which leads to failure many years
after the first critical decision was taken. Typical examples
incAltde:
1. Too much reliance cn short term loans. Companies sometimes
issue debentures with a fixed interest rate in order to raise
investment funds. Failing companies often appeared to allow
leverage of these loans to rise to a level at which its future
was placed in jeopardy. In a previous study Argenti has
illustrated that companies run by ambitious autocrats, not
constrained by strong finance directors, are particularly
liable to make such errors.
2. Overloading. Companies often try to expand business to a point
which will not cause ovedbamding typically a company expanding
faster than its funding. Far example, Nears Bros Holdings Ltd
[see Appendix D] expanded its UK and overseas operations
quickly leading to shortages in cash flaw before failure. In
preference an expanding company should try to increase its
equity base instead of relying on loans.
3. Lames in projects. Cavanies that fail are often those that
have undertaken large projects, involving an excessive
inventory building or high technical induabmial constangAdan.
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Similar effects can result from guaranteeing the loan of a
subsidiary company. The obligation may not be able to be met
if matters deteriorate particularly:
a) Contract claims:
Administration should ensure that these are given the
proper attenticn, carefully analysed and doomerited, to be
equitably resolved as soon as possible. Once a claim has
been resolved, a change order should be issued to cover the
resolution. Unresolved claims cause shortage in liquidity
and therefore could lead to failure.
One of the main reasons behind the failure of Mars Bros
Holdings Ltd seemed to be improper handling of substantial
claims on contracts.
b) Overseas Contracting:
Work abroad seemed to be a good option for large firms
suffering declines in their home market. However, some
companies suffered huge losses due to lack of managerial
control In an unfamiliar environment. Indeed, Mears Bros
Holdings Ltd suffered a critical financial drain attempting
to establish a contracting trading base overseas.
4.	 Acquisition of a Potentially Failing Firm. A company may
unfortunately take over a firm and later find a hidden
difficult financial situation resulting in disaster if the
acquired firm fails. Indeed Southern Construction Ltd failed
primarily due to acquiring the Cal fin Division of the Ernest
Ireland Group.
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Sometimes unhealthy firms are taken over as an alternative to
bankruptcy, causing the take over comogy also to
fail. Indeed results attained from the "Taken over 9" group
ahow that 2 out of 9 were classified as failed two years before
take over, with a further 2 out of 9 classified as vulnerable
in the last year before take aver. The remaining 5 ompanies
were classified as non-failed but their Z-scores deteriorated
from year to year.
9.3.4 Summary and Conclusions
From case studies and previous studies [see Appendix D] the main
defects in a company's management appear to be:
1. Autocratic chief executive.
2. The same person acting as both chief executive and chairman.
3. The board of directors comprises ncn-contributing and executive
directors.
4. Lack of engineering experience.
5. Lack of a strong finance director.
6. Inadequate managerial skills.
7. Defective accountancy system.
8. Defective bidding system.
9. Inadequate marketing skills.
Other important factors leading to failure are:
1. Too uuch reliance on a short term loan.
2. Overtrading
3. Losses in projects.
4. Taking over failed firms.
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9.4 sunvEY RELATED TO MANAGERIAL DEFECIS AND MISTAKES
9.4.1 Introduction
Previous sections diagnosed the major managerial defects and mistakes
leading to failure. A questionnaire was thus designed to identify
these defects and mistakes and to try and discover which oannxtive
actions companies had taken to help survive. The survey included two
groups as follows:
Group 1: Canpanies classified as potential failures but not failing
i.e. those scoring negatively by both Z-models, i.e.
"failed" or "vulnerable".
Group 2: COmprised companies scoring positively by both Z-models,
i.e. those classified as "non-failed" by bothmodels.
By comparing the two groups, some of the reasons for revival were
ascertained as well as determining the reasons for financial distress.
Both groups were selected non-randomly in which criteria of selection
was based on those medium size companies operating in construction and
civil engineering which have limited liabilities and are classified in
two groups according to their Z-scores for the last three years.
Since there are significant differences in Z-scores in both groups
there could be a difference in managerial system.
9.4.2 The Survey
Ninety companies were contacted and 28 responded. Unfortunately
ultimately only seven provided enough information for each group as
shown in Tables 9.1 and 9.2:
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Cbmpany
Mbdel l_Origin) Mbdel 2 (Ftegressian)
84 85 86 85 86 87
1 Babcock Ltd -14.0 -6.2 -8.0 -1.0 -1.7 1.0
2 Consolidated Ltd 2.0 -6.4 -6.6 2.3 -4.25 -15.8
3 Cementation Ltd 2.1 -12.4 5.5 -0.9 -3.5 -0.75
4 Henry Boot & Sons 4.6 -11.2 -5.3 2.9 3.3 -1.2
5 J M Janes Ltd 11.0 -43.0 -7.6 0.9 -5.9 -7.2
6 Trollope & Coils Ltd 5.0 -4.0 -9.0 -1.02 -1.04 -2.3
7 Willet Ltd -13.5 -1.05 -22.5 -0.46 -4.9 -0.34
TABLE 9.1: SHOWS Z-SCORE FOR GROUP (1) BY USING BOTH Z-NDDELS
Company
Mbdel 1 Model 2
84 85 86 85 86 87
1 A F Budge Cont Ltd 14.2 14.6 15.7 2.75 2.45 3.5
2 Petbirs Hold Ltd 14.0 17.9 9.9 1.87 3.13 2.1
3 Tarmac Cant Ltd 4.3 4.2 11.0 1.48 1.58 3.02
4 Haymills Hold Ltd 12.3 5.9 15.2 2.03 2.34 2.48
5 Kyle Stewart Ltd 0 12.4 34.0 -0.27 -0.467 4.2
6 Croudace Hold Ltd 13.6 8.96 10.9 2.5 1.6 2.23
7 R Mansell Ltd -25.0 15.0 17.6 1.79 2.09 1.84
TABLE 9.2: SHOWS Z-SCORE FOR GROUP (2) BY USING BOTH Z-MODELS
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9.4.3 Results from the Survey
The existence of managerial factors related to failure was
investigated in the questionnaire using the multiple choice method,
(see Appendix D). The questionnaires included 17 questions related
to failure for both groups and produced the following observations:
i) The chief executive of the company has sole authority in 6 out of
7 companies in group (1), while in group (2), only 3 out of 7 has
this condition, i.e. the chief executive in group (1) had sole
authority more than group (2) i.e. 86% in group (1) and 43% in
group (2). The results reinforce the opinion that companies in
group (1) experiencednore difficulties than those companies with
an assistant or deputy with authority.
ii) The chief executive and chairman are the same person. One out of
7 in group (1) had a combined Chief executive and chairman post,
while in group (2) 5 out of 7 denonstrated this Characteristic.
Thus as long as a company is run by a team of managers with
authority, a better Chance of survival seems most likely.
iii)The board of the company comprises persons not working in the
company. Two cut of 7 of group (1) and 3 out of 7 of group (2)
canpany board comprised persons not working in the company. While
strong conclusions are not possible, companies may be more
successful if outside persons are involved at least in
authoritative decisim making at the highest level as indicated
by companies in group (1) classified as vulnerable.
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iv) Engineering experience. Over 70% of both groups employed
engineers with less than ten years experience and little can be
deduced.
v) Lack of a strong finance director. Information supplied by
companies particularly identified this problen. Indeed finance
directors should be clearly responsible for their company's
financial decision making. In all the companies of group (1) the
financial director had shared authority, while 4 out of 7 of
group (2) had similar responsibility. Since group (1) had more
financial difficulties than group (2), the presence of a weak
financial director may be a main factor behind the financial
difficulties.
vi) Lack of overall management skills observed. Only 1 out of 7 of
group (1) had managers with average experience less than ten
years, while none of group (2) had this deficiency. This defect
in both groups seems minor, therefore any observer should not
place too much emphasis on this point as in both groups managers
were generally well experienced.
vii)Defects In accountancy systan. In the failing companies the
finance department either had no cash flaw plan or one that was
not regularly updated. Borrowing requirements for the next
month, quarter, or a year ahead were genenally poorly
All companies in group (1) produced cash flow plans reviewed
periodically, while 1 out of 7 in groqp (2) had not produced a
cash flaw plan. The survey however revealed that all companies
in both groups (1) and (2) had budgetary control systems. Also,
generally all construction companies had a good accountancy
systen, but some companies had a weak finance director.
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viii)Bidding methods. In 2 out of 7 of group (1), middle managers and
specialists in bidding did not in all cases contribute, in
contrast group (2) middle managers always were involved in the
bidding process.
ix) Lack of response to market change. Four out of 7 in group (1)
had insufficiently rasporkkd to market changes, while 2 out of 7
of group (2) indicated a slow' response tommuitEM:change. Against
the competition and with rapid change in the construction
market, companies need to be sUcngly placed in the market.
Gotk Gully [Quartered Aoaxm*arts] believes that most ompmdes
suffer financial distress when attitudes to market changes are
weak. Furthermore, almost complete agreement exists among
specialists in that failing companies are those which have
either not noticed a change in their business eavirciment or
have not responded to it (JohnArgenti [7]).
Typically construction companies that have invested heavily in
land and property during a boom period, in a subsequent slow
down accompanied by increasing interest rates, often incurred
losses that may lead to failure.
Some particular factors in failure raised in the survey include:
i) Debentures: Normally companies issue debentures with a fixed
interest rate in order to raise investment funds. Failing
companies often then allow leverage to rise to a level where its
future is placed in jeopardy.
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No company in group (1) had issued debentures, but 1 out of 7 in
group (2) had done so. Thus debentures could be viewed as a
helpful means of stemming financial difficulties compared to
other loan forms.
ii) Overtrading: Companies often try to expand to a limit which
will not lead to ovartrading. In group (1) 2 out of 7 firms
appeared to do this, while no ompany in group (2) had done so.
Clearly group (1) companies had taken suchrisks e.g. J.M. Jones
Ltd tut small compared to the size of the oanpmly. Overbrading
generally results when a company expands faster than its
capital. This gives an indication of overtrading when the ratio
of 'turnover to capital employed becomes very high. In our case
4 7 . 2 7 and 4.4, respectively, i.e. emoomm.ave for the size of
busimes.
Losses in projects: A company may undertake loss making
projects, padwe resulting in disaster in the largest cases.
Six cut of 7 of group (1) and 2 out of 7 of group (2) had made
such carmitments. Although group (1) firms imurred losses more
than group (2), sane companies In the survey oalsidered the
resulting lamas snail compared to size of business, e.g. 7'a:climb
Construction Ltd. Misjudgements of this kind were not
significant in big films, while for small films the results
could mean bankruptcy.
iv) Taking over a failing firm: A company may take over another
firm and later find a hidden difficulty. The financial situation
may then deteriorate if the acquired firm fails. Indeed Southern
Construction Ltd failed due to aoquiring the Caffin Division of
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the Ernest Ireland Group. In our case, 1 out of 7 of each group
incurred such losses. However the size of losses depends upon
the size of company. For example, TaylarWccdrow plc who are not
included In both groups, describes sudh losses as minimal in the
context of company size. Furthermore, in boom periods mergers
often intensify to facilitate expansion of resources and so
allow more ambitious undertakings, while in a recession mergers
are more likely for diversification reasons to temper
fluctuations or because of an opportmityto acquire cheaply.
v) Diversification: An attempt to take corrective action by
diversifylav business in order to secure a reasonable existence
in another sector or even in the same line of business to smooth
out the fluctuations in demand can be achieved by
diversification. The survey indicates no company had diversified
business into other sectors.
vi) Contract claims: In the survey 4 out of 7 of group (1) and 2
out of 7 of group (2) had unthrtalawirmcdects involving contract
claims resulting in significant losses. Clearly, unresolved
claims are potential causes of failure, however large companies
like Henry Boot Ltd and Tarmac Construction Ltd were able to
sustain significant losses from contract claims, but the effects
could be more severe with small firms. As seen from the previous
sectim, Mars Bros Holdings Ltd in particular appeared to have
failed because of the delay by clients in the settlement of
certain substantial claims on contracts. R D Gilbreath [38]
recommends the elimination or reduction of the incidence of
claim provoking conditions and claims themselves. When claims
have to be presented the contract administrator should ensure
210
that they are given the proper management visibility within the
owner's organisation, carefully analysed and documented and
equitably resolved a soon as possible.
vii) Overseas projects: In the surimy, work Abroad seemed to be a
favoured option for large firms, suffering decline in their home
market. Two out of 7 of group (1) and I cut of 7 of group (2)
involved in overseas projects reported significant losses. As
seen in the previous section, Mears Bros Holdings Ltd which
failed had suffered a critical financial drain when attempting
to establish a oontracting trading base overseas. Generally
losses on overseas projects could be due to lack of managerial
control or restrictive regulations in these countries.
9.4.4 Conclusions
Cartparison of the effects of managerial factors related to failure in
baffigroups produced the following survey findings:
- The existence of managerial factors in group (1) is obviously
more than in group (2).
-
The effects of these factors depends upon the size of company
i.e. managerial factors related to failure were not significant
in large firms, while for the smaller type the deficiencies
could cause bankruptcy.
-
The majority of companies negatively Z-scoring in group (1) were
dominated by an ambitious chief executive with sole authority as
seen in 6 out of 7 of group (1) and not constrained by b LLCng
finance directors as demonstrated in all companies in group (1)
where the financial director had shared authority.
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-
The majority of companies which are negatively Z-scoring in
group (1), were incurring losses in projects, whereas 6 out of 7
of group (t) had been incurring big losses additionaa to losses
in contract claims.
- The majority of companies negatively Z-soored had high leverage
i.e. total liability to equity > 3 also the mean ratio of group
of total liability/net assets > 2.
9.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Managerial factors related to failure in order of importance appear to
be as follows:
Weak finance director
- Chief executive sole authcccity withcxrt assistant.
- Average experience of engineers less than 10 years.
NO quick response to market changes.
Non contributory persons on company's board.
- Seniormanogement st3ff not involved in bidding process.
- Average everience for management staff less than ten years.
- Chief executive and chairman same person.
Particular defects in order of importance were as follows:
Losses in projects.
- Losses in contract claims.
Losses from overseas projects.
- Overtrading.
- Taking over a failing firm.
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CHAPIER 10
A-SCORES 
10. 1 11117MJUION
The concept behind the A-score is based an the belief that if a
ompany is in financial difficulty the reascns generally relate to
inadequate management ability and errors perpetrated earlier.
This section is an attempt to rank the factors related to failure in
order of importance and to produce a weighted result. The factors were
previously described in Chapter 9.
The A-score is designed to introduce a measure of quantificaticn of
failure prediction. However, an A-score is dependent upon personal
juJgatent normally insufficient to draw firm canclusicns, in ccntrast
ccmpany ratios analysis and Z-score evaluates are generally much more
adective.
Practically, the A-score Should be used only for a suspect company
when:
accounts are not available or are late
accounts suffer from "creative accounting"
Z-scores or ratios give freak results.
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Section 10.2 reviews previous studies.
Section 10.3 includes formation of data groups.
Section 10.4 describes briefly the developed A-score model.
Section 10.5 includes results obtained from the " solvent 7" and "at
risk 7" groups.
Section 10.6 includes validation of the Z-score model.
Section 10.7 describes the relationship between 1-score ad Z-score
models.
The final section briefly discusses the results and sarmimes the
results with conclusions.
10.2 FORMATION OF DATA GROUP
There was a general problem in Obtaining the required information for
a large number of companies, mainly due to the policy restrictions.
Furidlemore the data Should include failed firms but difficulties were
encountered in persuading such firms to answer the questions.
An alternative approach was to investigate continuing firms with
similar financial profiles to failing firms. In response 28 out of 90
ocntiming firms were prepared to provide information from which 7 out
of 28 were classified as vulnerable and placed in an "at risk 7" group
i.e. those scoring negatively by the Z-score model. Of the 21
renaming firms 7 were placed in the "solvent 7" group, i.e. those
scaring positively by the Z-score model. The remaining 14 firms were
placed in a "test 14" group. A list of companies in the "at risk 7"
and "solvent 7" groups are as follows:
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A list of companies "at risk 7":
1. Baboodk COntractors Ltd
2. Cementation Cbnstruction Ltd
3. Consolidation Tern Investments Ltd
4. Henry Boot and Sons
5. J.M. Jones Ltd
6. Trollope and Coils Ltd
7. Willet COnstruction Ltd
A list of companies classified as "solvent 7" group:
1. A.F. Budge Ltd
2. Peter Birse Holdings Ltd
3. Tarmac COnstruction Ltd
4. Haynill Contractors Ltd
5. Kyle and Stewart Cbsntruction Ltd
6. Ccoudace Cbnstruction Ltd
7. R. Mansel Contractors Ltd
The two groups were analysed statistically and significant differences
between groups were found to exist, (see Appendix E).
10.3 THE DEVELOPED A-SCORE MODEL
As was seen in the previous section the "solvent 7" and "at risk 7"
groups were used successfully for comparison of the effects of
managerial factors related to failure and therefore were selected In
developing the A-model.
Managerial factors related to failure described in the previous
Owter in order of importance were as follows:
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1. Weak finance director
2. Chief executive sole authority without authorised assistants.
3. Average experience in years for engineers, less than ten years.
4. Slow response to market changes.
5. Nbn-executive persons on the ccmpany board.
6. Senior man4gement staff do not participate in bidding.
7. Average years of experience of management staff less than ten
years.
8. Chief executive and chairman, same person.
Also, the identified managerial errors related to failure in order of
importance were as follows:
1. Making losses on projects.
2. Making losses in contract claims.
3. Making losses in overseas contracts.
4. High leverage.
5. Taking over failing firms.
Having identified the relevant factors they are now weighted for the
survey sample of "solvent 7" and "at risk 7" groups.
The A-score for a ainpany is then obtained by adding the weight of all
factors together. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 show the A-score results
obtained from the "at risk 7" and "solvent 7" groups.
The least A-score in group (1) considered to indicate
vulnerability is 50. All calwdes In group (1) scored above 50,
a reasonable cut off value between vulnerable and solvent
canpanies.
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- In sample group (1) virtually all the companies were clearly in
danger in contrast to the strong group (2).
- All companies of group (2) scored less than 50 with a mean value
group score of 37.7. The mean value of group (1) was 65.85.
"At risk 7" Group Companies A-Score
1 Babcock Contractors Ltd 62
2 Cementation Construction Ltd 72
3 Consolidation Tern Investments Ltd 62
4 Henry Boot Ltd 96
5 JM JOnes Ltd 50
6 Trollop and Coils Ltd 69
7 Willet Construction Ltd 50
TABLE 10.1: SHOWS RESULTS OBTAINED FROM "AT RISK 7" GROUP (1)
"Solvent 7" Group Companies A-Score
1 A F Budge Ltd 31
2 Peter Birse Holdings Ltd 45
3 Croudace Cbnstruction Ltd 41
4 Hymill Contractors Ltd 29
5 Kyle and Stewart Construction Ltd 47
6 R. Mansell Ltd 28
7 Tarmac Construction Ltd 43
TABLE 10.2: SHOWS RESULTS OBTAINED FROM "SOLVENT 7" GROUP (2)
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10.3.1 Weighted Results
The items related to failure weighted in accordance with their
importance produced the following list:
Managerial Factors Related to Failure	 Weighting
1. Weak finance director	 17
2. Autocratic chief executive	 14
3. Lack of engineering skills 	 12
4. Poor response to market change	 10
5. Senior management staff not experienced in bidding 	 5
6. Company board comprised persons not working in the
company	 5
7. Chief executive and chairman, same person	 2
8. Lack of managerial skills 	 2
Total:	 67
Managerial Errors Related to Failure
	
Weighting
1. Making losses in projects 	 14
2. Making losses caused by contract claims 	 7
3. High leverage
	
5
4. Making losses caused by overseas amtracts 	 5
5. Making losses caused by taking over failing firms 	 2
Total:	 33
10.3.2 Method of Scoring
1. The scores are given only if the observer is confident that the
factors and errors are clearly evident in the suspect company,
otherwise nils are recorded.
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2. The score should be full values or zero. Intermediate scores
3. The overall critical mark is 50. A company scoring above that
level is considered vulnerable, clearly a score of this level
when accompanied by a negative Z-score should signify a crisis.
10.3.3 Statistical Analysis
The two groups were analysed statistically and significant differences
between groups were found to exist (see Appendix E).
10.4 VALIDATION OF RESULTS FROM THE "TEST 14" GROUP
Although the results in the previous section indicate that the A-score
model is discriminating between "solvent" and "at risk" companies well
the true test of the model's accuracy requires validation of
independent data. The results Obtained from data for 14 companies are
shown in Table 10.3.
Companies	 A-Scores
1. Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd 	 74
2. Balfour Beatty Ccnstruction Ltd	 39
3. Ben Baily plc 	 48
4. C H Beazer plc	 24
5. Cbstain Constructicri Ltd	 76
6. Dunbon plc	 24
7. Higgs plc	 48
8. F J Lilly plc	 81
9. Jahn Laing Construction 	 50
10. Miller Group plc	 46
11. Mbwlem Group plc
	 50
12. Taylor Woodrow plc
	 50
13. Walter Lawrence plc
	
41
14. Willmot Dixon Construction Ltd 	 50
TABLE 10.3: THE A-SCORE FOR "TEST 14" GROUP
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Three out of 14 of the "test 14" group are classified at risk, even
when scoring above 50. These were very large ccrrpanies, namely: 
	
1. Alfred McAlpine Ltd
2. Costain Construction Ltd
3. F J Lilly plc.
Thus some caution should be exercised When dealing with large
carlenies and A-scores need to be viewed with more tolerance than
small companies. Furthermore, by examining the Z-scores of these
cartpanies, all scored positively. Of the total "test 14" group 78% are
correctly classified as solvent, when scoring less than 50 with their
Z-sccme also positive.
Thus at first sight the results do not appear as good as the 100%
correctly classified in both the "solvent 7" and "at risk 7" groups.
Thus it must be concluded that an A-score alone is an insufficient
tool for prediction failure. However the results are quite valuable
When placed alongside the Z-score and financial ratios methods.
10.5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A-SCORE AND Z-SCORE
The results obtained from "at risk 7" and "solvent 7" groups indicate
that there may be a relationship between A-score and Z-soore, which
would be useful if proven statistically, (see Appendix E).
Unfortunately the results obtained from statistical analysis show that
the inter-correlations between A-score and Z-score are only 67.7% i.e.
rot very strong. lever, the Z-score value of zero also corresponds
to anA-score of about 50 i.e. the values considered critical in both
mcdS1s. Nevertheless, these results may still be misleading because of
the small number of companies in the survey.
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The results also indicate that when the Z-score falls below zero, the
corresponding A-score increases above 50 i.e. the value considered to
be a cut-off between "at risk" and "solvent" companies.
10.6 SUIMRY AND CONCLUSIONS
The A-score was developed to systematise failure prediction by
quantification measures based on non-financial features and then
linked with Z-scores.
It could be concluded that there is a link between Z-score and A-
SaDre. As was seen from the results of "at risk 7" and "solvent 7"
gawps, those companies scoring negatively in the Z-model also have A-
scores above 50 in 100% of the "at risk" group.
FInthermore the results of the "test 14" group show that 3 out of 14
olvemies scoring positively in the Z-model had A-scores above 50,
these being large firms whose strength and reputation can stave off
irmavency for some considerable time.
Another point of interest is the possibility the A-score concept might
be a suitable measure for those firms engaged in rescues. Put simply
when a company moves down the path to failure its A-score rises above
50 and to return to a healthy situation the items that contribute to
A-scores have to be corrected, for example, replacing a weak finance
director or reducing leverage etc.
Other alternatives might be:
a merger
diversification
issuing debentures.
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Finally, the above described analysis does not by itself deal with the
actions required to return a failing company to health, but only to
improve predictive ability by highlighting the factors and errors
wh:ktL may lead to failure.
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CHAPTER 11 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
11.1 immuclzoN
Construction is a high risk business, clearly therefore advantages
accrue if potential failures can be recognised at the earliest
possible stage and thereby minimise costs of liquidation to all
concerned. Some method is apparently needed which will give a
quantitative indication of the solvency.
This chapter discusses some of the other methods available to predict
company failure, also considers linkages between them. The three
methods developed in this research were namely the Z-scores (see
Section 11.2), the traditicnal ratios (Section 11.3), and the A-score
technique (Section 11.4). This latter method of failure identification
however operates on different principles to either the Z-scores or the
traditional ratios.
Section 11.5 brings all the research findings together and attempts to
conclude how well the methods developed meet the research objectives.
Section 11.6 makes recommendations for implementing the research
findings in practice.
Finally the chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis and
mammendations for future studies.
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11.2 7HE Z-SCORES
This research is first detailed attempt to develop a Z-soores model
for construction companies in the UK followingMason's earlier work in
the late 1970s and covers development of three new Z-models and
reexamination of Mason's model.
Two of the models failed to meet completely all the underlying
statistical criteria required in the discriminant approach because of
the small number of company accounts In the survey, restrictive
policies of construction firms in providing sensitive lafarmaticri, and
also "creative accounting" of some suspect companies.
Nevertheless, both these models were able to distinguish between
"failed" and "solvent" companies well and could identify a Short list
of "at risk" i.e. the profiles are very similar to failed ompanies
and that they are likely to experience financial distress which may
ORLS8 failure.
Indeed the results obtained from the "a11-90" group continuing
capEirdes in the industry indicate that over the last four years 17%
and 20% respectively have profiles similar to those bankruptcies in
both models. See Tables 8.8 and 8.15. This is a real test of both
models.
Furthermore the regression model classified oanpanies as vulnerable
substantially better than the original model particularly-with respect
to sensitivity to failed company data, although the model had less
discriminating power than the original model. It also classified the
geared up company better than the original model i.e. those companies
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relying on borrowed funds over a long period. In practice industry
prioritise those firms typified to be at risk and for this reason a
decision was made to evaluate the regression model further with the
London Borough of Camden with over 200 firms involved with this local
authority. By taking the classification boundary at the -1.6
threshold, the discriminating power of themodel was shown to be good.
Further verification of the quality of both models can be seen in
their composition with similar discriminating variables. The main
difference being that the regression model includPs five variables,
indeed 3 out of7 of the discriminating variables in the original
ncdel were removed and replaced by better representatives, namely
imam gearing ratio, i.e. the ratio of interest to profit before tax
and interest.
Figure 7.15 shows the trend in income gearing for the failed group
rising sharply to crisis level at the year of failure while for the
solvent group its value is stable indicating the discriminating power
of this variable.
The updated results of Mason's model are shown in Section 7.5 which
indicates the model has less discriminating power than those developed
in this research and thus needs further testing to provide its
validity.
Finally when applying Z-scores in vetting construction companies on
tender lists, the user should consider the following:
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- not to rely on single Z-score values for a single period. At least
three years or maybe a longer period may be needed because some
companies continue in the business depending on their capabilities.
individual Z-scores serve to rank companies in terms of their
solvency, the lower the Z-score or the more companies exhibit
negative Z-scores for Several years indicate more likelihood of
failure.
- the study introduced a distribution to give the user an indication
of the performance of a particular company, i.e. if the company Z-
score for 1986 is less than the mean for the industry in 1986 then
its performance is obviously less than average (see Figure 8.4).
- Z-scores alone cannot predict failure but only provide a financial
indicator to give a quantitative indication of the solvency of a
canpany, or a simple rule for gauging financial health.
11.3 THE TRADITIONAL RATIOS
Among 31 financial ratios analysed in this study, only three ratios
were considered to be reliable failure prediction tools i.e. those
critical ratios reflecting financial difficulties in a company (see
Sections 7.7, 8.4).
The results obtained from the "All failed 22" group produced the
followirgvaaues:
the current ratio in 17 out of 22 of the group is less than unity
- the net assets to current liabilities ratio in 15 out of 22 of the
group is less than unity
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- the pretax profit to interest ratio in 20 out of 22 of the group
is less than 2.0
nirthermore, the study suggests that the above ratios can help to
Identify failing companies when deterioration has continued over
several years. Also the study showed that a company with a low Z-
sxze and deteriorating ratios is likely to fail.
Finally, the study managed to combine Z-scores with critical ratios
i.e. companies classified as failed by Z-scores analysis when the
critical ratios were also less than the specified limit for these
ratios.
11.4 THE A-SCORES
The A-score was developed to systRmatically predict failure with a
quantification measure based on non-financial features linked to Z-
scores.
The A-score alone was by itself an insufficient tool for predicting
failure, but provides a valuable indicator when placed alongside Z-
s:area and financial ratios.
lbws apparent from the results that Z-scores below zero and A-scores
above 50, are values considered to be cut-offs between at risk and
solvent canpanies, the exception being large firms which need to be
viewed more tolerantly because of strength and repubMticm Usually,
mall companies suffer first in a recession period and therefore
beam more vulnerable than large firms [interview with Addy of Dark
Gulley].
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Finally the A-score concept might be very suitable for those engaged
in rescues, put simply when a company moves down the path to failure
its A-score rises above 50. To return to a healthy situation the
itens that contribute to A-scores have to be corrected, for example
replace a weak finance director or reduce leverage etc.
11.5 RESEARCH FINDINGS
The ultimate findings of this work are:
1. There are likely to be two features of company failure; firstly
financial as has been seen Z-scores and traditional ratios are
indicators of approadhing failure, which generally appaar in the
last three years before collapse. Secondly, non-financial
features as observed through A-scores.
2. Z-scores alone cannot predict failure; similarly a combination
of traditional ratios and Z-scores.
3. There will be companies that do not respond to Z-scores analysis
and give freak results. Similarly traditional ratios cannot
always provide a reliable overall picture of performance but can
pinpoint particular areas of concern. Some large firms do not
always respond to A-scores and need to be examined by other
tools.
4. Z-scores and traditional ratios are liable to be influenced by
changes in the economy i.e. a rise in interest rates which may
cause a deterioration in all gearing for all companies.
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5.	 Traditional ratios and Z-scores should be ranked with those for
its awn sector of industry.
6. Z-score models need redevelopment when they become "old and
tired" as "bankruptcy prediction models are fundamentally non-
stationary" (see Mnsah, 1984 [18], pp391) also the test of
Mason's model after 10 years in Section 2.3.6 .
7. Prediction of bankruptcy using Z-scores is likely when the
probability using a Bayesian approach (see Section 8.2.8) of a
company actually failing is classified as at risk can be
calculated approximately.
8. The results obtained from the "All 90" group, suggest that 18%
of continuing companies in the industry might have profiles
similar to the bankruptcy profile in both Z-models i.e.
approximately 18% to be over the last four years (see Tables 8.8
and 8.15).
9. Failure signs can be seen in financial ratios and indicate an
increasing reliance on borrowed funds over at least a three year
period. In particular net assets to current liabilities ratios
of failed companies decrease, while the ratio remains stable in
the continuing firms.
10. The current ratio in failed companies deteriorates at least two
years prior to failure, while in continuing firms it remains
stable. Pretax profit to interest ratio of failed companies is
lower than 2.0.
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11. The following ratios are considered to be an ultimate test of
company solvency, if their values decrease to specific limits as
calculated from the means of "All failed 22" and "Non-failed 20"
groups (see Section 8.4.2):
- current assets/current liabilities < 1.0
net assets/current liabilities < 1.0
- pretax profit/interest < 2.0
12. The results obtained from 73 continuing carpanies with positive
Z-scores had the above three ratios as follows:
i) 6 out of 73 of the group had a current ratio less than
unity (see Section 8.4.3)
ii) 30 out of 73 of the group had a net assets to current
liabilities ratio less than unity thus reflecting that
over 40% of construction companies rely on, having borrowed
funds, considered to be unusual in other industries.
iii) 14 out of 73 of the group had a pretax profits to payable
interest ratio less than 2.0.
13. Twelve calpanies out of 73 of the group had two ratios mentioned
above less than the specified limits of the "failed 22" group
i.e. about 16% of continuing companies have profiles similar to
failed curpenies.
14. The lower the Z-score and deteriorating ratios for a company and
the more years the company is classified at risk the more likely
that company is to fail.
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15. The evaluation of the managerial factors related to failure in
order of importance were as follows:
- weak finance director
- chief executive sole authority without authorised assistants
- lack of engineering Skills
- poor response to market change
- non-contributing persons on company board
- senior management staff not involved in bidding process
- lack of managerial Skills
- chief executive and chairman, same person.
16. The evaluation of management errors In order of importance were:
- making losses in projects
- making losses in contract claims
- making losses in overseas contracts
- high leverage
- taking over failing firms
17. The results obtained from case studies showed that the following
factors and errors can lead to failure:
- poor trading on contracts taken an at tight margins
- delays in settlement of substantial claims
- losses incurred by other companies within the group such as
guaranteeing loans of a subsidiary company
- acquiring failing firms with activities not fitting in well
with the parent business
- financial drain caused by expansion of home or overseas work.
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18. The analysis of trends of failed and non-failed companies was as
follows: 
	
- profitability ratios for solvent companies is always
positive, while for failed firms declines sharply and beaams
negative (see Figures 7.5, 7.10, 7.12)
- current assets to net assets ratio for failed firms rises due
to increased reliance on borrowed funds, net assets decrease
sharply, current assets remains stable in continuing firms
(see Figure 7.6)
- turnover to net assets ratios for failed companies rises due
to cvertrading, while for continuing ccmpanies remains stable
(see Figure 7.7)
- current liabilities to net asset ratios for failed canpanies
rises due to increased reliance on borrowed funds with sharp
decreases in net assets, but for continuing companies remains
stable (see Figure 7.14).
11.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE RESEARCH FINDINGS IN
VEITING CalsrRocrioN ampANnis ON TENDER Isms
To obtain reliable results in vetting construction companies on tender
lists, application of the developed models of this study as
classification devices required the following to be implemented:
- Financial ratios and Z-scores should be ranked with those in its
own sector of industry. It is important to view the company in
relation to the performance of the rest of the industry.
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- Produce a distribution of Z-scores for the industry each year, and
compare the performance of a particular company with the mean of Z-
scores for that year.
- nets is potential danger in relying upon the results of single
tests, at least two methods should be adopted in vetting
construction companies on tender lists.
- At least two financial ratios out of the three critical ratios are
needed to give results less than the specified limits and to
exhibit negative Z-scores for at least three years before ouningto
the conclusion that a company is "at risk".
- A-scores should only be used for companies exhibiting failure Z-
scores and/or critical ratios methods.
- A-scores should be viewed more tolerantly for large compared to
small firms because of their strength and reputation in the market.
For a systematic appraisal of contractors, the procedure is as shown
in Figure 11.1 and is designed to facilitate the vetting of
construction companies on a tender list. However, the developed
models should only be used as part of an overall assessment of company
stability. Any predictions should be interpreted with caution as the
models require further testing on a broader range of companies. It is
also important to appreciate that the use of such models to exclude
ccmpanies from tender lists could accelerate or even cause failure.
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YES
/ Checking the A- score
( Qualified company
YES
Z2= 2.817 2.84 X1 +15.3 X2 -2.08 X3 + 0.581 X4 + 0.282 X5
Note
- Model 1 is applied for quoted and unquoted companies.////////// - Model 2 is applied for unquoted companies.
Checking the Z- score
Z1= 14.6+82 V1-14.5 V2 +2.5 V3- 1.2 14 +3.55 V5 -3.55 V6 -3 V7
/ li
I 
Checking the critical ratios;
- Current assets/current liab ties>1.0
/ -
Net assets/current liabilities	 >1.0
- Pre-tax profit/payable interest >2.0
FIGURE 11.1: SHOWS A SYSTEMATIC APPRAISAL OF CONTRACTORS
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
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Model (1)
Z:. = 14.6 + 82 V1 -14.5 V2 + 2.5 V3 -1.2 V4 +3.55 V5 3.55 V6	 3 v7
V1 : As a ratio of earnings after tax and interest to net capital employed
V2 : k a ratio of current assets to net asset
V3 : A a ratio of turnover to net asset
V4 :	 a ratio of short term loan to earnings before tax and interest
V5 : As a tax trend
V6 : Earnings after tax trend : En + E(n-1) E (p-2)
2
EQ1-2)
V7 : Short term loan trend : Ln + 1kp-1 _ 49_2)
2
1(n -2)
Model (2)
Z = 2.81 - 2.84 X,1 + 15.3 X2 - 2.08 13 + 0.581 14 + 0.282 X5
X1 :Is a ratio of current assets to net asset
X2 : Is a ratio of earning after tax and interest to net capital employed
13 : As a ratio of interest to earning before tax and interest.
X4 : Tax trend Tn + T(2-1) T(p-2)
2
T(12-2)
X5 : As a ratio of turnover to net asset
Note ;
- The denominator is taken as the absolute value
- The trend ratios are calculated for year n.
FIGURE 11.2: KEY TO FIGURE 11.1
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11.7 CONTRIBMION OF THESIS TO THE CONSTRUCITCN INDUSTRY
This research provides an insight into the methodology of predicting
ccmpany failure in the constructicn industry and offers an opportunity
to link several methods together in order to systematically appraise
contractors on tender lists. Until now other construction based
systems in the UK have been unavailable.
The research provides several models which provide quantitative
indicaticns of the solvency of companies.
Finally, the research highlighted managerial factors contributing to
failure and provides the A-score test suitable for those engaged in
rescues.
11.8 FURTHER RESEARCH WORK
1. Development of an expert system package to help in vetting
calsbnactIon canpanies on tender lists, perhaps using the models
indicated in this research.
2. Produce an alternative remedy to bankruptcy for companies
classified at risk in the construction industry.
3. Development of quantitative mezsxres to return a failing company
to health in the construction industry, perhaps using the models
indicated in this research.
4. Multivariate Discriminant Analysis approadh for analysing merger
activity In the construction industry.
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APPENDIX A
MANUAL FOR USE WITH THE FORTRAN PROGRAM "ADNAN-FOR" FOR THE
COMPUTATION OF FINANCIAL RATIOS 
1.1	 INTRODUCTION
The Fortran program, ADNAN. FOR developed to perform the financial
ratio calculations and data manipulation including:
- the User Manual
the Program Documentation
1.2 USER MANUAL
1.2.1 Introduction
The canputer program ADNAN.FOR has been written and developed for
specific use in the calculations required in this project and could be
used in financial institutions. The User Manual sets out how the
program may be used to perform the calculations and the program
docunentation section allows the program to be understood.
The program calculates, from 18 pieces of financial information
Obtained from company financial reports, a series of financial ratios
and measures 46 in all relevant to this study.
The program is in two parts:
- the 18 pieces of financial information are read by the computer and
printed out for checking
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- the program calculates the 46 financial ratios and measure of
performance for the six years as maximum period, and the program
asks the user the required number of years, and name of file for
output.
The program also calculates the means of financial ratios for the
required period, and the program prints the trend and growth ratios
for the 18 pieces of financial data and also the means of the results.
1.2.2 Input Data
This section describes the financial information extracted by the user
from the company financial reports to the computer. The following
information is required for input for six years as maximum period.
Financial
	
Description
	
Units
Data No
	
1	 Annual turnover 	 x 106
	
2	 Profit after tax
	
3	 Profit before tax
	
4	 Net assets
	
5	 Cash
	
6	 Current assets
	
7	 Current liabilities
	
8	 Fixed assets
	
9	 Stock and work in progress
	
10	 Debtors
	
11	 Debit over me year
	
12	 Total interest Charged
	
13	 Short term loan and overdraft
	
14	 Depreciation
	
15	 Retained profit
	
16	 Equity
	
17	 Employees remuneration
	
18	 Total tax
Note: The maximum number which could be used in this program is 6
characters without decimals, three places if decimals are
available for all data. Each number must have a decimal point,
and may be written anywhere in the 10 allocated columns.
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123456.123 .123Line 19 6.123
col. 1-10 col. 11-20 col. 51-60
Figure Al shows the method of inputting data, and Figure A2 shows a
sample printout.
Year 1	 2	 6
Line 1 123456.000 56.000 6.003
Line 2 .123 1.234 12.345
FIGURE Al
1.2.3 Output
The output is tabular in form, the printout includes:
1. the financial data for each company.
2. the financial measurements of performance for each company
including financial ratios for six years with mean, trends and
growth ratios.
To indicate what the user Should expect from the program, Figures A3
and A4 Show some output resulting from runningthe program.
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Part 1
A concise flowchart of the four parts is as follows:
For all companies in the study
Input 18 pieces of financial data
for years 1-6
e.g. TUrnovem:INtars 1-6
Ir
Print this out for checking
Calculate 46 financial ratios with means
for 6 years
Part 2
Calculate 18 trends from 2nd year till 6 Part 3
with means
Calculate 18 growth ratios from 2nd
year till 6 with means
Part 4
The data should be inputted as follows:
1. For each of the 30 companies, 19 lines of recording must be
canpleted.
2. On line 1 the company number is written i.e. 1-30 which Should for
clarity not contain a decimal point and should be in the first 10
columns. This enables the company data to be eawil y identified.
3. Lines 2-19 the financial data, 1-18 above is entered.
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1.3	 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION
1.3.1 Introduction
ADNAN.FOR is a computer program written in the programming language
FORTRAN 77 for use on the PC-IBM.
Core space required 141186 bytes.
Input data is stored in a three-dimensional array, and all
calculations are performed using three-dimensicnal arrays.
1.3.2 Variables
The following variables are used:
1 V: a three-dimensional array 30,18,6
containing the 18 pieces of input financial data for 6 years and
for 30 companies.
2 R: a three-dimensional array 30,46,10
containing the 46 calculated financial ratios for 6 years, and for
30 companies. Further the means of the data are held In R.
3 A file name for output
4 N the number of the company
5 ny the number of years
6 Ii, i=1„ , 18 the subscripted variables used as a counter in the
DO loops.
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PROGRAMME LISTING  •
ZOMMO	 V(30,18,6)
rea1 it 8 R(30,46,10)
ch2racter*32 fname
write(*,'(" Enter data filename")')
read(*,'(a)')fname
operi(file=fname,acce = s= 'sequenti =11 ',unit=7 ,stptua.'old')
write(*,'(" Enter number of year ")')
read(*,*)ny
write(*,'(" Enter filename for output")')
read(*,'(a)')fname
open(file=fname,statu=='new',Acce=s='=ecloential'wHiE=9)
WRITE (8,999)
. 999 FORMAT(1H,////////!///////)
il=l
1 continue
C	 READ COMPANY NUMBER
READ(7.10,end=300,err =q00) t‘l
10 FOR1AT(13)•
DO 50 12=1,18
READ 1'TH COMPANY DATA
READ(7, 31.9end =300 err=300 ( V ( T1,12,13),I3=1,ni)
50 CONTINUE
PRINT 1'TH COMPANY DATA
• WRITE(8,55)
55 FOKMAT(1H1)
WRITE(8,160)
WRITE(8,60) n
60 FORMATOH ,/,10X,'*****INPUT FOR COMPANY'0 4 ,' *****''')
.	 WRITE(8,160)
70 FORMAT( III ,'DATA' ,7X,' 	 2'.10X,'	
3',10X,' . A'00 Y,RITE(8,70)
1 '	 5',10X,'	 6'9!)
WRITE(8,160)
DO 90 14=1,18
WRITE(8,80)14,(V(11,14,15),15=1,n)')
80 FORMAT(I3,6F14.3)
90 CONTINUE	 •
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• a.
CALCULATE - F:INANO-1 AL kt=iT -I -0.5FOP. 1I TH . cOripiAily
DO 100 16=1 ny
EBIT/NA
R(I1,1,I6)=V(I1,39I6)/V(I1,4,I6)
EBIT/ED
I6)=V( 11,3,16 ) /V( II. 16, 164)
• EBIT/CL
P.(I1,3,I6)=V(I1,31I6)/V(I1,7,I6)
EBIT/NCE
R(I1,4,16)=V(I1,3,16)/(V(I1,41516)11,1(I1,13,I6))
EB I T/TURNOVER
R(I1,3,T6)=V( II 3,16 )/ 1.:( 11 /1,15)
PAT/NCE
R(I1 1 6,16)=V( 11,2 , 16) /( 1.1 (U ' A, 16 )1 12(11 ,13,I6))
PAT / EC
R(I1,7, IS )=V( 11,2, I6 )/V( Ii, 16,16 )
FA/E0
LA/C1.
1'2(11,4,16)=W(
	
) -V( II	 16) / 1 .1 ( 11,7,16)
14C/NCE
P(I1,10, I6)=-0.1 ( 11,6, 16 )
DR/CL -
R( 11,11,16)=V(I 1 10, I6 ) 	 ti I	 )
INT/EBIT
IF Mil ,3 n Ib) .E0.0.0)THEN
R(I1.12, 16)=0.0
ELSE
R(I1,12,I6)=V(II.,12,16)/12(I1,34Iii)
END :IF
CL/NA
R(I1913,16)=V(I177,I6)/V(
CL/NCE
R(I1,14,16)=V(I197,16)/(V(I1,49I6)+V(I1,13.16))
DEBIT/NCE
R ( I1,1.506)=V(I1,119I6) / (V(I 1 , 44,I6 )4%3(11,13,16))
CA/CL
R(I1 116,I6)=V( 11,6.16 )/V( 11 9 7,16 )
CA/ NA
R(I1,17, I6)=V( 11,6,16 ) /V( Ii 0,16)
CA/E0
R(I1,18,16)=V( '1,6,16) /k)( I1 9 16, T6 )
CA/NCE
R(I1,19,I6)=V(I1,6,I6)/(Vt 11 7 4,16 )-I-V( I1,13,16/1
LA/NA	 -10	 -
R(I1,2006)=CV(II 6 I6)-V(Il.pg.I6))/V(Ilgt±II6)
LA/E0
R(I1,21.16)=(V(I1F6,18)-V(T1,9$I6))!V(II,16.,,I)
TUMMY/NA
R(11,R2'16)=V(I1,1061/V(I1F4FI6)
STL/EBIT
IF(V(I1,3 ' IO).E0.0.0) THEN
R(I1.23,16)=0.0
ELSE
R(11,23,18)=V(11,13,14)/V(I193,18)
END IF
NCF/CL
R(I1,21i06)=(V(I1,1404)*V(T1115,I4))/V(I197,IS)
CASH FLOW/CL
R(I1,25,I6)=(V(I1,2,I6)+V(I1,14,I4))/V(I1,7,I4)
NON-BANK CREDIT TO TUPNOVER
R(11,28,I6)=IV(I1,79I6)-V(It,13,I4))/VI1,1514)
WC/TURHOVER
R(I1,27,I6)=(V(I1,6,145)-V(I1,7,T6)):11(I10,1,i.)
WC/NA
R(11/28,16)=(V(11,6,I6 1 -"(I1, 77 ,I6) 1 .V(I1,4,I6)
WC/CA.
R(T1,E9,I6)=(V(I1,8,16)-"(I1,7,[4')/V(I1,4,I4)
CASH/TURNOVER
P(I1,3004)=V(I1,..508)/V(I1,1,15:)
CASH/CL
R(I1,31,I6)=V(I1,5,16).".'fIl,7,14)
CASH/CA
R(I1,3R,16)=V(I1,5,I6)/%1kII,6,I8)
CASH /HA
R(I1,33.I6)=V(11,5,I6)/V(I1,4,16)
C	 CASH/NON-BANK CREDIT
R(Ii'34,T6)=V(I1'506)/(V(I1,706)-V(I1,130.6))
RETAINED EARNING/NA
R(11,35,I&)=V(I1,15,16)/Y(I1,4,I6)
STOCK/CI
R(11,36/I6).=V(11,9,16)/V(I1,7,14)
STOCK/TURNOVER
TURNOVER/EQUITY
R(I1,38,I6)=V(I1'1,16)/V(I1'161I6)
TURNOVER/FA
R(I1,39,16)=V(I1,1,I6)/Y(I1,6,I.8)
EMPLOYEE REMUNERATION/TURNOVER
R(I1,A006)=V(I107,I6)/V(I1,1,16)
EMPLOYEE REMUNERATION / EBIT
IF(V(11,3,I6).E0.0.0) THEN
R(I1,til:tI6)=0.0
ELSE
P(I1,41,I6)=V(I1,179I6)/V(I1.3,113)
END IF
INTEREST COVER RATIO
IF(V(I1,12,I6).E0.0.0) THEN
R(I1p42,16)=0.0
ELSE
R(11,42,16)=(V(11,3,16)+V(11,12,16))/Y(11,12,14)
END IF
DEGREE OF CAPITAL GEARING RATIO
IF(V(I1,3,I6).ED.0.0) THEN
R(I1,43,I6)=0.0
ELSE
R(I1,43,16)=MII,30I6)+Y(I1912,I6))/Y(I1,3,I6)
END IF
PRE-TAX RETURN ON LONG TERM FUND EMPLOYED
R(I1,449I6)=(V(II,3,I6)+V(I1,12.16))/(VrI1,169n:+V(I1,11,It;)
PRE-TAX RETURN ON TOTAL FUND EMPLOYED
R(I1.45,16)=MI1,3.16)+V(I1,12,I6))/(V(I1,14.14)4
V(I1,7,I6)+V(I1,11,I6))
DEBTOR/TURNOVER
	
-
R(I1,46.16)=MI1,10,I4)K345.0"2(T1,1.14))
100 CONTINUE
CAI CUL ATE RATIO MEANS
• DO 120 17=1,46
r(il,i7,7)=0.0
DO 110 I8=1,ny
R(I1,I7,7)=R(I1,I7,7)1R(I1,I7,IS)
110 CONTINUE
.R(It,I7,7)=R(I1,I7,7)/floatin0
120 CONTINUE
W)3 E(8,160)
160
	 format(' 	
+ 	
write(8,170)11
170	 format(1h,9x,"***** financial ratios ***'i**'vl)
write(S,160)
write(81180)
180 format(lh,'ratio	 1',10g,'	 2',10x,"
C .
	, 5',10x,"	 6',10x,"mean',/)
write(13,160):
do 200 112=1,46 :
write(8,190)112,(r(i1,112,113)013=1,7)
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.write(8,160)
write(8,'C"
write(8,'("
GROWTH RATIO")')
Input",241:,'"2",13,
13,"6",13,"meell"
'37
) ',13x,
write(8,'(;)
DO 778 1=1,18
call growth(
. 778 CONTINUE
)
I,ny,i1)
190 - formatZi3p8f14.3)
200 continue
write(8,160)
write(8,160)
write(8,'(" TRENDS")')
write(8,'("Input",24x,"2",13x,"3",13x,"4",12::,"5",
13x,"6",13x,"mean")')
write(8,'(/)')
DO 777.1=1,18
call trend(I,ny,i1)
777 CONTINUE
write(8,160)
write(8,160)
il=i1+1
goto 1
300 continue
stop
end
sobroutine trend(n,ny!lc)
common v(30,18,6)
dimension x(6)
x(6)=0.0
do 10 i=1,(ny-1)..
if(v(ic,n,i).eq.6.0) then
u(i)=0.0
else
x(i)=(v(ic,n,(i+1))-v(ic,0,1))/v(ic,n,1)
endif
x(6)=1:(6)+;1(i)
10	 continue,
x(6)=14(6)/(ny-1)
,	 .	 .
252
" write(8'1 ' ( i3 14x 7f1 zi 
_3) )n, (1:( ) jr*C-1 76)
return
end
subroutine growth(npny,ic)
common v(30,18,6)
dimension x(6)
x(6)=0.0
do JO i=1,(ny-1)
if(v(ic,n,i).eq.0.0) then
-x(i)=0.0
else
x(i)=v(icon,(1.4.1))/v(ic,n9i)
endif
x(6)=1:(6)+11(i)
10	 continue
x(6)=(6)'(ny-1)
write(8,'(i3,14x,7f14.3)')n,(x(i),i=1,6)
return
end
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FIGURE A.2: THE INPUT FINANCIAL DATA
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APPENDIX B
A MANUAL FOR USE OF THE "SPSS-X" STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES SUBPROGRAM "DISCRIMINANT" AND ITS OUTPUT 
1. INTRODUCTION
The statistical package described here is used through the Computer
Centre of Loughborough University of Techmlogy, see SPSS (Version X)
Manual, McGraw-Hill and SPSSX Handbook by M J }hint.
2.THE STANDARD PROaRAM
A listing of a standard program to call pp the DISCR1NaN7iNT program,
is Shown on page264using the Multics command SPSSX followed by the
name of the file, the SPSSX command (called the control file).
To run SPSS-X requires constructing a file giving two different types
of information:
1. Definition cammand, which describes the data
2. SPSS-X procedures, which perform the analysis.
The data itself should be held on a separate file.
All lines must begin with a command name, unless the line is a
condruation of a command givencn a previous line. Cantimmttion has
must begin with at least one blank character. The carmand name is
usually followed by further information. For example, the first
257
command title is followed by the actual legend of desired canpanies in
quotation marks:
Title "Cbmparison of profitable and insolvent companies"
often requires more lengthy information and is often brOken up by the
slash Character '/' with key words followed by the = character, for
example
file handle account/at d=" file-adnan.data"
in which the name of the file to be handled, in our case "adnan.data"
which includes 31 financial ratios for both "solvent and insolvent
companies".
The file handle command simply tells SPSS-X where to find the data
i.e. the name of the data file.
The next command needed is the data list. This command tells SPSS-X
whereabouts In the data file to find each item of data.
The variable labels command is simply used to give meaning to the
blunt variable names in the data list command. The two labelling
ccrffnands are:
Variable labels V32 "status"
Value labels V32 1 "Solvent" 2 "Insolvent".
Both label commands are not essential but enable us to remember what
we are doing and interpret printout, and will help future researchers
to use the same work.
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3. SUBCOMMANDS
The subcommands which are used in this program are as follows:
3.1 The "GROUPS" Subcommand
The GROUP subcommand defines the groups. Each case used in the
amputation of discriminations is assigned to a group based on its
value on grouping variables for example:
DISCRIMINANT GRCUPS = V32 (1,2)
In our case two groups are defined by the variable V32.
3.2 The VARIABLES Subcommand
The VARIABLES subcommand names the variables to be used as
discriminating variables during the analysis phase, for example
VARIABLES = V1 to V31
specifies that variables V1 through to V31 are to be used during the
analysis phase.
3.3 The ANALYSIS Subcommand
Several discriminant analyses can be done with one DISCRIMINANT
camand. The user should ice named all the variables to be used in the
various analyses on the VARIABLES subcommand and then use the ANALYSIS
miloocumand to specify subsets of variables for individual analysis.
For example:
ANALYSIS = V4 V9 V1 V13 etc
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3.4 The METHOD Subcommand
Different stepwise methods in the METHOD subcommand are  available.
These methods enter and remove variables one at a time, selecting them
on the basis of specific criteria. Different criteria are used for
different stepwise methods.
The METHOD subcannand follows the ANALYSIS subcommand and the method
applied In this research was Wilks, In which the variables that
minimise the overall Wilks' Lambda are selected. The othm7rethods are
described in the Manual, Moaraw Hill.
3.5 The STATISTIC Carmand
Several optional statistics are available in this program, see (SPSS-
X) Manual by McGraw-Hill.
4. OUTPUT FROM THE DISCIRDEMNT PFKXNAM
The following is some output resulting from the program listing on
page 264. The liable card results in the printcut as Shown In Figure
1, the number of cases by group, in our case in two groups, solvent
group 20 cases and insolvent group 11 cases.
Prior to each subanalysis the infammadon shown in Figure 2 is printed
out, the information includes the tolerance level "Maximum number of
steps" that are allowed for the analysis, minimum "F-value" of
variables for inclusion into the function, and the "F-value" for
deletion fnan the falaticri, statement of the method to be used in the
analysis and value of the prior probabilities of group membership are
included.
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In stepwise method the program automatically prints out standard step
by step information, as shown in Figure 3, also the information
includes at each step, a value for "Wilks Lambda", for which an
approximate "F-test" of significance is given. These are followed by
informaticn about each of the discriminating variables. The variables
which have been entered into the analysis are listed, and the value of
the "Entry criterion" at the time the variable was selected is given
along with the current "F to remove".
At step 9, seven discriminant variables have resulted as Shown in
Figure 4. The program also results in the "Statistic 11"
unstandardised canonical discriminant functions. These coefficients
are multiplied by the raw input data to arrive at discriminant scores.
Coefficients and canonical discriminant functions are evaluated at
group means (group centroids) as Shown in Figure 5, and the "Statistic
14" discriminant scores as Shown in Figure 6.
The "actual" group for each case and also the group for which it has
the highest probability of membership under P(G/X) is printed as the
probability of membership cn which the claification WBS based.
The second highest group probability P(G/X), is also printed if it
exceeds .0005. These are then followed by the "Discriminant Scores".
Assuming the statistics table as shown in Figure 7 includes
eigenvalues, percentage of variance, cumulative percentage of
variance, cam-ilk:ea correlation, Wilks Larrbda, dtli-Expare, degree of
freedom, and significance of chi-square are reported for the
functions.
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5. OUrPUT FROM THE PROGRAM BY USING THREE GROUPS
An attempt was made to discriminate between three groups of canpanies
used in this analysis and these groups are namely:
1. "Obintirumpd 20" group.
2. "Failed 11" group.
3. "Taken-over 9" group.
Because of the complexity of functions which are included, 19
discriminating variables, the discriminating model has not been
developed for the follawingxwasccs:
- time restriction
- has not strictly adhered to failure prediction
- requires further research beyond the scope of this thesis
The following is output resulting from the program listing on page272.
The program resulting from the "Statistic 11" unstandardised cammicaa
discriminant function coefficients for functicns 1 and 2 are shown in
Figure 8.
The "Statistic 10" territorial map as shown in Figure 9 shows the all-
group scatter plot and the "Statistic 14" discriminant scores are as
shown in Figure 10.
The "Statistic 13" classification results are Shown in Figure 11 and
include a portion of cases classified correctly. The overall
classification rate is 97.5%.
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The "Statistic 16" separate-groups plots, in our case three scatter
plots, are produced as Shown in Figure 12 including all the groups
scatter-plots.
5o ccmpare the territorial map as Shown in Figure 9 with the all-group
plot, we can identify the misclassified cases, those are the cases not
falling within the outline boundaries on the territorial map.
Assuming statistics as Shown in Figure 13, eigenvalue, percentage of
variance, cumulative percentage of variance, canonical correlaticn,
Wilks Lambda, chi-square, degree of freedom and significance of chi-
spare are iricauded.
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PROGRAM LISTING FOR TWO GROUPS 
20 MAY 88	 SPSS— X RELEASE 1.0 A	 Honeywelt/Multics
Loughborough University	 Honeywell 68/80 Multics
SPSS INC LICENSE NUMBER:
	
906
	
1 0
	 title 'Comparison of Profitable and.Insotvent Companie
	
2 0
	 file handle accounts /atd=avfite_ adnan.datO
	
3 0
	 data List file maccounts free/ vi to v32
	4 0	 variable labels v32 'Status'
	
5 0	 value labels v32 1' 4-So(vent' 2.°Insolvent°
	
6 0
	 /*breakdown tabtes=v1 to v31 by v32
	
'7 0	 discriminant groups=v32(1.2)/
	
8 0	 variables = vi to v31/
	9 0	 !*analysis = v4 v9 vIl.v13 v16 v18 v20 v22 v26/
	
10 0	 method = wilks/
	
11 0	 statistics 11.14
THERE ARE	 997480 BYTES OF MEMORY AVAILABLE.
THE LARGEST CONTIGUOUS AREA HAS 	 997480 BYTES.
SINCE ANALYSIS= WAS OMITTED FOR THE FIRST ANALYSIS ALL VARIABLES
ON THE VARIABLES= LIST WILL 8E ENTERED AT LEVEL 1.
THIS DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS REQUIRES
	
23544 (	 23.0K) BYTES OF WO
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.20 MAY 88	 Comparison of Profitable and Insotverrt Companies
Loughborough University	 Honeywett- 68/80 Muttics-
MP	 •	 .......	 •• •MO MID V= Mr'.	 nMI.-
	
OI ST CRIN r N 	 T
	 A
ON GROUPS DEFINED BY V32	 Status
31 tUNWEIGNTEDi CASES WERE PROCESSED.
0 OF THESE WERE EXCLUDED. FROM THE ANALYSIS.
31 (UNWEIGHTED) CASES WILL. BE USED IN THE ANALYSIS.
MUNGER OF CASES BY GROUP
NUMBER OF CASES
Y32	 UN WEIGHTED
	
WEIGHTED
	
1	 20	 20.0
	
2	 11	 11.0
	
TOTAL
	 31	 31.0
LABEL
Solvent
Insotvent
I.
FIGUR 1: NUMBER OF CASES BY GROUP
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I MAY 88 Comparison of Profitable -and Insolv ent Companies
Loughborough University
	
HoneYwelt 68/80 Multics
••••	 .01. n ••••
I GROUPS DEFINED BY V32
	 Status
DISCRIMINANT
IALYSIS NUMBER	 1
rEPUISE VARIABLE SELECTION
SELECTION RULE: MINIMIZE WILICS LAMBDA
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF STEPS. 	 	 62
MINIMUM TOLERANCE LEVEL 	
 040100
MINIMUM F TO ENTER 	 	 M 	
 1.0000
MAXIMUM F TO REMOVE. 	
 1.0000
LONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF FUNCTIONS. 
	 	 1
MINIMUM CUMULATIVE PERCENT OF VARIANCE
	
 100.00
MAXIMUM SIGNIFICANCE OF WILES' LAMBDA... 1.0000
RIOR PROBABILITY FOR EACH GROUP IS 0.50000
FIGURE 2: STEPWISE VARIABLE SELECTION'
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20 MAY 88	 Comparison of Profitable and Insolvent Companies
Loughborough University
	 Honeywell 68/80 Multic
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
AT STEP	 1. V.17	 WAS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS.
DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIF. 	 BE
WILKS' LAMBDA
	 0.66258	 1	 1	 29.0
EQUIVALENT F
	 14.7684	 1	 29.0 0.0006
VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS AFTER STEP
tpIABLE	 TOLERANCE	 F TO REMOVE	 WILKS 	 LAMBDA
V17	 1.0000000	 14.768
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnn
- VARIABLES NOT IN THE ANALYSIS AFTER STEP	 1
MINIMUM
VARIABLE TOLERANCE TOLERANCE F TO ENTER WILKS' LAMBDA
V1 0.9990450 0.9990450 4.6439	 . 0.56832
V2 0.9681785 0.9681785 144144 0.63072
V3 0.9983150 0.9983150 5.9521 0.54642
V4 0.9985298 0.9985298 .81888 0.64375
V5 0.9993747 0.9993747 6.0529 0.54481
V6 0.9917448 0.9917448 11.193 0.47336
V7 0.9653664 0.9653664 3.1499 0.59558
V8 0.9909484 0.9909484 2.3178 0.61192
V9 0.9992914 0.9992914 .24032 0.65694
0.9406767 0.9406767 .74155 0.64548
V11 0.9751889 0.9751889 .36107 0.65414
V12 0.9803528 0.9803528 9.8783 0.48978
V13 0.8935987 0.8935987 2.0991 0.61637
V14 0.7227410 0.7227410 0.19159E-0/ 0.66213V15 0.7893639 0.7893639 0.74505E-02 0.66240
V16 0.9426998 0.9426998 5.9474 0.34650V18 0.7477856 0.7477856 .23070 0.65716V19 0.4454334 0.4454334 8.8747 0.50311V20 0.9758882 0.9758882 0.63005E-01 0.66109V2/ 0.87821/5 0.8782/15 .23516 0.65706V22 0.9897215 0.9897215 3.7502 0.38432V23 0.6022425 0.6022425 3.4224 0.59041V24 0.9926706 0.9926706 7.0123 0.52988V25 0.9194308 0.9194308 3./1076 0.59831V26 0.9960822 0.9960822 .47371 0.65156V27 0.9910142 0.9910142 0.44931E-01 0.66152V28 0.9126132 0.9126132 .62446 0.64812V29 0.9709617 0.:9709617 .89549 0.64204V30 0.9519061 0.9519061 .11358 0.45990V31 0.9770676 0.9770676 .23636 0.65703
FIGURE 3: VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS AT STEP 1
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!O MAY 88	 Comparison of Profitable and Insolvent Companies
Loughborough University
	
Honeywell 68/80 MuLtics
1 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * * * *1* * * * *
sT STEP	 9. V12
	
WAS REMOVED FROM THE ANALYSIS.
DEGREES OF FREEDOM SIGNIF. 	 BETWEEN
aLKS LAMBDA
	
0.13517
	
7	 1	 29.0
EQUIVALENT F
	
21.0224
	
7	 23.0 0.0000
VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS AFTER STEP 9 ..... ---------
lARIABLE TOLERANCE F TO REMOVE
16	 0.5602124	 29.295
117	 0.3447527	 29.648
03	 0.2829541	 16.182
. 04	 0.6434045	 13.928
125	 0.5113777	 19.161
126	 0.5479918	 8.5112
130	 0.6915605	 6.8454
WILLS LAMBDA
0.30734
0.30941
0.23027
0.21703
0.24778
0.18519
0.17540
VARIABLES NOT IN THE ANALYSIS AFTER STEP 	 9
MINIMUM
VARIABLE TOLERANCE TOLERANCE F TO ENTER	 WILKS' LAMBDA
0.1546806
V2	 0.2803695
(3 0.3626145
0.8003164
0.227b301
V7	 0.1747145
V8	 0.8036324
V9	 0.5767617
V10	 0.8359510
V11	 0.8100130
V12	 0.1695183
V13	 0.4297389
V14	 0.4924572
V15	 0.5726225
V16	 0.3735249
V18	 0.5415379
V19	 0.3171498
V20	 0.7387956
V21
	 0.7220602
V22	 0.8627341
V27	 0.9404892
V28	 0.7182636
V29	 0.8042650
V31	 0.9175061
0.1546806
0.2306829
0.2643240
0.2795612
0.1956506
0.1747145
0.2810149
0.2801188
0.2828644
0.2795873
0.1491418
0.2194048
0.2365650
0.2715193
0.2652799
0.2417479
0.2593306
0.2726227
0.2716766
0.2793084
0.2826655
0.2748877
0.2795671
0.2792637
.46462
0.32042E-03
.80408
.45011
.50261
.13911
0.49684E-01
.69035
0.85863E-01
.28084
0.23381E-01
.49203
0.95672E-02
0.51554E-04
.17501
.1124A
0.45041E-01
.12648
.11060
.68119
0.69288E-02
0.13368E-01
.44794
0.67571E-01
0.13237
0.13517 .
0.13040.
0.13246
0.13215
0./3432
0.13486
0.13106
0.13464
0.13347
0.13503
0.13221
0.13511
0.13517
0.13410
0.13448
0.13489
0.13440
0.13449
0.13111
0.13513
0./3509
0.13247.
0.13476
FIGURE 4: VARIABLES IN ANALYSIS AT STEP-9
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UNSTANDARDIZED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
FUNC	 1
V6 —16.06449
V17 2.848277
V23
—.4894365
V24 .2345166
V25 —.6957342
V26 .6957439
V30 .5972381
(CONSTANT) —2.854138
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS EVALUATED AT GROUP MEANS (GROUP CENTROID!
	
GROUP	 FUNC	 1
	
1	 —1.81437
	
2	 3.29885
FIGURE 5: UNSTANDARDISED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT COEFFICIENTS
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E MIS ACTUAL HIGHEST PROBABILITY 2ND HIGHEST mut-v.1r
UM VAL SEL GROUP GROUP P(D/G) f(G/D) GROUP P(G/D.) SCORES.
1 1 1 0:7082 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.4401
p2 1 1 0.1939 1.0000 2 0.0000 -3.1135
/3 1 1 0.6821 1.0000 2 0.0000 -2.2240
4 1 1 0.0371 0.9179 2 0.0821 0.2700
5 1 1 0.1307 0.9952 2 0.3048 -0.3030
6 1 1	 0.8858 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.9579
7 1 1 0.8725 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.9749
8 1 1 0.2105 1.0000 2 0.0000 -3.0666
9 1 1 0.8708 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.6517
10 1 1	 0.1115 0.9929 2 0.0071 -0.2229
11 1 1	 0.8525 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.6284
12 1 1 0.8702 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.9778
13 1 1 0.1149 1.0000 2 0.0000 -3.3910
14 1 1	 0.3247 1.0000 2 0.0000 -2.7992
15 1 1	 0.3745 1.0000 2 0.0000 -2.7024
16 1 1 0.2483 0.9992 2 0.0008 -0.6598
17 1 1 0.4542 0.9999 2 0.0001 -1.0660
18 1 1	 0.4069 1.0000 2 0.0000 -2.6437
19 1 1 0.9687 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.7752
. 20 1 1	 0.8847 1.0000 2 0.0000 -1.9594
1 2 2 0.4483 1.0000 1	 0.0000 4.0570
a 2 2 0.8445 1.0000 1 0.0000 3.4950
23 2 2 0.4115 0.9999 /	 0.0001 2.4775
24 2 2 0.0309 0.8843 1 0.1157 .1.1400
25 2 2 0.2252 1.0000 1 0.0000 4.5116
26 2 2 0.4628 1.0000 1 0.0000 4.0330
27 2 2 0.4354 0.9999 1	 0.0001 2.5189
28 2 2 0.8504 1.0000 1 0.0000 3.1102
29 2 2 0.9364 1.0000 1 0.0000 3.3787
30 2 2 0.8766 1.0000 1 0.0000 3.4541
31 2 2 0.4166 1.0000 1 0.0000 4.1112
MFICATION PROCESSING SUMMARY
31 CASES WERE PROCESSED.
0 CASES WERE EXCLUDED FOR MISSING OR OUT-OF-RANGE GROUP CODES.
0 CASES HAD AT LEAST ONE MISSING DISCRIMINATING VARIABLE.
31 CASES WERE USED FOR PRINTED OUTPUT.
FIGURE 6: THE DISCRIMINANT SCORES
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STEP ENTERED REMOVED
VARS
IN
WILKS1
LAMBDA
SUMMARY TABLE
SIG.	 LABEL
1 V17 1 .66258 .0006
2 V6 2 .47336 .0000
3 V12 3 .35081 .0000
4 ,V25 4 .25383 .0000
5 V23 5 .21584 .0000
6 V26 6 .17335 .0000
7 V30 7 .15087 .0000
i)8 V24 8 .13503 .0000
9 V12 7 .13517 .0000
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT I
PERCENT OF CUMULATIVE	 CANONICAL :	 AF1
FUNCTION EIGENVALUE
	 VARIANCE	 PERCENT	 CORRELATION : FUNCT
1
	 6.39813	 100.00	 100.00	 0.9299627 :
* MARKS THE	 1 CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS REMAINING IN
STANDARDIZED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
„.n
FUNC 1
V6	 -1.07529
V17	 1.37431
V23	 -1.29912
V24	 0.82331
V25	 -1.01372
V26	 0.75494
V30	 0.61927
FIGURE 7: EIGENVALUE, PERCENTAGE OF VARIANCE CANONICAL
CORRELATION
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PROGRAMME LISTING FOR THREE GROUPS
-- - _ --
	 --- -__
	 _
Loughborough University
	 Honeywell-68/80 Multics
SPSS INC LICENSE NUMBER: 18950
0	 title "Comparison of Profitable and Insolvent Companies'
0	 file handle accounts /atd="vfile_ set2.data"
0	 data list file maccounts-free/ v1 to v32
0	 variable labels v32 'Status'	 .
0	 value labels v32 1 'Solvent' 2 'Insolvent' 3 'Take over'
0	 breakdown tabLes=v1 to v31 by v32
ARE	 995960 BYTES OF MEMORY AVAILABLE.
fGEST CONTIGUOUS AREA HAS	 995960 BYTES.
..
*GIVEN WORKSPACE ALLOWS FOR 6224 CELLS WITH	 1 OIMENSIONS FOR BREAKON
1
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UNSTANDARDIZED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
FUNC
	 1 FUNC	 2
V3 -7.530362 1.555425
V4 -11.09368 3.951185
VS 64.82103 1.338344
V6 -14.13432 -11.70164
V10 5.210845 .4421673
V14 -4.58/054 6.395205
,V15 12.51857 -3.634966
V16 7.550571 -3.971655
V17 5.817900 -.4192620
418 -3.333902 1.732463
.719 1.657647 -6.357691
V20 -3.879387 3.190735
V21 5.320921 -2.586156
V22 -1.993904 1.962062
V24 0.2681234E-01 .2481200
V25 .2507642 -.6466737
V28 4.792134 -..2785467
V29 -.7492963 -.3938435
V31 -4.632241 1.080963
(CONSTANT) -6.554657 -.6737030
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS EVALUATED AT GROUP MEANS (GROUP CENTRO!
GROUP
	
FUNC	 1	 FUNC	 2
1 1.23286 -1.66466
2 1.24474 3.02013
3 -4.26105 0.00798
FIGURE 8: UNSTANDARDISED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT
FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
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TERRITORIAL MAP * INDICATES A GROUP CENTR
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION 1
—8.0	 —6.0	 —4.0	 —2.0	 • 0.0	 2.0	 .4.
	 +------
3322
3322
3322
3322
3322
3322
3322	 .-
3322
332
322
3322
3322
	
+ 3322 •	 4	 •
3322
3322
3322
3322
3322
3322	 •
332
322
3322
33222222222222222222222222222
3111111111111111111111111111
• *4.	 + 331	 +
311
331
311
331
311
331
311
331
311
331
311
• 331+
311
331
311
331
311
• •	 331	 +	 •
311
331
311
331
311
331
4n•
—6.0	 —4.0	 —2.0	 0.0	 2.0	 4.0
FIGURE 9: ALL GROUP SCATTER PLOT
C	 8.0+
A	 1
1
O 1
N 1
1
C	 6.0.
A	 1
1
1
1
1
• 4.0-.
‘C	 1
1
1
1
1
N 2.04
A	 1
1
1
1
U	 0.0+
1
1
1
1
O 1
—2.0+
1
2	 1
1
1
1
—4.0 +
1
1
1
1
—6.0 +
1
1
1
1
1
— 8.0 +
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ASSIFICATION RESULTS -
NO. OF	 PREDICTED GROUP MEMBERSHIP
ACTUAL GROUP	 CASES
nnnnnnn ...... nnn 	 nnnnnn
-	 1 ..	 2
nnnnnnnn
•	 - 3
nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn
KM 1 20 19 1 0
(vent 95.02 5.02 0.02
NP 2 11 0 11 0
solvent 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
OUP 3 9 0 0 9
e over 0.0% 0.02 100.0%
HEWT OF "GROUPED" CASES CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED: 97.502
ASSIFICATION PROCESSING SUMMARY
40 CASES WERE PROCESSED.
0 CASES WERE EXCLUDED FOR MISSING OR OUT-OF-RANGE GROUP CODES.
0 CASES HAD AT LEAST ONE MISSING DISCRIMINATING VARIABLE.
40 CASES WERE USED FOR PRINTED OUTPUT.
FIGURE 11: CLASSIFICATION RESULTS
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ALL-CROUPS SCATTERPLOT - * INDICATES A GROUP CENTS
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION 1 .
OUT
X
OUT X
1
1
1
6.0 +
1
4.0 +
1
1
1
1
2.3 +
1
0.0 +
1
1
1
-2.0.
1
1
1
-4.0 +
-	 I
1
1
1
-6.0 •
1
1
1
-6.0 -4.0 -2.0 0.0	 -•-	 2.0 •	 4.0-
3
3
33
3*	 3
3
3
3
nn4-
1
12
1
4-nn
2
2
1
1
1
1
2 2
2
2
2*
2
1
11
*1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
OUT X
	
X •••••	 -+-	 4.•n•
OUT	 -6.0	 -4.0	 -2.0	 0.0	 2.0	 4.0
FIGURE 12: ALL GROUPS SCATTER PLOTS
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CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS
PERCENT OF CUMULATIVE 	 CANONICAL. :	 AFTER
FUNCTION EIGENVALUE	 VARIANCE	 PERCENT
	
CORRELATION : FUNCTION WILK
1*
2*
5.69868
4.20961
57.51
42.49
- 57.51
100.00
0.9223431
0.8989143
.
:
:
0
1
0..
o.
* MARKS THE	 2 CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS REMAINING IN THE ANALY
STANDARDIZED CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
A
FUNC	 1
-1.22079
-1.10525
FUNC
	 2
0.25216
0.39365
6 3.01058 0.06216
-0.88397 -0.73183
00 0.98088 0.08323
04 -1.58097 2.20706
05 1.14318 -0.33194
06 1.87153 -0.98444
07 2.97854 -0.21465
08 -7.41498 3.85319
09 0.64408 -2.47027
120 -1.31478 1.08138
121 6.60072 -3.20818
122 -0.81020 0.79726
f4 0.10640 0.98461
.25 0.33065 -0.85268
128 1.57714 -0.09167
129 -0.85922 -0.45162
/31 -2.10811 0.49194
FIGURE 13: EIGENVALUE CANONICAL CORRELATION AND STANDARDISED
CANONICAL DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
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APPENDIX C
A MANUAL FOR USE OF THE MINITAB STATISTICAL PACKAGE
AND ITS Oman 
1. INTRODUCTION
Minitab is an interactive statistics package written and dib
	 ibuted
by Minitab Inc, Pennsylvania.
Minitab stores the data being analysed in a worksheet which is
arranged in a structure of rows and columns. The values of each
different variable are stored in a separate column of the worksheet
within Minitab. These columns are designated Cl , C2 ... C.
The package offers various statistical analyses as follows:
simple descriptive statistics
- graph and histogram plots
- correlation and significance testing
- regression analysis (including stepwise)
- probabilities
- variance analysis.
2. MINITAB Ca*HINDS
There are over 100 Minitab commands of which any one user will
probably analyse a few of -them. The following ccimards are used in
this thesis.
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2.1 The "Set" Command
To input data from the terminal in_prime_systems, it needs to use the
"set" command which inputs data one column at a time. The values of
31 financial ratios were inputted in separate columns of the
worksheet.
2.2 The "End" Cbmmand
The input is terminated by the "end" command. The following columns
were inputted onto the worksheet.
Ci-C31: represents 31 financial ratios.
C32:	 represents Z-values calculated from the Mason model.
C:	 represents the value of discriminant scores obtained from
MIDA, see Figure 5.5.
2.3 The "Save" Command
To store the data on file, the "save" command is used, followed by
"filename". For example, save "Adnan".
2.4 The "Stop" Ocmnand
To leave the Manitab, the "stop" command is used which stops the
program.
2.5 The "Retrieve" Cbmmand
To retrieve the data, it is necessary to use the "retrieve" command,
followed by the filename. For example, retrieve "Adaan".
2.6 The "Help" Cbmmand
The Manitab program is itself able to supply infornot.tm on its own
command and method of use.
To use the "help" command, type "help" followed by the command, e.g.
help regress or help correlation.
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3. STATISTICAL COMMANDS
The package offers various statistical commands and can be used for
data manipulation. Several optional statistics are available in this
program. The commands which are used in this program are as follows.
3.1 The "Describe" Cbmmand
This is used to deliver descriptive statistics About ccntinuous type
data variables. In particular, "describe" gives the mean standard
deviation etc.
To use "describe" simply give the command followed by any number of
columns. For example, describe C1-C31.
3.2 The "Histogram" Cbmmand
This is used to plot histograms. To use "histogram" simply give the
carrnand, followed by any number of columns, e.g. Hist Ci.
3.3 The "Regression" Command
To use "regress" simply give the command "regress" followed by number
of independent variables which are included in the analysis. For
example, regress C32 5 C6 C12 C17 C23 C25.
4.0 =TIN FRCM THE V02EVIAB FROMM
The following is some output resulting from the program listing on
pages 282  tO 3 0 1 .
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Ma > print c1-c32
ROW	 Cl C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8
1	 0.0755 0.1000 0.1160 0.067 0.0330 0.0570 0.0620 0.6900
2	 0.1560 0.1620 0.1470 0.155 0.0630 0.0960 0.1000 0.7150
3	 0.0800 0.1000 0.1500 0.068 0.0450 0.0600 0.0700 1.1500
4	 0.0460 0.0700 0.0630 0.035 0.0250 0.0260 0.0520 1.3200
5	 0.0970 0.1270 0.1760 0.084 0.0680 0.0860 0.0860 0.4000
6	 0.1500 0.1600 0.1560 0.150 0.0270 0.1030 0.1150 0.4408
7	 0./540 0.1850 1.1870 0.140 0.0490 0.0900 0.1200 0.7700
e	 0.2200 0.2780 0.7500 0.210 0.1700 0.1260 0.1670 0.3600
9	 0.0830 0.1070 0.1500 0.070 0.0600 0.0430 0.1800 1.1500
10	 0.1150 0.1300 0.0750 0.100 0.0/60 0.0900 0.1100 0.7300
11	 0.1580 0.1760 0.0940 0.118 0.1120 0.1130 0.1720 1.0800
12	 0.0960 0.1250 0.2040 0.095 0.0685 0.0640 0.0840 1.0580
13	 0.2300 0.3300 0.3070 0.218 0.0877 0.1460 0.2250 1.1360
14	 0.2130 0.2360 0.5120 0.207 0.1220 0.1250 0.1420 0.4260
15	 0.0960 0.1060 0.1000 0.083 0.0300 0.0770 0.0990 0.7900
16	 0.1720 0.2250 0.1600 0.210 0.0470 0.0440 0.1300 0.8100
17	 0.0900 0.1000 0.1070 0.061 0.0360 0.0480 0.0770 0.3870
18	 0.0570 0.0550 0.0740 0.055 0.0060 0.0430 0.0500 0.3000
19	 0.1620 0.1890 0.2100 0.568 0.0900 0.0930 0.1230 0.5800
20	 0.1270 0.1790 0.2060 0.117 0.0800 0.0760 0.1200 1.3880
21	 0.0913 0.1170 0.0619 0.046 0.0549 0.0430 0.1000 0.5950
Continue'
22	 -0.4570 -1.4750 -0.5591 0.216 -0.1740 -0.2490 -0.5330 2.1200
23	 -0.0800 -0.0800 -0.0200 0.081 -0.0027 -0.0450 -0.0030 0.9680
24	 0.1293 0.2810 0.1240 0.085 0.0625 0.0830 0.2750 0.7315
25	 0.0400 0.1570 0.0440 0.028 0.0177 0.0248 0.0347 •.4580
26	 -0.1710 -0.1710 -0.0600 0.085 -0.0277 -0.0980 -0.1920 0.4530
27	 0.1160 0.1160 0.1110 0.100 0.0500 0.0890 0.1040 0.4470
28	 -0.5900 -0.5900 -0.1270 0.274 -0.0380 -0.1310 -0.3200 1.2200
29	 0.2440 0.0698 0.0480 0.056 0.0099 0.0220 0.0280 0.5960
30	 0.1115 caria a 1065 Ca 74 a_asaa a dIR7 6.7710 1 GIRRO
31	 0.2030 0.6620 0.1050 0.085 0.0420 0.0510 6.4000 0.9190
'ROW C9 C10 C11	 C12 C13 c14 C15 C16
1 0.480 0.4220 0.320	 0.3600 0.670 0.6000 0.2100 0.5900
2 0.420 0.0990 0.105	 0.3150 1.100 1.1000 0.0400 0.9100
3 0.320 0.0330 0.270	 0.3600 0.530 0.4400 0.1400 0.7400
4 0.340 0.1400 0.250	 0.9500 0.760 0.5800 0.2500 0.8300
5 0.560 0.6000 0.290	 0.2600 0.550. 0.4700 0.1880 0.4400
6 0.980 0.5800 0.400	 0.4700 0.970 0.9900 0.0830 0.6100
7 0.560 0.3100 0.500	 0.0300 0.820 0.7400 0.3700 0.1000
8 1.460 0.6800 0.160	 0.0197 0.300 0.2770 0.1930 0.2900
9 0.780 0.1330 0.135	 0.1900 0.430 0.3770 0.2050 0.6000
10 0.820 0.3300 0.367	 0.2300 1.580 1.4100 0.1300 0.8000
Continue?
11 0.455 0.1440 1.323	 0.3540 1.660 1.2700 0.0820 0.9580
12 0.500 0.1780 0.020	 0.1140 0.470- 0.4670 0.2260 0.7270
13 0.634 0.2070 0.037	 0.1390 0.763 0.9320 0.2940 0.7680
14 0.940 0.6000 0.570	 0.0400 0.420 0.3100 0.0950 0.4050
15 0.980 0.2700 0.610	 0.1580 0.880 0.7600 0.0910 0.7800
16 0.770 0.3370 0.517	 0.1640 1.070 0.9500 0.0480 0.7360
17 0.430 0.4000 0.380	 1.4200 0.930 0.5700 0.0430 0.5850
18 1.560 0.7100 0.490	 0.1920 0.960 0.9300 0.0900 0.4800
19 0.080 0.4300 0.042	 0.1000 0.600 0.6700 0.1220 0.6100
20 0.800 0.6740 0.270	 0.2380 0.630 0.5700 0.2650 0.4600
21 0.400 0.3580 0.079	 1.6900 1.500 0.7530 0.0880 0.7415
22 0.404 0.4980 0.400	 0.5200 2.110 1.0200 0.0203 1.9500
23 0.710 0.0930 0.623 --1.5100 1.190 0.7560 0.1950 0.9940
24 0.522 0.4270 0.376	 0.7250 0.944 0.6250 0.3240 0.5700
25 1.228 0.2730 0.326	 0.9360 0.790 0.8160 0.2500 0.6800
26 0.586 0.2970 0.580	 0.2590 0.723 0.9260 0.0001 0.7970
27 0.734 0.3615 0.730	 0.6260 1.170 0.9680 0.0001 0.7220
28 0.230 0.2720 0.210	 0.0920 2.760 1.3170 0.0025 1.0000
29 0.278 0.3080 0.268	 1.3750 1.490 1.1580 0.0001 0.7860
30 0.989 0.7320 0.255	 0.6160 0.890 0.9735 0.0001 0.5640
31 0.525 0.2940 0.520	 0.6000 1.000 0.7990 0.0830 0.7300
ROW	 Cl?
Continue?
C18 C19 C20 C21 C22 C23 C24
1 1.1900 1.530 1.020 0.3200 0.430 1.631 2.240 1.750
2 1.2000 1.240 1.200 0.4700 0.480 1.240 2.500 2.311
3 0.5900 0.670 0.460 1.0800 1.310 1.450 1.800 2.870
4 0.9000 1.360 0.690 0.2600 0.400 1.500 1.900 6.100
5 1.2300 1.570 1.070 0.2800 0.360 1.270 1.480 3.340
6 1.5600 1.700 1.560 0.9500 1.040 1.380 5.430 2.311
7 1.1780 1.420 1.060 0.4600 0.560 1.580 3.100 0.680
8 0.7500 1.160 0.965 0.4300 0.540 1.500 1.010 0.210
9 0.7200 0.930 0.625 0.4500 0.590 0.178 1.350 1.770
10 1.9600 2.300 1.750 1.3000 1.540 1.326 6.750 1.700
11 1.7000 1.870 1.310 0.7440 0.824 1.500 6.250 1.780
12 0.5270 0.788 0.645 0.2340 0.307 0.360 1.410 0.163
13 0.9800 1.415 0.932 0.4800 0.696 0.530 2.115 0.220
14 1.0340 0.880 1.004 0.3900 0.435 1.800 1.736 0.300
15 1.1600 1.290 1.040 0.8750 0.970 1.740 3.270 1.730
16 1.4500 1.900 1.300 0.8160 1.090 1.620 3.620 0.740
17 1.5600 1.690 0.970 0.3870 0.390 1.680 2.500 11.300
18 1.6800 1.850 1.400 1.2000 1.320 1.036 12.200 0.880
19 1.2600 1.500 1.105 0.0610 0.070 0.837 1.800 0.901
20 1,3600 1.980 1.240 0.4900 0.740 1.426 1.630 0.735
21 2.0520 2.480 1.020 0.3130 0.401 1.356 1.811 12.800
22 1.0815 1.096 0.523 0.8590 0.898 1.900 3.285 3.740
23 1.1800 1.180 0.760 0.8330 1.060 2.050 2.156 8.000
Continue?
24 1.5890 3.210 1.052 0.4140 0.836 1.829 1.792 6.960
25 1.1420 1.143 0.860 0.9480 0.850 1.572 1.521 6.150
26 2.6400 2.630 1.160 1.1250 1.124 1.925 5.470 0.400
27 1.5860 1.580 1.330 0.8430 0.843 2.275 2.360 1.767
28 2.5300 2.530 1.285 0.6430 0.643 1.238 10.160 2.566
29 1.8990 1.899 1.466 0.3380 0.448 1.313 6.000 16.100
30 2.3750 14.600 1.705 1.2920 8.230 1.627 2.726 4.740
31 2.7700 8.900 1.080 0.0808 3.420 1.850 4.860 2.800
ROW C25 C26 C27 C28 C29 C30 C31
1 0.700 0.143 0.070 0.027 1.760 0.023 0.0650
2 2.930 0.300 0.210 0.084 0.380 0.630 0.2100
3 0.320 0.280 0.450 0.080 0.800 0.250 0.1300
4 0.290 0.290 0.350 0.430 0.210 0.800 0.4700
5 0.500 0.410 0.220 0.140 0.970 0.725 0.2380
6 0.870 0.650 0.310 0.290 0.140 0.630 0.0130
7 0.280 0.210 0.510 0.530 1.000 0.630 0.4300
8 0.490 0.380 0.081 0.237 1.879 0.330 0.2100
9 0.225 0.270 0.700 0.220 0.350 0.095 0.8800
10 0.440 0.520 0.220 0.130 1.060 2.250 0.3400
11 1.370 1.050 0.400 0.240 2.860 1.780 0.3100
12 0.205 0.520 0.400 0.114 0.105 1.400 0.1600
Continue?
13 0.550 0.255 0.154 0.142 0.623 0.345 0.1210
14 0.850 0.170 0.042 0.083 1.043 0.620 0.1470
15 3.250 1.210 0.196 0.500 0.830 1.170 0.4500
16 0.084 0.160 0.110 0.074 0.183 0.530 0.0660
17 7.300 1.400 0.145 0.316 0.600 1.330 0.530
18 1.260 3.620 0.265 0.400 0.685 0.400 0.6240
19 0.860 0.068 1.280 0.920 0.840 0.343 0.1625
20 3.000 0.960 0.450 1.570 1.060 0.480 2.3200
21 1.000 0.056 0.500 0.570 a .125 0.5.0 /..262f
22 0.700 0.330 0.116 0.060 0.265 0.430 0.1140
23 0.600 0.835 0.157 0.155 1.550 0.441 0.0825
24 0.357 0.295 0.300 0.040 0.414 0.150 0.2220
25 0.011 4.900 0.200 0.180 0.198 0.690 0.2400
26 0.625 0.370 0.185 0.200 0.177 0.928 0.1800
27 0.569 0.210 0.590 0.785 1.575 . 5.485 0.4900
28 2.930 2.930 0.910 0.910 1.196 1.687 0.8260
29 0.543 0.600 0.260 0.007 0.213 0.500 0.1873
30 0.497 0.900 0.025 0.134 1.400 0.176 1.0037
31 0.398 0.576 0.480 0.833 1.070 2.500 0.4740
1TB > print c34
C34
1.4401 3.1135 2.2240 -0.2700 0.3031 1.9579 1.9749 3.0666
1.6517 •	 0.2229 1.6284 1.9778 3.3910 2.7992 2.7024 0.6598
1.0660 2.6437 1.7752 1.9594 -4.0570 -3.4950 -2.4775 -1.1400
-4.5116 -4.0330
-2.5189 -3.1102 -3.3787 -3.4541 -4.1112
MEAN
0.0721
MEDIAN
0.1150
TRMON
0.1040
STDEV
0.1805
SEMEAN
0.0324
n D	 13e5(.
	 C
31
C2 31 0.1306 0.1270 0.1344 0.2529 0.0454
31 0.1217 0.1100 0.1184 0.2015 0.0362
C4 31 0.1270 0.0850 0.1123 0.1034 0.0186
C5 31 0.0413 0.0470 0.0445 0.0579 0.0104
C6 31 0.0463 0.0600 0.0571 0.0807 0.0145
V 31 0.0809 0.1000 0.0774 0.1722 0.0319
Ca 31 0.8443 0.7300 0.7558 0.5533 0.0994
C9 31 0.6605 0.5600 0.6350 0.3433 0.0617
00 31 0.3610 0.3300 0.3564 0.1955 0.0351
01 31 0.3362 0.3230 0.3338 0.1888 0.0334
02 31 0.4856 0.3150 0.4371 0.4679 0.8840
03 31 0.9890 0.8900 0.9285 0.5239 0.0941
04 31 0.7911 0.7600 0.7856 0.2935 0.0527
05 31 0.1332 0.0950 0.1272 0.1053 0.0189
06 31 0.7347 0.7270 0.7085 0.2853 0.0512
Cl? 31 1.446 1.260 1.419 0.582 0.115
08 31 2.267 1.570 1.679 2.698 0.485
09 31 1.0835 1.0600 1.0796 0.3178 0.0571
20 31 0.6266 0.4800 0.6182 0.3532 0.0634
21 31 1.060 0.740 0.771 1.456 0.261
22 31 1.4361 1.5000 1.4687 0.4665 0.0838
Continue?
C23 31 3.427 2.360 3.019 2.627 1.472
24 31 3.478 1.780 2.909 3.942 1.708
25 31 1.097 0.569 0.865 1.456 0.262
26 31 0.802 0.380 0.601 1.089 0.196
27 31 0.3318 0.2600 0.2974 0.2687 0.0483
21 31 0.3355 0.2000 0.2917 0.3523 0.0633
29 31 0.825 0.800 0.763 0.644 0.116
C30 31 0.911 0.620 0.246 1.047 0.188
01 31 0.3737 0.2100 0.2956 0.4570 0.0821
Continue?
NIN	 MAY	 nt
JA-ntinue?
MIN MAX Ul 03
-0.5900 0.2440 0.0755 0.1581
-0.5900 0.8230 0.1000 0.1890
-0.5590 0.7500 0.0630 0.1761
0.0280 0.5680 0.0680 0.1550
-0.1740 0.1700 0.0177 0.0680
C6 -0.2490 0.1460 0.0387 0.0900
V -0.5330 0.4000 0.0520 0.1421
0.3000 2.9850 0.4470 1.0800
0.0800 1.5600 0.4200 0.8200
00 0.0330 0.7320 0.2070 0.4980
01 0.0200 0.7300 0.2100 0.5010
02 0.0197 1.6900 0.1580 0.6261
03 0.3000 2.7600 0.6300 1.1700
04 0.2770 1.4100 0.5700 0.9735
05 0.0001 0.3700 0.0430 0.2100
C16 0.2900 1.9500 0.5990 0.8001
C17 0.527 2.770 1.081 1.700
08 0.670 14.600 1.180 1.981
09 0.4600 1.7500 0.9320 1.3000
UO 0.0610 1.3000 0.3380 0.8750
C21 0.070 8.230 0.435 1.tót
C22 -0.1780 2.2750 1.2700 1.7400
Continue?
03 1.011 12.210 1.792 4.860
U4 0.163 16.100 0.740 4.741
C25 0.011 7.300 0.357 1.000
C26 0.056 4.900 0.255 0.901
C27 0.0250 1.2800 0.1549 0.4500
C28 0.0070 1.5700 0.0840 0.5001
U9 .	 0.105 2.860 0.213 1.070
C30 0.023 5.485 0.345 1.171
C31 0.0037 2.3200 0.1300 0.4701
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ITB > Step c34 .c1-c31
STEPWISE REGRESSION OF	 C34	 ON 31	 PREDICTORS,	 VITH N =
Continue?
31
STEP	 1	 2	 3	 4 5 6 7
CONSTANT	 4.148	 2.512
	 3.273	 2.973 2.809 3.040 3.007
Cl?
	
-2.87	 -2.25
	 -1.95	 -2.10 -2.84
-3.14
-2.87
1-RATIO	 -4.31	 -3.99
	 -4.23	 -6.05 -7.86 -11.91
-17.39
C6	 16.14
	 13.99	 13.65 15.34 14.77 15.66
1-RATIO	 3.96
	
4.20	 5.45 7.11 9.62 16.68
C12	
-2.26	 -2.58 -2.08
-1.82
-1.85
1-RATIO	
-3.99	 -6.00 -5.37 -6.51
-10.90
C25	 0.628 0.581 0.642 0.660
1-RATIO	 4.69 5.12 7.88 13.37
C23 0.282 0.439 0.446
1-RATIO 3.45 6.67 11.19
C26
-0.630 -1.647
1-RATIO
-5.05
-8.57
C30
-0.459
1-RATIO
-6.52
Continue? rear c34 5 c17 c6 c12 c25 c23
2.12	 1.73
	 1-05 -	 0.080 4.425 _4,370
To print more output, type Y or YES or push return.
10 terminate printing, type N or NO.
For more information, see HELP OUTPUT.
(Note that before typing HELP OUTPUT, you must either finish
printing or terminate this OUTPUT.)
Continue?
39.02	 60.92	 75.43	 86.68	 90.98	 95.63	 98.47
MORE? (YES, NO, SUBCOMMAND, OR HELP)
SOBC> abort
MTI >
MT1 rear c34 5 c17 c6 c12 c25 c23
The regression equation is
C34 = 2.81 - 2.84 Cl? + 15.3 C6 - 2.08 C12 + 1.581 C25 + 0.282 C23
lie regression equation is
24 = 2.81 - 2.84 Cl? 4 15.3 C6 - 2.08 C12 	 1.581 C25	 1.282 C23
Predictor	 Coef	 Stdev	 t-ratio
Constant	 2.8093	 0.4977	 5.65
Cl?	 -2.8426	 0.3618	 -7.86
Co	 15.336	 2.156	 7.11
C12	 -2.0820	 0.3876	 -5.37
C25	 0.5807	 0.1134	 5.12
C23	 0.28192	 0.08161	 3.45
= 0.8798
	
R-sq = 91.0X	 R-sc(adj) = 89.2%
Analysis of Variance
SOURCE	 DF	 SS	 MS
Resression	 5	 195.194	 39.139
Error	 25	 19.350	 0.774
Total	 30	 214.544
Continue?
SOURCE	 OF	 SE R SS
Cl?	 1	 83.707
C6	 1	 47.001
C12	 1	 31.114
C25	 1	 24.138
C23	 1	 9.236
Ttie riz areswori eqmAlon lc
C32	 =	 3.47
Predictor
ConiOnt
C4
C11
C26
C13
3 74.5	 C4
Coef
3.469
74.547
-14.667
3.3720
-5.168
-	 14.7 C11	 +	 3.37
Stdev
1.873
5.297
3.505
0.7933
1.672
C26	 - 5.17	 Cr;
t-ratio
1.85
14.07
-4.18
4.25
-3.09
s = 2.465	 R-so	 =	 95.01 R-so(adi)	 = 93.6:
nn••
STEP	 1	 2 3 4
CONSTANT	 -3.1850	 1.7778 0.2507 3.4685
C4	 76.1	 69.7 74.7 74.5
T-RATIO	 8.89	 9.00 11.39 14.07
C11	 -13.4 -17.0 -14.7
1-PATIO
	 -2.70 -4.00 -4.18
t26 2.95 3.37
1-RATIO 3.04 4.25
c13
-5.2
1-RATIO
-3.09
4.32	 3.77 3.05 2.46
/-SO	 81.45	 87.01 91.77 94.98
mORE?
	 (YES,	 NO,	 SUBCOMMAND, OR HELP)
murs,
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NIB ) hist cl—c31
Histogram of Cl	 N = 31
	Midpoint	 Count
	
-0.6	 1	 *
-0.5	 1	 *
-0.4	 0
-0.3	 0
	
-0.2	 1 *
-0.1	 1	 *
-0.0	 2 **
	
0.1	 14 **************
	
0.2	 11 ***********
Continue?
Histogram of C2	 N = 31
Midpoint
-0.6
-0.4-
-0.2
-0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Continue?
Count
1	 *
1 *
1 *
4 ****
21 *********************
1	 *
1*
1	 *
Histogram of C3	 N = 31
	Midpoint	 Count
-0.6	 1	 *
-0.4	 0
-0.2	 1
-0.0	 *********
	
0.2	 17	 *****************
	
0.4	 1	 *
	
0.6	 1	 *
	
0.8	 1	 *
Continue?
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	Histogram
	 of C4	 N = J1
	Midpoint	 Count
	
0.05	 10 ***t*t*t**
	
0.10	 11 ********mt
	
0.15	 3 ***
	
0.20
	 j *****
	0.25	 1 *
	
0.30	 0
	
0.35	 0
	
0.40	 0
	
0.45	 0
	
0.50	 0
	
0.55	 1	 *
Continue?
Histogram of C5	 N = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
-0.15
	 1	 *
-0.10
	
-0.05	 2 **
	
.-0.00	 5 *****
	
0.05	 17 *****************
	
0.10	 5 *****
	
0.15	 1	 *
Continue?
Histogram of C6	 N = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
-0.25	 1 *
-0.20	 0
-0.15	 1 *
	
-0.10	 1	 *
-0.05	 1 *
	
-0.00
	 2 **
	
0.05
	
11 ***********
	
0.10	 11 ***********
	
0.15	 3 ***
Continue?
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Continue?
Histogram of C7
	 N = 31
	
Midpobn	 Count,
-0.4	 0
-0.3	 1	 *
-0.2	 1 *
-0.1	 0
-0.0	 3 ***
	
0.1	 18 ******************
	
0.2	 4 ****
	
0.3	 2 **
	
0.4	 1	 *
Continue?
Histogram of C8	 N = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
	
0.4	 13 *************
	
0.8	 9 *********
	
1.2	 7 *******
	
1.6	 0
	
2.0	 1	 *
	
2.4	 0
	2.8	 1 *
Continue?
Histogram of C9	 N = 31
Midpoint Count
0.0 1 *
0.2 2 **
0.4 8 ********
0.6 7 *******
0.8 6 ******
1.0 4 ****
12. 1 *
1.4 1 *
1.6 1 *
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Continue?
Histogram of	 C10
Midpoint	 Count
N = 31
0.0 1 *
0.1 5 *****
0.2 2 **
0.3 9 *********
0.4 6 ******
0.5 1 *
0.6 3 ***
0.7 4 ****
Continue?
Histogram of	 C11
Midpoint	 Count
$ = 31
0.0 3 ***
0.1 3 ***
0.2 2 **
.	 0.3 9 *********
0.4 5 *****
0.5 4 ****
0.6 4 ****
0.7 1 *
Continue?
Histogram of	 C12
Midpoint	 Count
N	 = 31
0.0 4 ****
0.2 11 ***********
0.4 5 *****
0.6 4 ****
0.8 1 *
1.0 2 **
1.2 0
1.4 2 **
1.6 2 **
Continue?
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Histo9ran of C13
	 N = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
	
0.4	 4 ****
	
0.6	 5 *****
	
0.8	 7 *******
	
1.0	 6 ******
	
1.2	 3 ***
	
1.4	 1	 *
	
1.6	 3 ***
	
1.8	 0
	
2.0
	 0
	
2.2
	 1	 *
	
2.4	 0
	
2.6
	 0
	
2.8	 1	 *
Continue?
Histogram of
	 C14
Midpoint	 Count
N	 =	 31
.	 0.3 2 **
0.4 -	 2 **
0.5 2 **
0.6 5 *****
0.7 2 **
0.8 5 *****
0.9 3 ***
1.0 5 *****
1.1 1 *
1.2 1 *
1.3 2 **
1.4 1 *
Continue?
Histogram of C15
	
N = 31
Midpoint Count
0.00 6 ******
0.05 3 ***
0.10 8 ********
0.15 2 **
0.20 5 *****
0.25 4 ****
via 7 **
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Hi3togram of C16	 N = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
	
0.2	 1	 *
	
0.4
	
4 ****
	
0.6	 8 ********
	
0.8
	
12 ************
	
1.0
	
v
J *****
	
1.2
	
0
	
1.4	 0
	
1.6
	
0
	
1.8	 0
	
2.0	 1	 *
Continue?
Histogram of	 Cl?
Midpoint	 Count
N	 = 31
0.6 2 **
0.8 2 **
1.0 4 ****
.	 1.2. 8 ********
1.4 2 **
1.6 5 *****
1.8 2 **
2.0 2 **
-)	 F)4.4. 0
2.4 1 *
2.6 2 **
2.8 1 *
Continue?
Histogram of	 C18
Midpoint	 Count
N = 31
0 4 ****
2 24 ************************
4 1*
6 0
8 1*
10 0
12 0
14 1 *
Continim?
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014,VWDIWM .
Midpoint
n..
Count
n
0.4 1 *
0.6 4. ****
0.8 2 **
1.0 11 ***********
1.2 5 *****
1.4 wJ #####
1.6 1 *
1.8 2 **
Continue?
Histogram of C20
Midpoint	 Count
N = 31
0.1	 2 **
0.2
	 1 *
0.3	 5 *****
0.4	 3 ***
0.5	 6 ******
0.6	 1 *
0.7
	 1 *
0.8	 3 ***
0.9	 3 ***
1.0	 1 *
1.1	 2 **
1.2	 1 *
1.3	 ..), **
Continue?
Histogram of C21 M	 = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
	0 	 10 **********
	1 	 10 ******************
	2 	 1*
	
3	 1*
	
4	 0
	
5	 0
	
6	 0
	
7	 0
	
8	 1*
Continue?
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Histograii of	 C22
Midpoint	 Count
N = 31
0.2 1 *
0.4 1 *
0.6 1 *
OA 1 *
1.0 1 *
1.2 3 ***
1.4 6 ******
1.6 9 *********
1.8 4 ****
2.0 3 ***
2.2 1 *
Continue?
Histogram of C23	 0 = 31
	Midpoint	 Count ****
	
2	 12 ************
	
3	 6 ******
	
4	 1 *
	
5	 3 ***
	
6	 2 **
	
7	 1*
	
8	 0
	
9	 I
	10	 1 *
	
11	 0
	
12	 1	 *
Continue?
Histogram of C24
Midpoint	 Count
N = 31
0 10 **********
2 11 ***********
4 3 ***
6 3 ***
8 1 *
10 0
12 2 **
14 0
16 1 *
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Histogrim of C25	 N = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
	
0	 12 ************
	
1	 14 **************
	
2	 0
	3 	 4 ****
	
4	 0
	5 	 0
	6 	 e
	7 	 1	 *
Continue?
Histogram of C26	 N = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
	
0.0	 7 *******
	
0.5	 15 ***************
	
1.0	 5 *****
	
1.5	 1	 *
	
2.0	 0
	
2.5	 0
	3.0	 1	 *
	
3.5	 1	 *
	4.0	 0
	 5	 I
	5.0	 1 *
Continue?
Histogram of C27 . 0. = 11.
Midpoint
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Continue?
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--Histogram OT v2A
Midpoint	 Count
N	 =	 J1
0.0 8 ********
0.2 12 ************
0.4 3 ***
0.6 3 ***
0.8 2 **
1.0 2 **
1.2 0
1.4 0
1.6 1 *
Continue?
Histogram of C29
Midpoint	 Count
0.0	 6
0.4	 6
0.8	 7
1.2	 6
1.6	 4
2.0 •	 1
2.4	 0
2.8	 1
N = 31
******
******
*******
******
****
*
*
Continue?
Histogram of C31	 N = 31
Midpoint	 Count
0.0	 4 ****
0.5
	
17 *****************
1.0	 3 ***
1.5	 3 ***
2.0
	
1 *
2.5
	
2 **
3.0
	 0
3.5
	
0
4.0
	
0	 •
4.5
	
0
5.6	 I
	  3 5____ _1 *_
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Histogram of C31	 N = 31
	
Midpoint	 Count
	
0.0	 5 *****
	
0.2	 14 **************
	
0.4	 7 *******
	
0.6	 1 *
	
0.8	 2 **
	
1.0	 0
	
1.2	 1	 *
	
1.4	 0
	
1.6	 0
	
1.8	 0
	
2.0	 0
	
2.2	 0
	
2.4	 1 *
MTB >
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APPENDIX D
CORRESPONDENCE, DIAGRAMS, CASE STUDIES AND QUESTIONNAIRE
1. INTRODUCTION
This appendix consists of five sections as follows:
D-1 Includes manta of survey of 25 Lcrikn auUlacities Obtained
from Loncbn Borough of Richmond-upark-numes (research sBctian),
about financial appraisal procedure - approved list of
contractors and competitive tendering. An analysis of the
results of the survey is attached.
D-2 Includes certificate obtained from London Borough of Camden
concerned with the validation of multiple regression model on
those private companies dealing with LBC.
D-3 Contains the Z-score trends during the period 1982-1986 for the
"non-failed 20" companies and the last three years before
failure for the "failed 11" companies
D-4 Includeq three case studies obtained from Cork Gully Chartered
Accountants, and these include the following companies declared
bankrupt with Cork Gully appointed as liquidators:
1. Southern Cbnstruction Ltd
2. Crouch Construction Ltd and Crouch Group plc
3. Mears Bros Holdings Ltd.
D-5 Includes a questionnaire designed to identify the managerial
defects and mistakes related to failure, and includes 27
questions investigated by using the multiple choice method.
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APPENDIX D-1 
RESULTS OF SURVEY ABOUT FINANCIAL APPRAISAL PROCEDURE
bY
LONDON BOROUGH OF RIC:HMI:IND-UPON-THAMES RESEARCH SEX,1 ION
p.P.
p.a.
p.P.
a. a-
P. p.
p.
p.
P.
p.
a.
p. P.
Li! P. p.
P.
a. p.
P. P.
p.
p.
311 a-
vi
p. • a.
P. • p.
0
p. N
;41
2
a. •
p. n
30.
S
N.
PI3. ;a 3t 1 3. lt
• •	 el
•
.4	 1.11
3.
p-11
p.;ii
p.	 .4
Financial Appraisal Procedires 
Approved List of Contractors and Competitive Tendering 
Results of Survey Carried out by L.L Richmond Upon Thames 
Introduction 
Table 1 summarises the responses to questions requiring Yes/No type
answers. As a nuther of authorities preferred not to be identified the
results are presented anonymously. Responses were received from 25 of
the 33 London authorities surveyed, a response rate of 76%. These notes
suamarise and conment upon the results shown in Table 1 and discuss the
results of the more detailed questions. The results have not been
converted into percentage terms as little would be gained from doing so.
1.	 General
All 25 authorities carry out financial appraisals of firms applying to
do work for them, whether for a select list of contractors, annual
maintenance contracts or other ad hoc contracts. Table 2 sumnarises the
answers to Q. 1.2 concerning the frequency of reappraisal, the most
common response being 'every 3 years' (10 authorities).
•
Table 2 (0.1.2)
	 •
Frequency of	 •••••	 No. Responses 
Reappraisal	 --.
a •
Annual.	 5
2 years	 3
3 years	 10
4 years	 1
5 years	 2
Ad Hoc Basis • ;	 4
2.	 Financial Appraisal Procedures 
2.1	 Table 3 suamarises the sources of information and techniques used
In carrying out financial appraisals.
I.
Table 3 (Q.2.1)	 Yes/	 No	 Total
a) Perusal of Firm's Accounts 	 24	 1	 25
b) Company Searches	 18	 7	 25
c) Ratio Analysis	 20	 5	 25
d) Bankers ',References	 14	 11	 25
a) Companies' Accounts 
• The majority of authorities (24 out of 25) examine firms'
financial accounts, with cnly 1 authority relying solely on
company status reports prodiced by outside agencies. •Eleven
respondents . prefer to see accounts for the last 3 years, a
further rl . expect to see the last 2 wars' accounts.. an& the
rennining 2 base - their appraisal -I -of -the most recent_ year's
results- a lone.
	
_	
—
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b) Company Searches 
Eighteen authorities use company searches prod,ced by outside
agencies (of which the most popular are Infocheck (8) and Dunn
and Bradstreet (6). Only
	 authorities have.access to company
searches on line. Seven tee')
	
thortti es obtain Jrjförmit_ink
both directl y finza
	
and from company searches
• wi th only one using company searthies 	 _
c) - . Ratio Analysis 
• Twenty authorities use ratio analysis (to a greater or lesser
extent) to assess the financial standing of prospective
contractors. Four authorities rely on company status reports
produced by outside agencies, soma of which quote ratios as
part of their analysis of course.
Use of Z-Score Analysis 
Of the 20_ authorities using ratios 6_ use Z-score analysis
riiniv Aitmans Z-scorg) to assess the soivencji if potential
cion tractors —
A Z-score for a particular firm is calculated by adding
together a nurther of ratios, each having been weighted
according to its usefulness. The formula results in a single
score which is compared with standard bench marks e.g. a score
greater thaa-3-11tpdicates that the company should be safe
list k . score_heio,w,	 tne comrhinv,is- a t risk
Dr ret"Tture., The ratios inco-FpOri-tba into r;soore—analysii
: working capital/total assets; retained
earnings/total assets; profits before interest and tax/total
assets; market capitalisation/book value of debts; and,
sales/total assets.
Given its comparative complexity, Z-score analysis requires
the use of Apreadsheet software if it is to be carried out on
a regular basis.
	
_
• Further information on the Z-score technique can be found in
an article by David Citron and Richard Taffler: "The Financial
Vetting of Contractors" in PFA (Sept 9th 1988). This also
dils.usses .thr.. tme ,ctf r isk indi css. _and_ PAS=s_cor es ik
'Per forman ce measiggs..
Traditional Ratio Malysis 
• Fourteen authorities use traditional ratio analysis i.e.
. selected ratios are calculated and the results used to make
professional judgements as to the continuing financial
viability of potential and existing contractors. Table 4
(overleaf) outlines the different ratios used and the nurrber
of authorities using each one.
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No. Authorities 
14
12
'3
3
2
2
1
1
•
glow
Table 4
	 Use of Selected Ratios 
Ratio
Current Ratio (Curr.Assets/Curr.Liabs)
Acid Ratio (Curr. Assets-Stock and WIP/
Curr. [Jabs)
Profitability Ra tios (var bus)
Gearing
Net Worth/Turnover
Working Capital/Turnover
Return on Capital Employed
Debtors/Turnover
Creditors/Cost of Sales
Earnings Per Share
All of the authorities using traditional ratio analysis
calculate the current ratio and most use the acid or quick
ratio in addition. The wajority of authorities expect to see
minimum values of between 0.7 Jut 14_ far the_ curnat ratio,
and between 0.5_and:17u -for . the acid r_a_tio.
Nine authorities use profitability ratios, most comonly net
profit before interest and tax/turnover, although gross profit
margins are also used. Two authorities expect to see net
profit margins of at least 3%, and one 0%. The remaining
authorities do not set minimum levels.
Oily 3 authorities calculate gearing ratios and these would
normally expect to see results of less than 1.0, although some
flexibility is alluded. ' -
	
-
In most cases the minimum/maximum acceptable ratio values are
set for guidance rather than being applied rigidly. The
inter-relationship between ratios, together with other
information given by the accounts, is examined to assess the
significance of any departure from the normally expected levels.
Traditional ratio analysis, as used by the authorities
responding to this survey rd l ies heavily yoon_an assessment of
.1 iQU	 This is to be eip-Fctinifen Wt a major concern
ts to avoid letting contracts to firms which are likely to go
out of business. Profitability is also seen as important,
followed by gearing, with a few authorities calculating
additional ratios as shown in Table 4. However, most
authorities look not only at the ratios they have calculated
but also at the overall financial position as Indicated by the
accounts. Ratios are used to focus attention on the salient
points. Therefore, it would not be correct to assume, for
exanple, that the five authorities which 63 not calculate
profitability ratios do not take any account of this aspect in
their appraisals.
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d) Bankers' References 
Fourteen of the 25 respondents seek bankers' references in
support of applications from potential contractors. Some seek
bankers' references in every case, others use them on a
selective basis depending cn the size of the firm, how well
knoim or otherwise it may be and the type of contract.
3.	 Financial Limits on Contract Size 
twenty two of the 25 authorities impose some form of limit on the value
of contracts which may be awarded. These limits take one of three
forms: a) a limit on the maximum total value of contracts which may be
awarded to a particular contractor in any one oar; b) a limit on the
value of work which a particular contractor may have outstanding at any
one time; c) a limit on the value of individial contracts which may be
awarded to particular contractors (but no limit on the nurther of
contracts which may be won). The results are broken dovm as follows:-
Tab le 5 (0.3.1)
	
No. Authorities 
a)	 Annual Limit on Total Value
	 12
of Contracts
b) Limit on Value of Work
Outstanding at Any One Time	 6
c) Limit on Value of Individual
Contracts (but no Overall Limit)
	 4
The following tables show the values used.
Table 6 shags the values used by the 12 authorities which set annual
limits.
-r.
Table 6	
f	
a)	 Annual Limits	 No. Authorities 
r-
100% turnover	 1
w
(1) 50% turnover	 4
25%-28% turnover	 4
20%-25% turnover(or less)	 3
• .
I •al
T2
- •I :	 •	 -
143 t e (1)	 3 authorities use 50% of the average previous 2 years turnover
Table 7 (overleaf) shows the limits set by the 6 authorities which
control the amaunt of work outstanding at any one time.
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Table 7 b) Limits on Work Outstanding
at My One Time 
• 50% turnover
	 4
turnover.25% 1
Unknown 1
No. Authorities 
• .1
c)	 Limits Per Contract (But no Overall Limit on Nurtber of 
Con tracts 
One of the 4 authorities which limit the value of individual
contracts uses limits recommended by Infocheck. (Recommended
con tract limits  do not appear as part of the usual on line
company status reports which Infocheck produce but nay be
provided by special arrangements). Another uses a limit of
25% turnover or 50% turnover depending on the type of
contract. The others set limits averaging approximately 15%
depending upon the results of the financial appraisal.
Irrespective of the type of lidt applied, most authorities
apply more restrictive limits to firms with less favourable
financial appraisal results.
Why are Financial Limits Used? 
The responses show a broad concensus as to the reasons for applying
financial limits. These are summarised below:-
firms should not take on work beyand their capacity:
authorities do not wish to encourage over-tradina an
consequen t receiversh ips.
▪ the risk of mid-contract liquidation or other default should
be minimised in order to avoid additional costs,
administrative inconvenience, problems in getting defects
remedied etc.
▪ firms should not be over-reliant on Council business; if for
any reason the Council were to cease providing the level of
work expected, the firm might suffer financial difficulties
with consequent job losses in the local area, bad Council
public.relations image etc.
▪ the authority should not allow itself to become
over-dependent upon a few contractors as this could encourage
the formation of cartels and provide the opportunity for
collusion between officers and contractors.
there should be as wide a choice of suitable firms as
possible to ensure that tenders are competitive and the
authority gets value for money.
0627r
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z n
the use of financial limits based on standard criteria
ensures that applicants are treated fairly.
Most authorities find it necessary to allow some exceptions to the
rules, for exanple if there is a shortage of firms on the list for
particular types of work. One authority notes that the set limits nay
be exceeded by up to 10% without consultation to allow some
flexibility. Some authorities require committee approval for limits to
be exceeded.
Whilst the use of financial limits in sane form is seen as essential by
most authorities for the reasons mentioned above, most agree that
monitoring adherence to those limits is problematic. Unless an
authority has a computerised system which can cortine both tendering and
payments histories for individual contractors, it can prove difficult to
apply the limits. A few authorities responding to this survey are
!roving in this direction but as ye t none has such a system in full
operation. Therefore, the use of annual limits relies to a large extent
on keeping running totals of the amount of work awarded to individual
contractors. Limits on the mount of work outstanding at any one time
also require payments to be checked on a regular basis so that payments
can be subtracted from the value of contracts awarded to determine the
available limit.
Keeping track of contracts and payments in this way is time-consuming
and difficult given that a nutter of different departments and even
sections within departments are involved in letting contracts.
	
4.	 Use of Financial Guarantees, Performance Bonds Etc 
	
4.1	 Financial Guarantees 
As shown in Table 1, 21 authorities use financial guarantees from parent
companies.
	
4.2	 Performance Bonds .
Table 8
	 . Are Performance Bonds Used?	 No. Authorities 
	
a) Always	 1
. .b) Sometimes	 i I	 22
	
. 1 pie, Never	 .	 .	 2
• •.: 0 I
• • r f"'
Most of the authorities responding to the survey use performance bonds
under certain circumstances, whether for contracts over a certain value,
of a particular type (e.g. all new build works) or for firms which fail
to satisfy the usual financial requirements. Nineteen authorities
quoted a threshold contract value above which performance bonds are
usually sought. A wide range of threshold values was quoted as
Illustrated in Table 9.
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Threshold
Table 9 (0.4.3) Con tract Sum Above Which
Performance Bonds are 
Usually Required 
No. Authorities
5.
1 30,000
r..	 11 tts
I 50,000._
•	 ; A..4--
I 60,000
1100,000
1125,000-1150,000
1200,000-1250;000
1500,000
Special Circumstances
New and Emerging Businesses
• 2
1
7
3
4
1
4
Nineteen of the 25 authorities are prepared to give work to new or
emerging businesses with little or no financial track record.
The arguments in favour of using new and emerging businesses were as
follows:-
▪ lack of suitable established firms available to do the job
▪ local economic development issues: e.g. new businesses cannot
be expected to develop unless they are given a chance to
demonstrate their capabilities; being accepted for local
authority contracts acts as a good reference and can help
firms secure work from other sources.
If new and emerging businesses are to be offered work, most authorities
find it necessary to relax the financial appraisal criteria normally
applied. In the absence of audited financial accounts, some authorities
seek other forms of financial references such as bankers' and
accountants' references, details of financial backing, details of
previous contracts carried out, business plans and financial forecasts
etc. Some authorities assess such firms on the basis of technical
criteria al one.
Given the degree of risk associated with awarding contracts to new
firms, some authorities restrict the types of contracts which nay be
awarded e.g. to jobs of a fragnented nature such as painting and
decorating or minor landscaping works. Many authorities restrict the
value of contracts whith may be awarded. Ten authorities mention
specific suns, ranging from 5500 per contract to 120,000 per annum.
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.Some respondents mentioned the danger of encouraging new businesses to
rely too heavily on Council contracts. One authority adopts a system of
banding in setting its financial limits, with the financial limit
progressively reduced as a proportion of turnover as a firriN size
increases. Thus a firm with an annual turnover of less than 110,000
would be allowed a contract limit of 150% of turnover, reducing to 100%
when turnover rises to 110,000-150,000, and 75% for turnover of
150,000-1100,000. When turnover rises above 1100,000 the authority's
normal limit (maximum of 50% of turnover) then applies. In this way,
firms are encouraged to seek work from other sources.
To minimise the risk involved in giving work to new businesses, many
authorities insist on financial guarantees or performance bonds. Some
authorities ensure stage payments are made whilst others take the
opposite view and only pay on completicn. A few authorities require
specific connittee approval before firms with no track record can be
added to an approved list. Other safeguards include regular monitoring
of firms both from a financial and technical point of view with a few
authorities having formal reporting procedures.
APPENDIX D-2 
VALIDATION OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION SECOND VERSION MODEL
AT LONDON BOROUGH OF CAMDEN
..motwAliowswy,rwe;hatkPasv•-,...tor%.40K.t
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Your reference
	
Our reference
	
FIN/SPO/LP
	
Inquffles to
	 Mr L Pardhanal
	
Ext.	 2222
air iamigoviz=gi0===
rlir
London Borough of Camden
Finance Department
Peter Derrick BA IPFA —Director of Finance
The Town Hall Euston Road London NW1 2RX Telephone: 01-278 4444
FAX — 01-860 5748	
Date
	 7 December 19,
A Abidali Esq
Civil Engineering Department
Loughborough University
of Technology	 -
Loughborough
Leics LE11 3TU
Dear Mr Abidali
RE: FINANCIAL APPRAISAL OF CONTRACTORS 
I am pleased to confirm that this Council has made use of
the appraisal model developed by you.
Financial appraisal at this authority is very much in a
state of flux and presently we employ a combination of the
Altman formula, several 'key' Accounting Ratios, as well as
your model to assist us with our appraisal processes. From
time to time we also make use of other facilities such as
those offered by Credit Ratings Ltd, programmes developed by
other local authorities, as technical aids in the appraisal
process.
Speaking from the point of view of someone who has needed to
analyse a number of Annual Reports and Accounts over the
past few months, I am able to say that your model with its
heavy reliance on the profitability factor has proved
discriminating and interesting. Having said this, I am sure
you are only too well aware of the potential dangers of
relying exclusively upon the results of a single test, which
is why we make use of several tests including yours to
supplement our judgemental processes.
I hope this letter is useful to you and I would like to
close by thanxing you for your help and to wish you every
success for the future.
With kind regards.
Yours sincerely
L PARDHANANI
SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICER
All correspondence to be addressel
to the Director of Finance
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APPENDDC D-3
Z-SCORE TRENDS
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TILBURY GROUP PLC
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APPENDDC D-4
CASE STUDIES
Cork Gully Shelley House 3 Noble StreetLondon EC2V 7D0 a member firm 01Coopers & Lybrand (Internabon.
your reference
telephone 01-606 7700
cables Groproy is London
telex 884730 Corkgy G
lax groups WM 01-606 9887
when telephoning please
ask for
Mr. E. Williams
Ext. 3217
our reference
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PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL 	 30th March, 1988.
To the Shareholders and Creditors of Crouch Group Plc
Dear Sirs,
CROUCH GROUP PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
(In Receivership & Liquidation)
Trading Address prior to Receivership:
Sutherland House. Surbiton Crescent. Kingston-upon-Thames. KT1 2JU
I write to advise you that meetings of Members and of the Creditors
of Crouch Group Plc were duly convened and held pursuant to Section 98 of
the Insolvency Act 1986 at these offices on Friday 18th March 1988.
Mr. P.J.H. Meyer, Director of the Company, acted as Chairman.
A summary of the Statement of Affairs as at 18th March 1988, as sworn
to by the Director, Mr. Meyer, was presented to the meetings, together with
a Group family tree, copies of which are attached.
The meetings were advised that Cork Gully had been instructed by Mr.
Meyer on 16th February 1988 to assist in convening the meetings of Members
and Creditors and preparation of the Statement of Affairs for presentation
thereat for which a fee of £5,000 plus VAT had been voted but not yet paid.
It was pointed out that neither I nor my firm had previously acted for the
Company or for any of its directors other than in regard to placing certain
subsidiaries into creditors' voluntary liquidation.
On 2nd July 1984, the Group's Bankers, Midland Bank Plc, had
appointed Mr. D.L. Morgan and Mr. N.H. Russell of Spicer & Pegler, as Joint
Receivers and Managers to Crouch Group Plc and certain of its principal
subsidiaries, namely:-
Crouch Homes Limited
Crouch Developments Limited
Crouch Investments Limited
Crouch Group Services Limited
Crouch Civil Engineering Limited
Crouch Painting Limited
Crouch Joinery Limited 	 Cont.
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Mr. N.H. Russell died on 21st March 1986, since when Mr. Morgan had
continued to act as sole Receiver.
The appointments of Joint Receivers to Crouch Group Plc were made by
the Bank under the terms of Debentures registered 4th May 1950 and 9th
April 1984, granting fixed and floating charges over all assets of the
Company.
Prior to the appointment of the Joint Receivers on 2nd July 1984, one
of the principal trading subsidiaries, namely Crouch Construction Limited,
was placed by the Members into Voluntary Liquidation on 21st May 1984, and
on 12th June 1984 this company went into creditors' voluntary liquidation.
The company had suffered substantial losses on two major contracts due to
industrial relation problems and it was apparent that further severe losses
were being incurred.
Following the appointment of the Joint Receivers on 2nd July 1984, a
number of the Group's subsidiaries went into liquidation as follows:-
Crouch Developments Limited	 - 4th October 1984 -
Creditors Vol. Liq.
Crouch Leisure Developments Limited	 Compulsory Liquidation -
17th December 1984
Crouch Homes Limited	 - Compulsory Liquidation
8th February 1985
Crouch Painting Limited 	 Compulsory Liquidation
25th February 1985
Crouch Investments Limited	 -	 Creditors Vol. Liq. -
20th July 1985
Earlier on 18th March 1988, the following dormant subsidiaries were
placed in Creditors' Voluntary Liquidation:-
Museum Estates Limited
Dovemart Limited
The Philip Flooring Co. Limited
Crouch Joinery Limited
Crouch Plant Limited
Crouch Civil Engineering Limited
Crouch Group Services Limited
In each case, I was appointed Liquidator for the purpose of the
winding-up.
Cont.
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The meetings were advised that the Company was incorporated in 1931
when—it traded in the name, G.T. Crouch Limited, as residential, commercial
and industrial property builders and developers. The name was changed to
Crouch Group Limited in January 1969 and to Crouch Group Public Limited
Company in March 1982.
The Company was converted into a public company on 20th February 1969
when the authorised share capital was increased from £35,000 to £1 million
and the £1 ordinary shares sub-divided into ordinary shares of 25 pence
each. On the same date, £966,667 of the Company's reserves was capitalised
and issued. pro-rata to the members as 3,866,668 ordinary shares of 25 pence
each.
The shares in the Company became quoted on the London Stock Exchange
in 1969 being 4 million ordinary shares of 25 pence each.
In June 1981, in order to strengthen the long term capital base of
the Group, certain of the short term borrowings were replaced by the issue
of £2 million of 9% Convertible Unsecured Loan Stock 1993/96.
In December 1982, the Company reported a Group loss for the six
months ended 30th September 1982 of £1.329 million, the first reported loss
incurred by the Group since its shares were listed on the Stock Exchange in
1969. A re-appraisal of the Group's trading and financial situation took
place and it was resolved to reduce the Group's borrowings. At a Board
meeting held on 13th December 1982, Mr. Clempson, who was appointed
executive chairman in 1978, was removed from his executive duties and also
removed as Chairman of the Board.
The audited accounts for the year ended 31st March 1983, which were
finalised in August 1983, disclosed that provisions of £1.787 million were
required to be made in respect of developments and £1.889 million against -
losses incurred in the U.S.A. As a consequence, the net tangible assets of
the Group were shown to have reduced to £3.906 million from £7.745 million
at 31st March 1982.
On 28th December 1983, the Board of Crouch Group Plc announced that
the Group had entered into conditional agreements with Mr. P.J.H. Meyer who
was then (with his family interests) a substantial shareholder.
Details of these agreements were set out in a formal circular issued
to all shareholders of the Group Company dated 4th January 1984. This
circular was issued by the then Board under the chairmanship of
Mr. Campania.
Cont.
Group shareholders were reminded in the circular that, in August
1983, the Group Board had resolved to ensure a reduction in overheads and
borrowing charges and to bring about an optimum balance of house building,
construction and commercial development. Unfortunately, it had not been
possible within a short time to find tenants for a substantial part of the
completed developments and consequently this had delayed the sale of the
properties concerned.' Furthermore, difficulties had been encountered in
selling the Crouch Group investment properties and in reaching speedy
conclusions to the partnership agreements in Florida, and therefore it had
not been possible to reduce borrowings quickly. The circular stated that
the Group Board was under pressure from its bankers to accelerate disposals
which meant that working capital was not available for Crouch Homes to
replace its stock of land for private house building purposes.
It was now the Group Board's view, the circular explained, that the
continuing shortage of working capital had begun to prejudice the long term
viability of Crouch Homes. It was therefore necessary to adopt a new
approach if the Group was to survive. The Board had therefore welcomed an
approach by Federated Housing Plc, a company controlled by Mr. Meyer who
also held 18.5% of the existing ordinary share capital of Crouch Group Plc,
whereby a subsidiary of Federated Housing would take over the
responsibility for and some of the benefits of, managing and financing the
development and sale of the Managed Land Bank of Crouch Group.
This agreement would provide an initial cash injection of £750,000
into Group and would alleviate the burden of providing working capital to
develop the Managed Land Bank. The agreement would also ensure that the
Managed Land Bank would realise its current value and thereby provide an
uplift to reserves. The terms of the management agreement would not
restrict the continuation of house building by the Crouch Group.
It was also proposed, (amongst other things) shareholders were
advised, that Crouch Group would acquire 20 per cent of Federated Housing
in return for an issue of new ordinary shares.
The implementation of these proposals, the circular continued, would
fundamentally restructure Crouch Group's balance sheet by reducing gearing
and give the Group time to reorganise its business within a more reasonable
time scale.
Shareholders were advised that upon the agreements detailed in the
circular becoming unconditional, Mr. P.J.H. Meyer would be invited to join
the Crouch Group Board and become its Chairman. On Mr. Meyer joining the
Board of Crouch there would be a complete review of the operations of the
Group in the light of which decisions would be taken as to the Group's
future direction. In the meantime the present Directors of Crouch Group
believed that the Group had adequate bank facilities for its present
requirements.
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The proposals were duly approved by shareholders at a meeting held on
27th January 1984. Subsequently, the Company's authorised share capital
was increased from £1,500,000 to £1,950,000. The issued share capital was
increased from El million to £1,450,000, through the issue of 1,800,000 new
ordinary shares at 25 pence each, in exchange for the Company's £900,000
investment in Federated Housing.
The Directors at the time of the re-organisation were:-
Mr. F.D.N. Campailla	 (Chairman)
Mr. J.M. Bishop	 (Managing)
Mr. T.M. Hearley
Mr. A. Longman
Mr. D.L. Shaw
Mr. A. Stephenson
On 13th January 1984 shareholders had been advised that the Group's
unaudited half year results for the six months ended 30th September 1983
had resulted in a loss for the period of £1.171 million on a turnover of
£9.096 million.
No audited accounts had been prepared since 31st March 1983.
Following implementation of the Board's proposals at the
Extraordinary General Meeting of the Company on 27th January 1984, Messrs.
Bishop, Hearley, Longman and Stephenson resigned and Mr. Meyer became
Chairman in place of Mr. Campailla.
Notwithstanding the inflow of funds to the Crouch Group arising from
the agreements with Federated Housing and the liquidation of Crouch
Construction Limited which relieved the Group from pressure from that
Company's creditors and continuing losses on contracts, the Group Board
found it impossible to continue trading without additional Bank support.
The Bank was unable to agree to provide an increased facility in excess of
the borrowings which at that time totalled some £3.3m., and following legal
advice, the Directors considered they had no alternative other than to
request the Midland Bank to appoint Receivers to the Group.
Subsequent to the appointment of Joint Receivers on 2nd July 1984,
the remaining Directors (with the exception of Mr. Meyer), together with
the Secretary, Mr. Homer, resigned on 13th September 1984.
The Statement of Affairs as at 2nd July 1984, as lodged with the
Receivers and Managers, indicated the following assets and estimated .
realisations as regards Crouch Group Plc:-
Cont.
Book Values
Estimated to
Realise
£'000 £'000
Assets subject to Debenture
Holders fixed charge:
Shares in Federated Housing Plc 900 720
Amounts owed by Subsidiaries 3,233
4,133 720
Midland Bank Plc
Fixed Charge Security 3,318 720
815
Assets subject to Debenture
Holders Floating Charge:
Investments in Subsidiaries 42
Estimated Total Net Assets £	 857
A summary of the Receivership receipts and payments for Crouch Group
Plc covering the period 2nd July 1984 to 18th March 1988 was provided as
follows:-
£'000 £'000
Receipts: Sale of Federated Housing Shares 720
Less: Expense of Sale 3
717
Dividend (Net) 18
Interest on Deposit 14
Other Receipts 14
763
Payments: Debenture Holder 600
Receivers Remuneration 77
Disbursements and VAT 36
713
Balance in Hand £	 50
The summary of the sworn Statement of Affairs as at 18th March 1988,
includes the funds in the hands of the Receiver, £50,266, from which there
must be provided further costs and expenses, in particular professional
charges incurred in dealing with Group taxation affairs, leaving a net
realisation estimated at £30,000 for Statement of Affairs purposes.
Cont.
The meetings were advised that amounts owing by Subsidiaries were as
follows:-
Crouch Group Services Limited
Crouch Homes Limited
Crouch Developments Limited
Crouch Leisure Developments Limited
Crouch Investments Limited
The Philip Flooring Co. Limited
Estimated to
	
Book Value	 Realise 
2,522,622
	
330,000	 33,000
134,094
185,000
1,381
8,500
3,181,597
	 33,000
It was explained that asset realisations are subject to the
subrogation claim of Crouch Homes Limited whose contribution towards
settlement of the Debenture Holders' indebtedness entitled it to stand in
the place of the Charge Holder. Such was the contribution from Crouch
Homes compared with all other contributories, that inevitably the surplus
fixed and floating charge realisations from the Receiverships and
Liquidations of the Group companies would require to be passed to the
Liquidators of Crouch Homes Limited.
It was stated that the unsecured creditors listed on the sworn
Statement of Affairs as at 18th March 1988, were partly based upon those
listed in the Statement of Affairs as at the date of receivership, and
partly upon claims notified since that date. In this connection, the
Trustees for the Holders of the Crouch Group 9% Convertible Unsecured Loan
Stock had claimed £2,000,000 in respect of loan stock outstanding and
£684,269 for interest, fees and expenses outstanding at 18th March 1988.
It would be a matter for the Liquidator to agree unsecured claims in
due course, but present indications were that only those creditors who have
valid claims in the liquidation of Crouch Homes Limited, have any prospect
of receiving a dividend.
It was regretted that no surplus funds were expected to become
available for distribution to unsecured creditors of Crouch Group Plc, or
to shareholders. Shareholders wishing to make a claim under Section 22
CGTA 1979 should communicate with their own Inspector of Taxes. The
estimated deficiency as regards creditors was shown to amount to £3,277,172
and as regards members, was estimated at £4,727,172, subject to costs.
Cont.
In arriving at the overall deficit of approximately £4.7 million, the
principal items contributing to the deficiency since the date of the last
published and audited accounts, 31st March 1983, when net shareholders
funds were shown to amount to £1 million, were as follows:-
£'000
(a) Inter-company debts written down
	 3,149
(b) Investments in Subsidiaries 	 42
(c) Interest and Expenses outstanding
on Unsecured Loan Stock 	 684
(d) Guarantee liabilities re.
Performance Bonds, brought in 	 291
(e) LOSS on sale of Federated Housing
shares	 180
(f) Guarantee Liability of Debenture
Holder settled in Receivership 	 356
The Receiver had advised that the total receipts and payments in the
eight Group company receiverships were as follows:-
E'000
Receipts	 6,777
Payments	 6,036
Balances in Hand	 741
Settlement of the Debenture Holders' indebtedness plus interest
thereon had accounted for £3,402,077. In addition, payments to other
secured creditors had accounted for £1,533,627.
Action had been taken by the Receiver to protect the interests of
Creditors should it be possible to claim from the trustees of the Pension
Fund that any surplus therefrom be made available for the benefit of
creditors. The trustees were expected to apply to the Court for further
instructions in the matter.
The Receiver also advised that the overseas investments owned by
Crouch Investments Limited (In Liquidation), in Florida and Phoenix
Arizona, in which the Group had invested over £3.8 million at 31st March
1982 had failed to produce any realisation.
At the Members' meeting, a Resolution for the Company to proceed to
Creditors Voluntary Liquidation was passed and I and my partner,
Michael Anthony Jordan, were appointed Joint Liquidators of the Company.
At the subsequent meeting of Creditors, our joint appointment was
confirmed.
Cont.
Cont.
No Liquidation Committee was appointed.
A formal notice for claims is enclosed and I would be obliged-if you
would supply a detailed statement of your claim to Crouch Group Plc
(In Liquidation), c/o Shelley House, 3 Noble Street, London EC2V 7DQ
(Ref: SHSO1) in order that it may be scheduled.
I also attach duplicate VAT Debt Relief Forms both copies of which
should be completed and returned to me if you wish to seek such relief. In
that event, your claim in the liquidation must not include the VAT element.
If you require any further information, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
Yours faithfully,
R.M. ADDY
Joint Liquidator of Crouch Group Plc
Distribution:- 1 copy	 - Each Creditor - Secured, Unsecured & Preferential
(700)	 1 "	 - Each Director and Shareholder
1 "	 - Each Member of the Committee of Inspection
1 "	 - The Royal Insurance Co. Limited.
1 "	 - The Commercial Union Group - (Insurance)
1 "	 - Bradstock, Blunt & Thompson Limited - (Insurance)
1 "	 - Record File	 (Cork Gully)
5 copies - General Files 	 (Cork Gully)
2,684,269
48,754
223,238
290,662
30,249
Company No: 258878 	 Registered in England
CROUCH GROUP PLC
(In Receivership - 2nd July 1984) 
Summary of the Estimated Statement of Affairs as at
18th March 1988
Estimated
Book Value	 to Realise
£	 C
ASSETS:.
Assets not specifically charged:
Funds in the hands of Receiver
Amounts owing by Subsidiaries
Investments in Subsidiaries
	
50,266	 30,000
	
3,181,597	 33,000
	
42,010
	 -
Estimated total assets, subject to costs £ 3,273,873	 63,000
LIABILITIES:
Subrogated Debenture claim of Crouch Homes Limited	 63,000
Non-preferential claims:
Trustees for the unsecured loan stockholders
Preferential creditors in the receivership
Trade and Expense
Performance bonds and insurances
Amounts owing to Subsidiary companies
3,277,172
Estimated deficiency as regards Creditors,
subject to costs	 3,277,172
ISSUED SHARE CAPITAL	 1,450,000
Estimated total deficiency as regards Members,
subject to costs	 £ 4,727,172
Note: The above is a summary of the sworn Statement of Affairs as at
18th March 1988, which is available for inspection by Members
and Creditors.
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NOTICE to CREDITORS to SEND CLAIMS 
IN THE MATTER of THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
- a n d -
IN THE MATTER of CROUCH GROUP PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY
(In Voluntary Liquidation)
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Creditors of the above named
Company, which is being voluntarily wound up, are required, on or before
13th May 1988 to prove their debts by send to the undersigned R.M. Addy,
of Cork Gully, Shelley House, 3 Noble Street, London EC2V 7DQ the said
Liquidator of the Company, written statements of the amount they claim
to be due to them from the Company and, if so requested, to provide such
further details or produce such documentary or other evidence as may appear
to the Liquidator to be necessary. A Creditor who has not proved his debt
before the declaration of any dividend is not entitled to disturb, by
reason that he has not participated in it, the distribution of that
dividend or any other dividend declared before his debt was proved.
DATED this 18th day of March 1988
R. M. ADDY
Liquidator
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Cork Gully
your reference
Shelley House 3 Noble Street
London EC2V 7D0
telephone 01-608 7700
telegrams Groprovis London
telex 884730 Corkgy G
*hen telephoning please
ask for
Mt Rishi
Ext. 3257
a member firm of
Cowes & Lybrand graernaponi
The ell cove busmen IMMO
It 3111:3antis If
Abacus House Culler Lane
OtaliPocie London EC2V etisi
cur relevance SR 502
PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL	 10th July, 1984.
Dear Sirs,
Re: Crouch Construction Limited
(In Liquidation)
Registered Office and Businese Address: 
Sutherland House, Surbiton Crescent,
Kingston-on-Thames, Surrey.
Builders and Contractors
We write to inform you that a Meeting of Creditors of the above-named
Company convened pursuant to Section 293 of the Companies Act, 1948, was held
at the Chartered Insurance Institute, Aldermanbury, London, EC2 on Tuesday,
12th June 1984.
An approximate Statement of Affairs as at the 21st May 1984 was presented
to the Meeting and a copy is attached.
The Meeting was informed that the Company was incorporated as a private
limited company on the 16th July 1969 in the name of Cavus Contractors Limited,
in which name it traded as building contractors until 4th May 1978 when the
name was changed to Crouch Construction Limited. 	 Between 1970 and 1978 the
Company traded on a small scale, and during the early years, only two shares
of £1 each were issued; one being held by the founder of the Company, a Mr.
Flux, and the ether by M & J.F. Plant Hire Limited which was a subsidiary of
Crouch Group Limited.
Mr. Z. J. Crouch was appointed a Director in November 1970 but he died in
February 1973. Although he was replaced with other members of the Group in
the ensuing years, the Company traded without any particular success but continue
in business.
In April 1978 the Company became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Crouch
Group plc when 998 additional Ordinary Shares of 	 each were allotted to Crouch
Group for cash at par, and embarked upon a rapid expansion in contract works,
mainly in the Southern Counties and particularly involving local authority
housing.	 Since that time the Company has continued to trade as a wholly-owned
subsidiary nf Crouch Group plc which became a Public Company in February 1969
and has been quoted on the Stock Exchange since that time.
In September 1979 the Company adopted a new set of Articles of Association
and its authorised Share Capital was increased to £10,000 although the issued
capital remained at £1,000.
	 There had been numerous changes in the Board of
Directors since 1982 but at the present time the Directors were as follows:-
t	 b•c•••• •	 11,...• C.o...	 r••••••• C 11 . 	0.sse••••,11..,•••• JUNfte.1.1•10	 jt am., J.0.0 NeOss.c Pe* Pauli IA Le*
a. •	 • K....	 	 • Ss. loft 1 . pet S. Oft ft.	 Ass.. ft ...ft. Con. 	G Iwo Joioftw.f.
I Not •n••••	 V.	 P•se • 4. 1..	 • A.	 .1.1J	 Leo. MO.=	 *sun C... In P..
FP,Rnil tl
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Mr. Peter Meyer
Mr. Leslie Andrews
Mr. Trevor Slater
- Appointed 29th February 1984 - Chairman
having been appointed to the
Group Board on 1st February 1984
- Appointed 29th February 1984
	
Managing Director
- Appointed 1st February 1984
having been appointed Group
Managing Director 1st February 1984.
Mr. David Shaw
	
- Appointed 5th October 1983	 - Surveyor/Non
Executive
Mr. F.D.N. Campailla 	 - Appointed 1st August 1978	 - Solicitor/Non
Executive
Mr. Richard Meinertzhagen - Appointed a Director on 1st July 1978
The Secretary of the Company and of the Group Companies is Mr. Barry Homer.
The previous trading results for the four years ending 31st March 1983
extracted from the Company's audited accounts were summarised as follows:-
Year ended 31st March
Turnover, being the value
of contracts carried out
Profit/(Loss), before
1980 1981 1982
£'000
7,714
1983
£'000
3,258
L'000
4,947
£1000
12,319
taxation (172) (62) (356) 102
The Profits/(Losses) have been
arrived at after charging or
(crediting) the following:-
Depreciation - 6 10
Plant . Hire 195 215 431 37
Directors' emoluments 13 32 42 56
Loss on sale of Fixed Assets - 1 1 1
Bank Interest (50) (50) (28)
(Group in overdraft but not Company)
	 •
The taxable profits in the years 1982 and 1983 were eliminated by the
utilisation of losses brought forward and by the receipt of group relief for
taxation purposes, for which the Group received no payment.
No audited accounts had been prepared for the Company since the 31st
March 1983.
Directors' emoluments for the year to 31st March 1984 amounted to
£73,715 made up as follows:-
Mr. A. Stephenson 29,793 (Resigned 29.2.84)
Mr. R. Meinertzhagen 16,002
Mr. L. Andrews 2,500
Mr. R.J. Weavers 16,670 (Resigned 31.1.84)
Mr. A.G. Britton 8,750 (Resigned 31.10.83)
The turnover of the Company for-the year ended 31st March 1984 was
estimated to amount to approximately £11.2m.
	
Based upon a realistic appraisal
of contracts in progress it becomeb -A5parent- that the Company had suffered
severe losses since lot April, 1983. 	 All the current contracts were
taken on prior to the main board changes, which took place early in 1984.
In May of this year the gross value of contracts in progress amounted to
approximately £20m of which approximately £10m of work remained to be
completed.
On 8th November 1983 the Company granted to Midland Bank plc a Fixed
Charge over its Book Debts as additional security for the overdraft (previously.
secured by a Floating Charge granted in June 1978) and in support of the Long
standing Cross-Guarantee liability for the Group indebtedness to the Bank.
On 28th December 1983, the Board of Crouch Group plc announced that
Crouch Group had entered into a conditional agreement with a Mr. P.J.N. Meyer
who was then (with his family's interest) a substantial shareholder. Details
of these agreements were set out in a formal circular issued to all shareholders
of the Group Company and dated 4th January 1984.
Shareholders were advised that upon the agreements detailed in the
circular becoming conditional Mr. P.J.H. Meyer would be invited to join the
Crouch Group Board and become its Chairman.
	 Upon Mr. Meyer joining the Board
of the Group Company there would be a complete review of all operations of the
Crouch Group in the light of which decisions would be taken as to the Group's
future direction. These proposals were approved by the Shareholders of Crouch
Group plc at a meeting held on the 27th January 1984.
On 29th February 1984 Mr. L. Andrews was appointed Managing Director of
Crouch Construction Limited in place of Mr. Stephenson who had resigned on that
day.
It was reported that the trading position of Crouch Construction Limited
during 1983/84 suffered as a result of two major loss-making contracts at Shirley
and Dulwich and also from poor trading on other contracts taken on at tight
margins during a period of recession.
	
Problems had also arisen from the
_.. numerous changes in directors and senior staff.
Referring to the Approximate Statement of Affairs, the meeting was informed
that the Midland Bank had a Fixed Charge over all Book Debts and other debts and
4 held a Floating Charge over all other assets and the Statement of Affairs was
drawn up so as to reflect this situation.
The debtors included completed contract balances relating to some 31
contracts where, according to the Company's records, there were total sums
outstanding of approximately £231,000 including retention moneys in the region
of £211,000.	 These debts exclude ex-contractual claims which have not been agreed.
After making an appropriate provision for nominated sub-contractors'
liabilities, estimated at £2,520 and a provision for maintenance and damages of
£30,000 the net book value of the contract debtors amounted to approximately
£198,000, estimated to realise £152,000.	 The Directors, however, were of the
• opinion that if the ex-contractual claims were to be pursued some additional sums •
should be realised, but it was difficult to quantify the sums involved at this
stage.
Amounts owed by fellow subsidiaries of the Company were estimated to
have a book value of £276,000 made up as follows:-
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L.
Crouch Group Services Limited 	 136,000
Crouch Homes Limited	 97,000
Crouch Leisure Developments Limited	 43,000
£276,000
The meeting was advised that no significant payments had been made to an
other Group Company since November 1983. However, receipts received during 19
included amounts of £50,000 from Museum Estates Limited and £250,000 from Crouc
Group Services Limited, the latter amount being cash introduced by Mr. P.J.H.
Meyer personally to assist Group liquidity.
The Shares in the wholly-owned subsidiary Company, Crouch Painting Limit
acquired in April 1978 were shown in the books at £12,000. As, :::wever, this
subsidiary suffered losses resulting in a deficiency in net assete in excess of
£150,000, no realisable value was attributed to the investment.
Stock and work in progress related to 17 contracts outstanding for
completion as at 21st May, although 4 of the contracts were virtually complete.
It was reported that James R. Knowles and Associates, Quantity Surveyor(
had been instructed to carry out an appraisal of each contract and had been
actively engaged in endeavouring to arrange possible assignments of the contra(
to other contractors with the consent of the employing authorities. 	 However,
based on the negotiations which the Surveyors were undertaking it was considerl
unlikely that any substantial sums would be received from the work in progress
contracts and for this reason the realisable value in the statement of affairs
shown at only £53,000 after making provision for liabilities to nominated sub-
contractors and reservation of title claims by suppliers to materials on variol
of the contract sites.
After taking into account preferential liabilities estimated at L174,00
including a claim by the Bank for moneys advances to pay salaries and wages, i
was apparent that there was little or no prospect of funds becoming available
to enable a dividend to be paid to Unsecured Creditors estimated to total some
£2.4m, excluding contingent liabilities under contract performance bonds havin
a gross value of £1.36m.
The meeting was advised that the deficiency as shown by the Statement c
Affairs in the sum of £2,714,000 was computed as follows:-
'
Amounts written-off from the assets	 L 000
..against  book values	 464
Less: Excess of Assets over Capital and
Liabilities as at 31.3.83 	 87
377
2,337
£2,714
The meeting was advised that on 21st May 1984 the Parent Company, Crou
Crimp plc, as Shareholders of the Company, passed at short notice a Resolutio
immediately placing the Company in liquidation and appointed Mr. M.A. Jordan
and Mr. R.M. Addy of Cork Gully as Joint Liquidators. 	 This action had been
Balance being estimated trading losses
for the period 1.4.83 to 21.5.84
taken on the basis that if funds were not available to pay for materials
and sub-contractors and indeed to pay to staff and employees of the Company,
the security of the contract sites, which represented on the face of it the
largest asset, would have been put at risk.
Following a considerable amount of discussion, creditors present at
the meeting confirmed the voluntary liquidation of the Company together with
the appointment of Mr. Jordan and Mr. Addy as Joint Liquidators with a
Committee of Inspection comprising of:-
A representative of Digby Scaffold Co. Limited
of G.K.N. Kwikform Limited
Roberts, Adlard plc
• R.M.C. Group
Mr. J. Kelly representing various creditors
A formal Notice for claims is enclosed and if you have not already done
so, we should be pleased if you would supply a detailed Statement of your claim
to Crouch Construction Limited (In Liquidation) c/o Shelley House, 3 Noble
Street, London, EC2V 7DQ (Ref. SHSO2) in order that it may be scheduled.
We also attach in duplicate V.A.T. Bad Debt Relief forms, both copies
of which should be completed and returned to us if you wish to seek such
	
relief.	 In that event your claim against the Company must not include the
V.A.T. element.
Meanwhile, if there is any further information you require, please
do not hesitate to write to this office.
We are,
Yours faithfully,
CORK GULLY
Distribution:- 1 copy - Each Creditor - Secured, Unsecured and Preferential
	
(800)	 1 "	 - Each Director and Shareholder
1 "	
- Each Member of the Committee of Inspection
1 "	
- James R. Knowles Associates - (Quantity Surveyors).
1 "	 - Raffety Buckland - (Agents)
1 "	 - Clintons - (Solicitors)
1 "	 - The Royal Insurance Co. Ltd. 	 .
1 " •	 - The Commercial Union Group - (Insurance)
1 "	 - Bradstock, Blunt .4 Thompson Ltd. - (Insurance)
1 •
	 - E.P.A. Dept.
	 (Cork Gully)
1 "	 - Records	 (Cork Gully)
1 •
	
- Record Book	 (Cork Gully)
10 copies - General Files
	 (Cork Gully)
NOTICE to CREDITORS to * SEND CLAIMS
THE COMPANIES ACTS, 1948 to 1981
CROUCH CONSTRUCTION LIMITED
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Creditors of the above-named Company
are required on or before the 10th day of August 1984, to send their names
and addresses and the particulars of their debts or claims, and the names
and addresses of their Solicitors if any, to ROBIN MICHAEL ADDY of Shelley
House, 3 Noble Street, London, EC2V 7DQ the Joint Liquidator of the said
Company, and, if so required by notice in writing from the said Liquidator,
are by their Solicitors, or personally, to come in and prove their said
debts or claims at such time and place as shall be specified in such
notice, or in default thereof they will be excluded from the benefit
of any distribution made before such debts are proved.
DATED this 21st day of June, 1984.
R.M. ADDY,
Joint Liquidator.
•	 •
Re: CROUCH CONSTRUCTION LIMITED
(In Liquidation)
Registered Office and Business Address: 
Sutherland House, Surbiton Crescent,
Kingston-on-Thames, Surrey.
Company No. 958166	 Registered in England
•
APPROXIMATE STATEMENT of AFFAIRS
- as at -
21st MAY 1984 
ASSETS:
Approximate Book Values
L000	 L'000	 L'000
231
3
_11
198
276
474
474
12
16
656
65
133
Uncertain	 198	 151
£486
V000	 £000	 L000
152
276
428
428
15
68
(tenets subject to Fixed Charge:
Completed contract debtors
Lees: Nominated sub-contractors
Provision for defects and damage.
Amounts awed by Crouch Group Companies
Deduct: Midland Bank	 - fixed charge security
Assets subject to Floating Charge:
Shares in Subsidiary Company
Furniture, equipment, site huts etc.
Stock and work-in-progress
Less: Nominated rub-contractors
Provision for reservation of title claims
Excess cost of completion
LIABILITIES:
Preferential Creditors:
P.A.Y.E. Income Tax and N.I.C. 70
Wages, Salaries and Holiday Pay 33
Rates 1
Midland Bank plc for advances of wages and salaries 70	 . 174
ESTIMATED DEFICIENCY as regards Preferential Creditors
£106subject to Costs of Realisation
Debenture-holder - Midland Bank plc:
Direct Indebtedness 613
Less: Fixed Charge security deducted above 428
Preferential claim - (expected to produce) 20 448
ESTIMATED DEFICIENCY as regards Debenture-holder, subject to 
Coate of Realisation 	 165
1
Unsecured Creditors:
Trade and Expense	 1050
Sub-contractors	 1530
Less: Nominated sub-contractors dealt with above 	 (68)
Provision for reservation of title claims 	 1131)	 2379
Amounts owed to Crouch Group Companies
	
--±3	 2442
ESTIMATED DEFICIENCY as regards Unsecured Creditors, subject to 
Costs of Realisation	 2713
ISSUED SHARE CAPITAL
ESTIMATED DEFICIENCY as regards Contributories, subject to Comte of Realisation
NOTES: 1. The above Statement of Affairs muet be read in conjunction with the verbal report given to
the Meeting of Creditors, a summary of which is issued to all known Creditors.
2. There may be Contingent Liabilities in respect of uncompleted contracts, the amount of which
cannot at present  be ascertained, but part of which may be secured by contract performance bonds.
Estimated to Realise
CORK GULLY,
Chartered Accountants,
Shelley Souse,
3 Noble Street,
12th June, 1984 	 London, EC2V 7DQ
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COOPERS & LYBRAND,
Abacus Houee,
Cutter Lane, Cheapeide,
Londun, EC2V. 8AH.
W. H. CORK, GULLY & CO.,
Guildhall Rouse,
807, Greaham Street,
London,	 2V. 7DS.
Tele one:
01..61 7700
Ref.12J/MWALH/5091
12th September, 19791.
PRIVATE & CONFIDENT/AL
Teleolione:
01-606 4040
Ref, N3602
Dear Sirs,
Re: Mears ?roe. Holdings Limited
(le Liquidation and Receivership)
Reg!stered Office:
D=an Rouse,DorcanWay, Swindon, SN3. 31S. 
We write to advise you that Meetings of Members and Credito of the above-
named Cumpany pursuant tu Section 293 of the Companies Act, 1948, re held an the
24th August 1575.	 61r 7,eorge Mfddleton, a Director of the Company , presided. An
sctizated Statement ef Affairs =-.t: notes thereon which had been prepared by the
Directors as at lith Jarmary 1979, the date of the appointment of he Receivers
anaManucrs, was presented le the Meeting. A copy of the Statement of Affairs,
together w.th relate . ' :: Le, is attached.	 The following is a summary of a report
presented to the MeelInge ..)), Mr. M.;.. Jordan and Mr. P.F.M. Shewell on behalf of the
Directors prerared fro=. :nfornation provided by them and by the Re eivers and
Managers.
Mr, A M. Homan an1 Mr. P.E. Larkins of Price Waterhouse & Cc$., were appointed
ana 	 y 3arn1ays an's. Limited on the 18th January 1979.
The Director:: in offle at tho time of the Receivers , appo tment were:
Annointid
SLr George Middleton	 16. 1.1976
iirigadier I.R.a. Hollyer	 1. 7.1971
Mr R.G. Norcy	 1.10.1567
Mr. R.W. 3a1e
	 1. 4.1977
on 14th June 1V7, anri b emame a Public Comoany an the 16th May 1968. The present
It waa reDortri that the Comoany had been incorporated as a lprivate Company
Mr. A.S. Wheate
	 11. 4.1178
Issued Share ::ap:tal was £1,750,000 consisting of 7m. Ordinary Shares of 25p. each,
fully paid.
Mears Rros 3o13ings Limited ("Mears Moldings") was the Parnt Company of a
Grcup cf utlijig, •:1711 engineering and contracting Companies. The main trading
Companieo comprised Meer:. Construction Limited, (now known as M.C.!Swindon
Realisations Limited (In Li . judation)), A. Long & Co. Limited and A. Long Products
Limited A fourth Sutsia.Lary, Mears Properties Limited, held the Group's larger
freehold and leaseh_ld prcrerties; there are also some minor Subsidiaries. Nears
Holdings, the U.K. .radind Sabsidiariee and Mears Properties were 1.11 parties to a
nin4c •nint Accoun- wfth 3arclays 3ank ("the MASS account")
In the m:.1-sevent1es the Grop decided to expand its activities overseas.
As part -)f this effort Mearn Construction formed a Liechtenstein Stibeidiary, Mears
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International Anstalt, to act so civil engineering contractors in the Middle East.
During this poriod Mearo Construction expanded its U.K. operations, the bulk of
which consisted of oivil onein.3ering works such as roada
n	
.reservoi 9 sea defancee,
public building works and public act:tor hoodig.
	
7
At this time the Croup also decided to transfer its headquarters fram
Sydennam to Swindon. 	 When the move was made early in 1978, however, the Group's
trading position had deteriorated coneiderably partly due, in the View of  the 
Directors as regards Mears Conetruction, to the  adverse weather cohdld_tiOne in the
second half of 1977 and-tp	 the fact tnat-ZIIIiia major contracti proved tcebi lose-
making.	 Also-in early 1978 a requer_euVatAniiilly_increaseii oierdreft
facilities was made to the Group'e Bankers who as a conclifiad-rer-grwetirmethe
increase took Fixed Charges over the Group's properties and requested a report an
the Group's financial position to he presented by Price Waterhoueel& Co. This
report showed the need for additional Group facilities and a further increase to
£3.25m. was granted in April 1978, in exchange for Fixed and Floating Mariam over
assets of the Long Companies.
	
As a result of a loss of £1,026,000 ineurmed by
Mears Construction for the half year to 31st March 1978, and to trading losses else-
where in the Group amounting to £470,000-F641-ied cash-flow projections prepared-in
June 1978, showed a requirement for an additional eim. which the Blank subsequently
aL eeed to grant in exchange for the execution on 6th July 1978, ofiftll Fixed and
Floating Charges by Meare Construetion and other major Companies in the Group that
had not already given Fleeting Charges, supported by Cross-Guarantees.
report, plans were made to reduce overheads
event they were not fully implemented.
of the Long businees were sold to third
t for the Group as a whole or for particular
i.
Despite a turnrcuee in Mears Construction's trading resultelfrom an estimated
lose of over el,D00,23C in tho six months to the 31st March 1978, to an estimated
loes of only £12,)00 in the six months to the 30th September 1978, the expected
ieprovement in the Group overall did not materialise and negotiations for the sale
of the Company werc ttesuceeesful with the result that on the 18th January 1979, •
larclaye Dank appointee a AeL:eiver and Manager over each Company which was party to
the MASS account.
It was repJrted that the failure of the Group was attributed by the Directors
of Meara Holdings to the follcwing factors:
(a) the losses incurred ..)y Mears Construction during late 1977 and the early part
of 1978.
Following the Price Waterheese
throughout the Group, althuugh in the
However, Mears International and part
parties and purchasers were also scugh
activities.
(b) the Inlay by clients Li the settlement of certain substantial claims on
contracts.
( ) the •emands made apon the ',-;roup 2ahkine facility due to losses incurred by
other Companies within the Group.
(d) the financial drain leaeei Ly the aeteepts to establish a contracting trading
base overseae-
(e) the short term cam; effects of T.he move to Swindon.
Details of the tradieg results of Mears Holdings for the three years to 30th
September 1975 were given an follows:
414	 ' (539)
• C539)
L160)
(559)
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ut./01/u
	
1:0d	 LUXK LLL IKtHLINU U(i4
V000
Excesa	 r Expenci t,lre over Income (	 2)
Extraordinary :tem:: (217)
(269)
Dividends received
241
Dividends pala (125)
Resalts for year 116
Closing SurplJs (iefinioncy) 938
Year to
	 Teat to	 Year to
30. 9 1976	 30. 9141977	 Q. 919-
oLITO	 vow
(114)
(34))	
022)
Cm)
(434)	 (539)
The Meetince were ad ,rised that earth of the MASS account Cimpanies is, as
between itself and the Bank. resperaible for the whole of the MASS account over-
draft and, through Crles-Guarantees, for other liabilities of the Oroup Coiepanies
to the Bank.
	
Thc whole liability to the Bank was therefore shown in the'enclosec
Statement of Arfairs
	
The Receivers and Managers were of the opnion that the
Croup could have f.N.Laln in excess of £1,500,000 available for Unsecured Creditors
after the dischar,7e ,f Preferential claims and the liability to the Bank but the
rixhts of indiricual ;:ompanies and their Creditors to share in aayIeurplus involved
cemsler legal :.unue:; whicr ould take a considerable time to resolire.
The ieficienci enti:.ated in the 3tatement of Affairs to amouat to £4,517,000
had seen computed ae
Surplus tf assets aver liabilities as at 1.10.1975
vow	 V000
822
Deibet: 'et Trai:ng losses from 1.10.1975 to 	 I
Id. 1 1975
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Dividends paid during period	 2po,
L 97
Less: Dividenia rec . ived	 am	 ga
1	 t 395
Dodurt Dther smni.:: tS uritten off in acccunts:	 I!
Advant.e Crrperation Tax irrecoverable	 253
Amvints wrI t.-:en :ff Investments in Subsidiaries	
__MI	 —6.416
Def;%innL.y per Acrounts as at 18. 1.1979 	 1	 t 251
Aid: Amount wr:t:eo off in respect of Subsidiaries	 1
...--
in preparinx Statement of Affairs
	 2,912
Contingent liabilities
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MASS Acz..:+unt	 .1,308	 Illa
Estimated Tota: Deficient:1
	 1	 t4,517
......m
At the ExtraDrdinary General Meeting of Members it was resoived that the
Company be ',mind gp r.si.,nlarily and Mr, M.A. Jordan of W.H. Cork, dully & CO. and
Mr, p,? M Shewell :f	 & Lybrand were appointed Joint Liquidators. The
aarehDiders Ala;	 to the Committee of Inspection:
Mr H.W. Aplin
Mr H.:. Lester
Mr. P M. TUrner
The Creditors sLt tneir Meeting confirmed the voluntary liquldation and
artu.r . ,ed the apr:,:nttit Di the :oin7 Liquidators together with a Committee .of
343
cunEl0L.Lnd n2 tne 'Shareholders , nominees.
Shareholdord are advised that the Share Regiater will roma-1,6 closediercept
ror tte Registration .)f Grants of Probate. 	 it is not necessary for than.to
d.ny further action unledd and until requested otherwise by tk4. Liquinntcrs.
,	 -
In accordance) with the attacned Notice, Creditors are requested to orvalEd
to Coopers & Lybrand at the address shown above a detailed statemmnt of their
claims against Mears Jros. Holdings Limited together with details of any security
held.	 We would draw your attention to the legislation relating tic) Value Added.Tax
relief un Lad debts. Creditors who wish to claim such relief should deduct the
amount of Value Added Tax from tho claim to be submitted to the Liquidators ant
ehould inform the LisuidaLors accordingly that their claim in the liquidation ie
net of V.A.T.
Please quote the name of Mears Bros. Holdings Limited (In Liquidation) in
all correspondence relatlag to this Company.
Yours faithfully,
P. F. M. 	 L A. CORMS,
as Joint Liquidators of Mears Bros. Holdings
Limited.
Di -s=rilion: - 1 n %7171. - Each Creditor - Secured, Unsecured and Preferential
(1,050)
	 1 II	
- Each Director and Shareholder
1 “	 - Debenture-holder
1 to	 - 2ach Memoer of the Committee of Inspection
1	 II	
- The Royal Insurance Co. Ltd. 	 I
1	 - The Commercial Union Group - (Insurance
,
-	 - Messrs. Eradstock, Blunt & Thompson Ltd..- (Insurance
- Record Book	 W.L. Cork,: Gully &ICC.
.
.	
- Records
	 W.H. Cork, Gully asiCo.
1 "	 - Records	 Coopers 4 Lybrand
15 . o-olec - General Files	 Coopers M Lybrand
15 "
	
- Seneral Files	 W.R. Cork,i Gully MICo.)
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1E41S BROS. HOLDINGS LIMITED
in rocoivership
Rotes to Directors Estimated Statement of Affaire,
This estl.mate. %clan is subject to the coots of receivership
and liquidation. should be read in conjunction with the repomts to
the shareholders and creditors.
2.	 It han been asstmed that the fixed charge over debtors gtven
by the debent:;re 'a valid.. 	 Thin poi=t will only be relevant if the
bank seeko to onforte /In own 3ubrogatod claim in competition with
other preferential creditors.
3.	 The aebtore include €587,000 from other group companies
in receivership and considered irrecoverable. Debts due to and from
group oompanics
	
however alter eubetantially as a result of the
claims 'made agaInst the co .rmanies by the bank and any subsequent
payntentn under t'le debenture. At this stago the amounts involved
cannot be gmognd ari The _egal rights likely to arise thereftom are
unclear
The preferential salariea and wages do not include any
suore,zatel ola:m that may Ice Ttade by the bank.
5.	 The ccmpaLy han guaranteed performance bonds, hire purchase and
bank and other _own; for Its subsidiaries.
	
For the purposes of the
staTezent uf affairs the .:.irt• ctors have not attempted to assess any
contingent lias.lily since they are unaware of any claim Which has been
made under this
No prevision has seen made for possible redundancy payments.
pi
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009
MARS BROS. HOLDINGS LIMITED IN RECEITERISHIP 
Unsecured Creditors as at lBth January 1979 
Akaumaliu Cleanind Services Ltd. 566
Barclays Sant,: (London & International) Ltd. 1,590
Baring Bros. & 00. Ltd. 8,64o
Coward Chance & Co. 9,777
Coys of Kensind-ton (Motors) Ltd. 564
Del ,itto Haskins 1 Sells 10,480
East-West Europe 1,464
IBM Yinsnoe Ltd. 45,000
Inland Revenue 1,712
R.:, Loighfield & Sons Ltd. 17,795
Lexterten Ltd. 931
Lombard North Central Ltd. 1,558
Mears Properties Ltd. 3,749
Nelson Hurst & Co. 3,344
New Opportunity Press Ltd. 1,042
Pont Office 671
Price Waterhouse & Co. 11,488
Thames Water Authority 4,220
Welter Son & Pack:An 1,719
A.S. Whcate 1,756
Unc1ai=e4 dividends 761
Sundry Creditors ander £530 3,270
£131097
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• - •	 RADFORD, SONS & CO.
-6204,4 tea/ 4...Cf000s,Araizma
MICHAEL G. V. RADFORD
	
12 PORTLAND STREET
SOUTHAMPTON S09 4LA
Consultant :
Gordon E. Radford	 Telephone (0703) 23101
Southerr Counties Construction Co. Limited
The first Meeting of Creditors of the above-named Company, convened pursuant to
provisions of Section 293 of the Companies Act, 1948, took place at Centre Hotel,
Portsmouth, on Friday 30th January, 1981. The Chairman of the Meeting was Mr. R.A.
Boyce who was accompanied by Mr. Michael Andrews, the Chairman of the Board of Southern
Constructions (Holdings) Ltd. (the Holding Company of the Group), and Mr. Richard Stone
of Messrs Cork Gully who was appointed Joint Receiver by the Debenture Holder on the
12th May, 1980. A copy of the Statement of Affairs and list of principal Creditors
which was submitted to the Meeting is enclosed herewith.
The Meeting was addressed by Mr. Michael Radford of Messrs Radford, Sons & Co.,
whr reported that he had recently been instructed by the Directors of the Company to
assist them with the formalities for winding-up the Company. He outlined the history of -
the Company, which was inccrp^rated i n 1936 and continued trading until March, 1941, whe
it closed down because of the war. It re-commenced in 1946 and expanded steadily. In
1 956 the shares were acquired by the holding company, Southern Constructions (Holdings)
Limited which later became a publicly quoted Company. There were many changes of
Directors and, at the late of the Meeting, those who remained in office were:-
R.A. Boyce
Ncrnal: Thomas
Arncid G. Selby
Trevor Rees
Barry Heather
Peter J. Sawtell
appointed 1st January, 1972
31st August, 1979
29th March, 1977
1st April, 1974
1st August, 1975
11
	
1st April, 1979
Mr. Michael J. Stallard was appointed Secretary on 1st September, 1977, but, after
assisting the Receivers for several months, he took a post abroad and Mt. Boyce was
appointed Secretary on 30th December, 1980.
Over the years additional businesses were acquired to work with the Company and
parts of the Company's activities were separated into individual limited liability
Companies, as subsidiaries of the Holding Company. Certain of these Companies ceased
trading and, at the date of the appointment of the Receivers, there were four other acti%
subsidiaries, as follows:-
Southern Constructions (Property) Ltd.
Southern Constructions (Plant) Ltd.
Bleach Haulage Ltd.
	 -
Cresta Technology Limited
The bulk of the business carried on by other subsidiary Companies was on behalf of
Southern Counties Construction Co. Ltd., which was the principal trading Company within
the Group. The Companies were inter-dependent and, in considering the trading results,
it is moie relevant to refer to the Group results rather than those of the Company solely
The following are the summarised trading results for the 5 years ended 31st January, 1971
2/ 	
348
1978
t
1977
E
1976
e
1975
E
1974
E
Turnover 12,221 13,709 10,737 9,929 7,363
Profit (loss) before taxation (293) (1,452) 160 554 223
Taxation -	 (9) (765) 85 316 159
Net profit (loss) after tax (284) (687) 75 238 64
•
The interim results for the six months ended the 30th June, 1979 were published in
October 1979 and showed the following:-
6 months to 30th June	 Year
1978	 1979	 1211
Turnover 6,858 4,663 12,221
Profit (Loss) 33 (398) (293)
As will be seen the Company's turnover had fallen substantially compared to 1978, and
this trend continued in the latter part of 1979 as the Company re-organised its affairs.
The accounts for the year have not been completed, but the turnover was approximately
£10 million, and the estimated trading loss was nearly £800,000.
The summarised figures above show that the Company had been very prosperous up to
1975, but suffered a gradual deterioration thereafter. In ?larch, 1977, following the
collapse of the Ernest Ireland Group of Companies the Company acquired the Caffin Divisior
of that Group, including its offices at Ridkmansworth and various employees, and it took
an assignment of a number of contracts. Unfortunately the activities did not fit in well
with the existing business, and it is estimated that losses on the contracts taken over
amounted to Li million.
Regular management accounts were prepared and, although these showed a continuing
trend of losses throughout 1979, the Directors were confident that the Group was solvent,
and due to the remedial steps that had been taken, it would overcome its difficulties.
Finance was provided by National Westminster Bank Ltd. with an overdraft limit of £765,000
but with a "bounce-up" facility of 000,000 to cover periodic pressures due to delays in
obtaining certificates on contracts and payments thereunder. There were various cash flow
crises in early 1980, and the Directors realised that the Company would need additional
finance, and Bonds totalling £600,000 in respect of contracts amounting to £7 million that
had been secured. An approach was made to the Bank for assistance and the Bank insisted
that the Group's affairs be investigated by an independent firm of Accountants, and this
exercise was carried out at the end of April and the first week of May. The contracts
were examined by an independent firm of Surveyors, and the properties valued. The reports
that went to the Bank showed that, on a going concern basis, the assets of the Group
exceeded its liabilities by £577,081, although on a break-up there would be a substantial
deficiency. The Directors were optimistic that, in the light of the report, the Bank would
accept their request for further assistance but, when the Bank refused, the Directors had
no alternative but to formally request the Bank to appoint Receivers.'
The Receivers continued trading for a short while attempting to finish off a small
job and to assign contracts. As a result of the termination of certain contracts and lowe
sustained through the assignment of others, the value of debts and work in progress has bee
3/
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reduced by approximately £1.4 million.	 The deficiency account can be summarised as Loll
Deficiency at 31st December, 1978 273,121
Amount written off debts and work in progress 1,419,694
Contingent liabilities under performance bonds 386,753
Redundancy pay, holiday pay and notice payments 114,721
2,194,289
Balance being estimated trading loss for
the period let January, 1979 to 1st May, 1980 1,236,578
Deficiency per Statement of Affairs £3,430,867
At the date of the appointment of the Receivers the total indebtedness to the Bank
was £815,353, and there was a contingent liability of £226,867 in respect of Bonds. The
fmmillatpresent held by the Receivers from the realisation of the assets of Southern
Counties Construction Ltd., are quite small, but they estimated that approximately
£500,000 remains to be realised, principally in respect of final accounts and claims on
completed contracts.
Unfortunately the Receivers have not yet succeeded in disposing of any of the
Group's properties and the funds held by them at present from the realisation of the
assets of the associated Companies is in the region of £400,000, and thus interest
continues to accrue on the overdraft. The estimated value of the Company's properties
is £750,000 and thus, provided the debts and retentions realise the amount estimated by
the Receivers and their Surveyors, a fund should be available for the Creditors of the
Group in due course.
The Statement of Affairs shows that there are no assets available for Unsecured
Creditors. Other Companies within the Group however dhow substantial surpluses. Mr.
Radford expressed the view that, when the assets of all the Companies had been realised
and it is known what funds (if any) are available for Creditors, consideration should be
given to combining the assets and liabilities and equating the dividends payable across
the Companies within the Group. Understandably objections to the proposal might be
received from Creditors of the other Companies but, bearing in mind that the liabilities .
of Southern Counties Construction Co. Ltd., constitute 910 of the liabilities of the
Group and, moreover, the other Companies where there are substantial assets would not have
existed but for the fact that those assets were hived off from Construction, the proposal
has the merit of equity. When the position is clearer, Creditors will be asked to express
their views, and it may be necessary even to make an application to Court.
The Meeting resolved that Michael G.V. Radford.F.C.A. be appointed Liquidator, with
a Committee of Inspection consisting of the respresentatives of:—
The Davum Steel Co. Ltd.
W. & J. Glosuup Ltd.
Ready Mixed Concrete Group
Tarmac Roadstone (Southern) Ltd.
Shell UK Oil
Would those Creditors who did not submit claims in response to the Notice of the
sleeting of Creditors please be good enough to do so, and where appropriate submit the
forms of acknowledgement for V.A.T. purposes. Forms previously submitted are returned
lerewith.
Yours faithfully
RADFORD, SONS & CO.
350
0c5r=c5oboo-o rz-.000o'000 00o re. a.
1••	 1••	 •n
\13 tr1 \ 0 0 0 LC \	 0 0
t•- t-- 0 N N N	 \ CO r•-•
'Kr .-1
tr\ EQ.	 rrr.
r-
-
\
tr.
caa
co
0
0 43
ce4
+3
N .- .6\ 1CO n0 \ON UN CD1
-P	
.. 4	 ...
	
.- V) I-	 .I0 a
03	 4	 MI Hal
o
i f)4)
/	 .......
	
0	 4	 g 2 3
	
42
	C.,	 a)	 42 420
	
4	 4.	 1-1
	
0	
go,
4 A 
8
.2 r4
	
43	 0	 4+	 I ce4
	
02 MI	 a'4202 0
	
(1) C.3	 H .	 0
	
41 rd 	 "aro	
4
	
a)	 I	 'll a
	
43 0	 1
la
	
A 4a2	
0	
ce-1	 5-4 •.-102 TS	 42	 54
	r-I 	 4	 ,1 -4 t3 i
	 •04a
	
41 Pe	 ;-11 a.1
I"'	
0
0 0	 4 1 ,.,	 44
	
0	 F-04 43i
ti 0 rA i	 $4	 all Fe	 0 i
0 $4 as il	 MI +3 030 F-I 0 4, a =	 A	 0 5 1 0	 0
.0 0 4.	 03	 MI A El g	 a)
rid V 42 1 44 '11	 M
	
r4	 w
	
g 8 4 V-04 g .8	 o	 4)	 .4)
	
4,014 ,2 04. .g -P iii	 42	0 	 A . 80 40 40	 1
A 03 El id 3 M o g 44 a)	 r., ':13o Ai 4 2	 ...4
	
,c1	 43
4 El 172 g	 t03 F41 co'	 4	 4	 A
%.0	 N	 0co
	
o 0 UN CT	 K \	 •ctCO 0 CO CO0	 0	 • ra
CI\ 0 fe% •\ 	 co
U	 1-re.0
PIN
4ia
N Cd)	 CY .\ \ N CO0 \ 0	 0 ON CD NrPC\ 
N	
in
•n•	 •n•
0
O.% 1-
re/
43	 .1:1
A 42A •CJ42
03 .--...
71	 II ...-...1 -78 14
•n 1-4	 0
-.-1	 0	 ( 51442 	 ca 1:114-1	 0'-.—•
I-4	 n	 424-I	 0	 •
.	 1 2 V. 2 20	 42 0 0O 1-1 ... 04cd	 T1	 420	 0-.-4	 .-4...l
I:0 42 2 +3 424 I.	 (1 R '40	 -ill	 0	 ".c1 1	 Ca43 42	 43 +2ul 2 
A'
2 4
a a 43 0	 Z 2 .8 2 20 V ?, e-4	 0 XI 0 0C.) 0 0 C.)
r4
 
P4• 2 ti	al
0 Q) 00	 Si 0 A 0 0o ?-, 0 A
1 i I .8 13	
0 In fl4 0 0)A A A
.) +3 • 43 +31., 0 0
4 f: s 4 ,„ : 0 • 0 0nd ra I-) CO CO
44Es1-:13	
1-4
o
351
59,871
105,793
140,073
18;930
9,100
be appointed Liquidator.
RADFORD, SONS & CO.
e714744 tea/ SIC~4114Zf,4
MICHAEL G. V. RADFORD	 12 PORTLAND STREET.
Consultant:
	 SOUTHAMPTON 501 OEB
Gordon E. Radford	 Telephone (0703) 330703
Facsimile (0703) 330099
Ourref. MR/CJ/C.GEN
Yourne.
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
26th August, 1988
Dear Sirs,
Southern Constructions (Holdings) Limited 
The first Meeting of Creditors of the Company convened pursuant to the provisions
of Section 98 of the Insolvency Act 1986, took place at the Southampton Park Hotel,
Southampton, on Wednesday, the 17th August, 1988.
The Chairman of the Meeting was Mr. J.M.G. Andrews. The Statement of Affairs sworn
by Mr. Boyce, one of the Directors, showed that the only assets of the Company are
certain claims against subsidiary Companies, which are also in the course of being
wound-up.
The Receivership of the principal trading subsidiary, Southern Counties
Construction Co. Ltd., will not be completed for several months. However, it is
anticipated that when the Receiver has completed his work, certain funds will flow back
to the Holding Company which might result in a dividend being payable to the Creditors
whose claims appear to amount to the following:-
E
Trade and Expense Accounts
Subsidiary Companies
Guarantee Liability
Claims from Directors and Ex-Directors
Ex-employees
The Meeting resolved that Mr. Michael G.V. Radford, FCA,
Mr. Radford is also Liquidator of the subsidiary Companies.
Would those Creditors who did not submit claims in response to the Meeting of 
Creditors, please be good enough to do so and where appropriate submit forms of
acknowledgement for V.A.T. Bad Debt Relief purposes.
Yours faithfully,
RADFORD, SONS & CO. 
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APPE21D3X D-5 
QUESTICtINAIRE
QUESTIONNAIRE
Please tick the appropriate box for question 1-10 and Yes or No for
questions 11-17.
1 - Please state whether the chief excutive is the sole authority
or has an assistant or deputy in the company.
Sole authority	 Assistant or deputy with
authority
[ ]	 F]
2- Please state whether the chief executive is the same person
acting as both chief executive and chairman of the company.
Chief executive and chairman	 Chief executive and
same person	 chairman not same
person
3- Please state whether the Company Board comprises persons
not working in the company.
Comprises only members	 Comprises of members
working in the company
	 not working in the company
[ ]
	 [ 1
353
4- Please state the average exeperience in years of the majority
of the company's site Engineers up to section Engineers.
Over 10 years	 Less than 10 years
[ ]
	 [ ]
5- State whether the financial director has sole authority for
financial decisions or shared by other senior managers.
Sole acting person	 Shared authority
with authority
6- State the average experience years of the majority of the
company's management staff (site and service manager
including at Head office).
Over 10 years
	
Less than 10 years
[ 1
	 [ 1
7- State whether the company produces cash flow plans.
Cash flow plan prepared 	 No cash flow plan
and reviewed periodically
[ ]
	 [ 1
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8- State whether the company has a budgetery control system.
Budgetery control system	 No budgetery control system
avialable in the company 	 avialable in the company
9- State whether the senior management staff carry all the
responsibility for tendering.
Senior management staff
	 Bidding decision not taken
experienced in bidding	 at middle management level
and taking bidding decisions
10-State how your company responds to market changes.
Quick response	 Fair response
[ 1	 F]
11- Did the company issue debentures before 1986?
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12-Did the company expand its business before 1986 and did this
result in over trading?
13-Did the company under-take a specific project before 1986
which caused significant losses?
14-Did the company take over an other firm before 1986 which
resulted in significant losses?
15- Did the company diversified its business before 1986? If Yes
does it relate to the same line of your business?
16-Did the company under-take a specific project including
contract claims before 1986 which caused significant losses?
17- Did the company under-take a specific overseas projects
before 1986 which caused significant losses?
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APPENDIX E 
STATISTICAL TESTS
E.1	 INTRODUCTION
One of the main objectives of statistical analysis in a situation of
uncertainty, unavailable mathematically, or otherwise to produce the
right answer, is that the information derived from samples drawn
a:an:ding to specific criteria can be used to make estimates of and
inferences about the characteristics of populations.
Statistical analysis can do no more than help to assess the level of
risk involvement. This idea is central to the whole concept of
statistical analysis, which is concerned not with the impossible task
of finding the right answer but with measuring the level of
unamlainty. This inevitably throws the final decision back on the
researcher's judgement.
E.1.2 CHOOSING A SAMPLE
A sample, of whatever size, should be randomly chosen. In practice it
is not easy to meet this condition so that various devices are used to
keep the sample as close to the ideal as possible. Despite much
effort, few data were collected with sufficient information.
The rules for choosing an appropriate size of sample in this research
were based on:
- availability of data
- qualitative analysis.
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Unfortunately, due to lack of information available only 22 failed
ccrnpanies have been collected. Eleven were used to develop the model
and 11 used to test the model. Also 20 continued companies were used
to develop the model and 70 companies were used to test the model.
The selection criterion adopted for the "non-failed 20" group was as
follows:
- continuing in business for at least four years and also had to have
continued in operation for two years after the focal year 1986
- has not been exposed to continuous losses for the last four years
in tusiness, some of them may have made losses over one or two
years
- finally, appearing solvent, but not necessarily considered healthy
companies.
While the selection criterion for the "failed 11" group consisted of
those declaring bankruptcy and into receivership between 1978 through
1986, a period of 8 years.
E.1.3 TEST ON NORMALITY OF DATA
The standard discriminant analysis procedures assume that the
variables used to describe or characterise the member of the groups
beirginwmftlgated are imiltivariatenormally distributed.
In practice, deviations from the normality assumption in finance
appear more likely to be the rule rather than the exception [see
Deakin, 1977].
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Violations of the normality assumption may bias the test of
significance and estimated error rates.
In the applied literature, the problem of testing for the
appropriateness of the distritmtional assumption has been largely
ignored, This is due in part, one would presume, to the fact that
most available normality tests are for univariate and not multi-
variate normality [1]. In our case a reasonable approximation
normality has been taken by calculating the financial ratios for four
years for the "non-failed 20" groups and the last three years for the
"failed 11" group, and averaging the ratios in order to smooth the
means. Also logarithmic and reciprocal transformation is adppted to
improve normality.
E.1.4 TEST CN RELATIONSHIP BEIWEEN VARIABLES
Ommllation between variables were tested. Previous studies (2)(3)
suggested that any ratio highly correlated with other ratios that
describe similar aspects of the crupany's financial structure should
be diwretised for example, correlation between any two variables 0.7
or greater, one of them should be selected for inclusion in the
analysis. This research adopted similar concepts as shown in Figure
E.1.
E.2 TEST THE GOODNESS OF FIT
In order to test the goodness of fit of the normal distributions
characterised by the mean and standard deviations of the two samples,
the Rolmogorov-amironu test is employed. The hypothesis tested is that
ttenorrnal distribution fits the data.
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If the computed value of the greatest absolute difference between the
distribution functions exceeds the tabular value, the hypothesis is
rejected.
The "Z" values for the "non-failed 20" and "failed 11" groups are
Shown in Table E.1. The range of "Z" values is divided into segment 3
units, and the frequency indicated on the gragh is the number of "Z"
values failing within that particular segment.
The histograms closely resemble the superimposed normal curve as shown
in Figure 6.2 (see Chapter 6). The greatest difference between actual
proportion and expected proportion is shown in Tables E-2 and E.3.
The hypothesis is not rejected at the 0.05 level of significance for
either group, as the tabular value for the samples size of twenty and
eleven are 0.26 and 0.36 respectively, and the assumption of normality
is presumably satisfied.
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FIGURE E.1: CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VARIABLES
TABLE E-1
Rank	 "Non-failed" Group Z Values "Failed" Group Z-Values
1 13.27
2 3.59
3 14.9
4 14.53
5 6.4
6 7.1
7 3.52
8 7.07
9 18.22 41 = 9.6
10 20.4
11 6.32
12 -1.85
13 14.74
14 8.25
15 -0.96
16 10.8
17 17.7
18 5.7
19 6.8
20 15.6
21 -4.1
22 -11.53
23 -22.6
24 -18.8
25 -10.13 11.2 =-14.3
26 -8.8
27 -16.0
28 -18.3
29 -21.3
30 -18.0
31 -7.66
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Range Actual Actual Expected Expected Actual Expected Diffe-
Frequen-
cies
CUmula-
tive
Propor-
tion
Cumula-
tive
Propor-
tion
Propor-
tion
rences
0-(-3) 1 1 0.76 0.76 0.05 0.053 0.003
0-(+3) 2 3 0.06 0.82 0.15 0.057 0.093
3-(6) 0 3 0.25 1.07 0.15 0.075 0.075
6- 9 3 6 2.835 3.905 0.3 0.274 0.026
9-12 5 11 3.78 7.685 0.55 0.539 0.011
12-15 1 12 0.76 8.445 0.6 0.593 0.007
15-18 4 16 5.67 14.115 0.8 0.99 -0.19
18-21 2 18 0.06 14.17 0.9 0.995 -0.095
21-24 2 20 0.06 14.23 1.0 1.0 0
TABLE E-2: SHOWS DIFFERENCES BETWOO4ACTUAL AND EXPECTED PROPORTIONS IN "NON-
FAILED 20" GROUP (Kolmogrov Smirnov Test)
Range	 Actual Actual Expected Expected Actual Expected Diffe-
Frequen- CUmula- Propor- CUmula- Propor- Propor- rences
cies	 tive tion	 tive	 tion	 tion
(0)-(-6) 1 1 0.76 0.76 0.09 0.062 0.028
(-6)-(-12) 4 5 5.67 6.43 0.454 0.526 0.068
(-12)-(-18) 2 7 0.06 6.49 0.636 0.537 0.103
(-18)-(-24) 4 11 5.67 12.16 1.0 1.0 0
TABLE E-3: SHOWS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND EXPECTED PROPORTIONS IN
"FAILED 11" GROUP (Kolnogrov Smirnov Test)
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E-3 THE F-TEST
F-test: It enables us to compare two estimates of the same variance
to give the likelihood that discrepancy would arise for the
size we have got, the test depends vitally on degrees of
freedom.
By establishing null hypothesis that all the figures come from the
same distributicn and then estimates are made of the variance of this
distribution in a variety of ways. Comparison of these estimates
allows a decision to be made on whether they are so different that the
null hypothesis shaaldice rejected.
The mean of the Z-value for the "non-failed 20" group is 9.60 and the
sums of squares of differences:
s12	 (z i-1)2 = 760
S.d E(Z-1)2. 	- 6.324
n-1
and the variance is the square of standard deviation. Hence variance
for the "non-failed" group = 39.9.
Similarly, the mean of the Z-value for the "failed 11" group is 14.30
and the sums of squares of differences
S22 =E(Z:f2 )2 = 375
gzji2)2
S.d. = 
	
 -6.123
n-1
and the variance is 37.49.
The best estimate of s.d. of whole populations:
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S.d. - 1X (Z1-21 )2 + E(Z2-22)2
n1+ n2 - 2
759.38 + 375
- 25 - 6.253S.d. 20 + 11 - 2
Variance of whole population = 39.1. 
Estimate sums of square for whole population:
39.1 x 29 = 1133.9 with DF1.
2. Estimate of variance for each oolumn and averages:
37.79 + 39.9 - 38.69 with 29 degrees of freedom2
39.1  - 1.01038.69
Naw we use the F-test to enable us to compare two estimates of the
same variance to give the likelihood that discrepancy would arise from
the size of samples we have got. There are two ways of making
estimates of the vaniarre:
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i) Estimating variance group b y grou2 
On the basis of null hypothesis, the "non-failed" group is a sample
sized 20 from the overall population. For this group the average Z-
score is 9.6, the sum of the squares of the difference from this
average is 759.4.
So the population variance is
7599
.9 - 39.971
We can do the same with the "failed " group where the average is -
14.30, the sum of squares of the differences from this average is
375.25 and the estimate of variance is:
375.25 - 37.5210
So that the best estimate of population variance is:
39.97 + 37.52 - 38.75, call this estimate "A"2
ii) Estimating variance using group averages 
The averages for each group are 9.6 and -14.3 respectively and this
is a sample size of 2 of what might be a large number of averages.
We can make an estimate of the variance of this large number of
averages from the two we have got. Average of the two:
9.6 + (-14.3) - -2.35
2
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Sum of squares of differences:
[9.6 - (-2.35)] 2 + [-14.3 - (-2.35)] 2 = 285.6
Estimate of variance, by using 2 degrees of freedom:
265.6 
_ 142.82
Nbw, the central limit theorem tells us that for sample size "n" out
of a full population with standard deviation 'S' the averages will
form a new distribution whicse standard deviation will be SArn. The
variance is the square of standarddviation so that:
Variance of average = variance of population/n
If we considered the sample size the lowest is 11 instead of 20. In
order to get lower estimates so that our final estimate of the overall
variances 142.8 x 11 = 1570.8, call this estimate "B".
TRE TERI
We now have two estimates of the variance of the Z-scores on the
assurrption (null hypothesis) that there is no difference between two
groups, these estimates are:
A. Estimating variance group by group and averaging 38.75
B. Estimating variance using groups averages
	 1370.8
Before we must consider "degrees of freedom" again because the test
depends vitally on this. Firstly-when. we used each group we got 19, 10
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degrees of freedom respectively. Using both groups gives 20 + 11 - 2 =
29 degrees of freedom. Secondly, when we used the averages of each
group, there were only two figures. We are therefore comparing:
38.75 with 29 degrees of freedom
1750.8 with 2 degrees of freedom
The ratio 1570.8/38.75 = 40.5.
The tabular value of F is 5.42 where DF 1 = 2 and DF2
 = 29 at the 1%
significance level while the computed value of F is 40.5. Therefore
the computed F-statistic for the overall function is good.
An F-ratio is the ratio between two variances and is used to test for
homogeneity of variance and equivalence of two groups.
A value of 'F' larger than the tabular value for the degrees of
freedom in the numerator DF1 , and the degrees of freedom in the
&animator DF2 at an indicated level of significance leadq to the
rejection of the hypothesis that the two groups are samples from the
same population with a confidence level of 99% or 1% level of
significance.
Therefore, we can conclude that an increase in differences between
means of the variables or decrease in the variability of variables
improves the ability of discriminant models to differentiate between
groups.
An alternative, and equally valid approach is to use the student t-
test to compare the Z-scores of two groups.
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The average Z-scores of group 1 +9.6
The average Z-scores of group 2 -14.3
The best estimate for the standard deviation of ocamonpcpulation
c 2 c2 2-) 
-6.253Ni + N2 - 2
The null hypothesis regards the two samples as samples from the same
population. Therefore no difference in the averages of the populations
from which the samples are taken have to be extended to include the
assumption that the standard deviations are also the same.
The formula for different sized samples is:
___ averages 	 v
	 + 1/n2t _ difference in best estimate of s.d.
t 9.6 + 14.3	 /1/11 + 1/206.253
. 3.822 _ 10.219 0.374
The number of degrees of freedom = 11 + 20 - 2 = 29.
Tabular value of t = 2.462 at 1% significance level.
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E.4 rEST OF MODEL 2 
Each variable in the multiple regression second version model is
tested for significant contribution to the coefficient of
determination (R2 ) which is a measure of the proportion of the
variance of the dependent variable accounted for by the independent
variables.
The amount of variance explained by the model is 89% of the total
variance. The adjusted R-squared is 91%. The higher level of variance
explained indicates the power of the model and that the most
discriminant variables are included in the model.
Also, the t value of the model tested indicates that the calculated
value (3.45) is greater than the tabular value (2.75) at 0.01
significance level.
E.5 TEST ON FINANCIAL RATIOS
The statistical method used to obtain the most correct predictor
ratios was based on criteria that an increase in difference between
means of the ratios or decrease in variability of ratios Improves the
ability of discriminant ratios to differentiate betmamgroups.
The student t-test is employed to compare the financial ratio means of
two groups for example. The means of current ratio for failed and non-
failed groups were 1.16 and 1.66 respectively. The best estimate for
the standard deviation of common population:
E(r1-1)2 + E(r2-i.-2)2
s.d. =	 	  - 0.511
n1 + n2 - 2
370
The formula for t for different sized samples is:
difference in averages , 1	 1t- best estimate of s.d.	 n1 n2
t - 1 66 - 1.16	 /1	 10.51	 20 11
t= 2.6
The nuMber of degrees of freedom = 11 + 20 - 2 = 29. The tabular
value of t = 2.46 at 1% significance level, therefore we can reject
the hypothesis that the two groups are samples from the same
population with a confidence level 99% or 1% level of significance.
Similarly, the t-values for NA/CL and EBIT/INT ratios are 5.16 and
2.56 respectively which are greater than the tabular value 2.46 at 1%
level of significance.
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TABLE E-4:	 SHOWS THE MEANS OF FINANCIAL RATIOS USED IN THE ANALYSIS
CA/CL NA/CL EBIT/INT
1.06 1.675 3.82
2.74 1.91 4.4
1.32 1.177 6.65
1.67 1.11 11.7
2.24 1.7 4.4
1.36 0.947 6.35
2.29 1.75 4.4
1.65 1.36 8.2
2.55 2.38 2.1
1.097 0.937 3.5
1.69 1.47 2.92
1.09 6.7 3.18
1.6 1.01 2.15
1.39 1.92 5.65
1.27 1.44 1.05
1.38 2.07 9.1
1.317 1.35 7.47
1.42 1.25 33.0
1.25 0.74 5.1
3.4 3.37
1.66 1.765 4.7
1.47 1.34 0.90
0.5 0.49 3.07
1.72 1.13 1.64
0.59 1.08 1.42
1.01 1.02 0.85
1.25 0.68 1.34
1.34 0.64 0.71
1.22 0.92 0.19
1.28 0.79 2.15
1.06 0.58 1.43
1.36 0.46 2.2
1.16
	 0.816	 1.44
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E.6 TEST ON A-SCORE MODEL
The A-scores for the "at risk 7" and "solvent 7" groups are Shown in
Figures 10.1 and 10.2 as follows:
62, 72, 62, 96, 50, 69, 50
31, 45, 41, 29, 47, 28, 43
i) Testing by Using t-Test
In order to deal with the null hypothesis that there is no difference
in the averages of both populaticns it has to be extended to include
the assumption that the standard deviations are also the same.
The average of the first group is 65.85 and the average of the second
group is 37.7.
For the first group the sum of the squares of the differences from the
average is:
(62-65.85)2 + (72-65.85)2 + (62-65.85)2 + (96-65.65)2
+ (50-65.85)2 + (69-65.85) 2 + (50-65.85)2
Therefore the sum of squares of differences = 1488.78.
For the second group the sum of the squares of the differences from
the average is:
(31-37.7)2 + (45-37•7)2 + (41_37.7)2 + (29-37.7)2
+ (47-37.7)2 + (28_37.7)2 + (43-37.7)2
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i.e. the sum of squares of differences = 393.25.
The best estimate of the standard deviation is given by:
VS ].2 + S22/2(n-1)
where n is the size of the sample. Therefore
1(1488.78 + 393.25)/2(7-1) = 12.52
t _ (difference between sample average) x Vsample size/2best estimate of standard deviation
65.85 - 37.7 xi/ 7 = 4.2t - 12.52
The tabular value of t with 12 degrees of freedom is 2.681 with 1%
significance level. We are therefore justified in saying that there is
a significant difference between the groups.
An alternative approach is to use the Wilcoxon (rank sum) test. The
Wilcoxon test, starts by putting all the results in rank order, lowest
first.
28 29 31 41 43 45 47 50 50 62 62 69 72 96
AAAAAAABBBBBBB
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
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The sum of the A rankings is:
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = 28
The sum of the B rankings is:
8 + 9 + 10 + 11 + 12 + 13 + 14 = 67
We test to see whether this difference is too great. The table shows
that with 7 in each sample the tabular value is 39 [see page 130 (4)].
Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5% level of
significance.
E.7 TEST ON RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Z-SCORE AND A-SCORE
In order to test the relationship between the Z-score and A-score, the
correlation test is employed.
The 'Z' and 'Ai' values for the "At risk 7" and "Solvent 7" groups are
shown in Table and their average Z- and A-values are 1.92 and 51.75
respectively.
The standard deviation of Z- and A-scores is calculated as follows:
Sz = I "Z:2)2 - 14
n-1
SA 
= 1 E(A4)2 - 18.9
n-1
s E(Z-Z)(A-A) - 179.18AZ	 n-1
where n = 14.
375
The correlation coefficient is now given by:
SZA	r -	 179 ' 18  - 67.7%SZ - SA 14 x 18.9
and the equation of the regression line is
A = (::4) (Z-Z) +
A = 179 (z - 1.92) + 51.75196
A = 0.9Z - 1.75 + 51.75
A = 0.9Z + 50
where Z = 0, A = 50.
Clearly, the value of r = 0.677 which indicates that a real
correlation exists, but is not strong enough, as usually a correlation
coefficient of more than 0.7 indicates a strong relationship.
liowever,the Z-score value of zero corresponded to an A-score cut-off
value of 50, these being critical values in both models.
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A (A-A) (Z-Z) (A-7k?
_2
(Z-Z) (A-A)(Z-Z)
-8.1 62 10.3 -10.02 106 100 -105
-6.5 72 20.3 -8.42 412 70.9 -170.9
-4.47 96 44.3 -6.39 1962 40.8 -283
-8.23 50 -1.7 -10.17 2.89 103.4 +17.3
-26.3 69 17.3 -28.22 299 796.3 -488
-6.5 50 -1.7 -8.42 2.89 70.7 +14.3
-11.7 62 10.3 -13.67 106 186.8 -140.8
16.15 31 -20.7 +14.23 429 202.5 -294.5
14.0 43 -8.7 12.08 75.7 145.9 -105
7.6 41 -10.7 5.68 114.5 32.2 -60.7
10.5 29 -22.7 8.58 515.3 73.6 -194.7
23.2 47 -4.7 21.28 22 452.83 -100
10.0 45 -6.7 8.08 44.9 65.2 -54
17.3 28 -23.7 15.38 561.7 236.5 -364.5
26.88 725 4654 2577 -2329.4
Z = 1.92, A = 51.75
TABLE E.5
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